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ABSTRACT
CONTENT AND CONTEXT:
THREE ESSAYS ON INFORMATION IN POLITICS
Ian Palmer Cook, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2016
This dissertation explores the implications of information asymmetries in three specific
political environments: primary campaign speeches; negotiating behavior; and testimony
delivered in a congressional hearing. First, dog whistling can dramatically affect the
outcome of elections, despite observers never being sure it actually occurred. I build
a model that addresses how a whistle operates, and explore implications on candidate
competition. I find that whistling lets candidates distinguish themselves from competitors
in the minds of voters. Second, political negotiation frequently looks like two sides staring
each other down, where neither side wishes to concede, claiming that doing so would incur
the wrath of voters. Little theory or evidence exists to explain how voters allocate blame
for different outcomes. We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate how anticipation
of blame drives negotiating behavior, and how observers allocate blame. We find that
the presence of an observer has little effect on standoff outcomes but appears to shorten
the duration of standoffs. Third, while congressional hearings give legislators a national
stage on which to score political points by publicly chastising high-level bureaucrats, and
gives lobbyists a forum to demonstrate their access and importance to policymakers, less
clear is how well hearings serve the purposes of oversight. I address this question through
automated text analysis of hearings in the 105th − 112th Congresses. I show that the
oversight function of hearings is only effective when it is least likely to be used: when the
congressional committee and the bureaucrat agree on policy.
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PREFACE
Number Six: Where am I?
Number Two: In the Village.
Number Six: What do you want?
Number Two: Information.
Number Six: Whose side are you on?
Number Two: That would be telling. We want
information... information... information.
Number Six: You won’t get it.
Number Two: By hook or by crook, we will.
The Prisoner
xii
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Information is a protean concept in political science research. Depending on the purpose,
it can be made more or less explicit, contrasting it sharply with traditional entities such
as floor votes, regulatory actions, survey answers, campaign contributions, budgetary
allocations, committee assignments, or Supreme Court rulings. Information is a broad
term, more akin to concepts that require the “political” modifier to first winnow the
options: ideology, will, violence. Indeed, one portion of the rational choice tradition
does not require any more definition than to simply state some information exists, one
or both sides may know it (and perhaps know the other knows it...), then concerns
itself with the impact of differing levels of information – anywhere on the spectrum from
complete to incomplete – on the strategic choices actors make in a vast array of situations
(Calvert 2013; Gates and Humes 1997). Information, in that work, is an abstraction,
and often operates on an epistemological level where actors have beliefs about their own
and others’ knowledge independent of whatever they are supposed to have knowledge of.
However, while each essay in this dissertation draws directly from this rational choice
perspective, explicitly using the insights from formal models to gain insights about politics,
I choose to be far less abstract. I make the subject of concern very clear in each case:
campaign messages and coded language; testimony delivered in a congressional hearing;
and negotiating behavior in a costly waiting game. As a result, I trade generalization of
information for applicability to specific political environments.
My work continues a long history of work positing information as a tangible good
to explore. The part of the vast literature most relevant to my work includes studies of
voter knowledge, and the information asymmetries that exist between principal and agent.
Voters have long been assessed, queried, and tested about how well they can identify
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political actors, events, or materials (the content of propositions, bills, trade agreements,
etc.) (L. M. Bartels 1986; Campbell 1964; Campbell et al. 1960; Lewis-Beck, Jacoby,
et al. 2008; Lupia, Mathew D McCubbins, and S. Popkin 2000; Lupia and Mathew Daniel
McCubbins 1998). Perhaps unsurprisingly, they frequently fail to measure up to an ideal,
be it one of rationality or normative desirability (L. Bartels 1996; Carmines et al. 1980;
Erikson and Wright 1993; Kuklinski and Quirk 1998; Lau 1997). Similarly, information on
policy choices in government agencies is at the heart of literature on delegation from the
legislature to the bureaucracy. Foundational work on delegation take a very general view
of information, considering broadly some principal who must decide whether to take an
action herself or delegate the action to an agent who is better informed about the relevant
topic (Bendor and Meirowitz 2004; Holmstrom 1984; Huber and Shipan 2002; Vickers
1985). Here, too, there is extensive work that considers more tactile forms of information.
Scholars have examined both the sources (Carpenter, Esterling, and Lazer 2004; Esterling
2004) and subjects (Carpenter 2010; Olson 1999; K. T. Poole and Rosenthal 1994; Splawn
1939) of information used in decision making, but rarely address the specific form it
takes. Part of the contribution of this dissertation is examining the particular content of
messages between actors and showing how it contributes to achieving political ends.
My first essay, “Dog Whistling” addresses the use of coded language in campaign
speeches. I ask whether messages that can be heard in different ways by different members
of the same audience allow candidates to capture vote share by signaling two possible
types. The title of the essay takes its name from the common term from this practice,
often described as a tool for delivering information to a subset of voters that would
upset the rest, if only that group had heard the whistle. The presence of these coded
messages privileges one group over another, possibly without the difference being known.
This undermines the ability of voters to develop accurate information about politicians,
and thus represents a threat to basic representative democracy. The traditional media
depiction of dog whistling paints the user as a biased villain (racist, sexist, homophobic),
appealing to the worse natures of intolerant voters Haney-Lo´pez 2014. I develop a formal
model to explore when candidates might engage in coded speech, generalizing away from
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the particular moral content, focusing instead on shared group affiliations between the
politician and the voters.
The model addresses the motives of two candidates campaigning during a primary
election, confronting audiences who may or may not share some group affiliation with
the candidate. There are two notable aspects of the model that serve as contributions
independent of the model’s results. First, I allow the two groups in the audience to differ
in their ability to hear the coded message, making it a function of their group identity.
This introduces behavioral differences in the model that stem from political psychology,
a still uncommon feature of formal modeling in political science. Second, I develop a
probabilistic model of message reception that makes the individual differences in hearing
a dog whistle a strategic tool for candidates to exploit. Dog whistles allow politicians to
split voters such that a single audience may hold disparate, but well-founded (given the
message they hear), beliefs. The model, then, represents a useful integration of two fields
in political science that should operate together more often than they do.
The results from my model undermine the traditional view of dog whistling. Coded
speech is not solely the tactic of a crypto-aggressor towards marginal groups attempting to
reveal a true, nefarious agenda. Put succinctly, dog whistles introduce an uncertainty in
the mind of a voter about the true identify of the candidates. This uncertainty can sway
some voters – who need not share the candidate’s group affiliation – to cast their lot for
the whistling candidate because even a slim possibility of electing the more-preferred kind
of candidate is better than definitely electing the less preferred. Moreover, the strategic
benefits of using coded speech often inspire its use by both candidates in an attempt to
mitigate competitor advantages. That is, given the opportunity, candidates may whistle
regardless of their true group identity, making it even harder for voters – and the media –
to correctly identify the candidate’s true intentions.
My second essay, “Time and Punishment: Blame and Concession in Political Standoffs,”
is joint work with Jonathan Woon, and addresses the interaction between representative
behavior in negotiations and voter assessment of performance. Political negotiation
frequently looks like two sides staring each other down, waiting for the other to blink.
In these showdowns, neither side wishes to concede, claiming that doing so would incur
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the wrath of voters. Whether this consideration of potential punishment influences
behavior during stalemates is not well understood, and little theory or evidence exists to
explain how voters allocate blame for different outcomes. Taken together, we investigate
two interrelated questions: how does anticipation of blame drive behavior, and how do
observers with a stake in the outcome allocate blame? Answering the first question sheds
light on how politicians internalize, and act on, information about their constituents’
preferences. Answering the second question provides insight into how voters with the same
information differ on how to apply it to condition the behavior of their representatives.
We conduct a laboratory experiment that implements a dynamic war of attrition model
for negotiation situations. In the experiment, concession time is the key choice variable for
the negotiators. Our design compares versions of the game with and without an observer
(whose payoffs depend on the outcome and who can punish the players). Without an
observer the game is a baseline measure of individual risk assessments about holding
out for the higher payoff. Adding the observer captures the salient parts of negotiations
that appear to be a growing feature of U.S. politics: standoffs between the two political
parties over legislation, with the continued funding of the government hanging in the
balance. The two sides appear to have incentives to out-wait the other, increasing the
possibility of total collapse of negotiations, but have to consider the real chance of costly
punishment if that happens. Our expectations for behavior during this game are based
on a simple model that extends the literature on blame by making the mechanism explicit
and the level of blame endogenous. The use of a laboratory experiment lets us control
the conditions to isolate the particular incentives we wish to test, such as the level of
affiliation between one negotiator and the observer (in terms of payoffs from the game).
We find that the presence of an observer has little effect on standoff outcomes but
appears to shorten the duration of standoffs. We also find that observers tend to punish
the winning player, which is qualitatively consistent with a rational or instrumental form
of punishment, but the amount of punishment is less than optimal. Negotiators, like
politicians, may not adequately anticipate when, or how much, they will be blamed,
preventing them from altering their choices and achieving better outcomes.
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The third essay, “Information Transmission in Congressional Hearings” returns to
theoretical examination of single messages, but empirically implements the theory in
assessing a large set of interactions during U.S. Congressional hearings. Using the Crawford
and Sobel (1982) model as inspiration, I explore the informativeness of a bureaucratic
agent’s message as a function of the committee chair receiving it.
Congress’ ability to extract information from the bureaucracy is central to performing
its oversight function. Hearings give legislators a national stage on which to score political
points by publicly chastising high-level bureaucrats, and gives lobbyists a forum to demon-
strate their access and importance to policymakers. But how well they serve their nominal
function, enabling oversight by revealing useful policy information, remains in doubt. I
address this question by directly examining the content of hearings from the 105th− 112th
Congresses. Through automated text analysis methods, I measure the language specificity
of the actors in the hearing in order to quantify the transmission of information between
legislators and agency witnesses. This process marks two contributions. First, this method
dramatically enhances the size of the corpus of documents on which to base assessments of
hearings. Indeed, this process can be used to quantify crucial information in any large set
of texts pertinent to important research questions. Second, as of this writing I believe this
is the first direct measurement of the central quantity in the Crawford and Sobel (1982)
model, which has informed a great portion of work on signaling in political science since
its publication. The value of a theory does not lie solely in testing it against empirical
reality, but basic empirical work on a rigorous theoretical model can dramatically improve
interpretation of the results. This method, then, provides a bridge between theory and
empirics for a wide range of important questions.
The empirical work in the third essay is a an empirical model of hearings; the results
indicate confirm my (and the theorists’) expectations, showing that increasing ideological
distance between congressional committee chairs and executive branch witnesses decreases
the amount of information revealed. The oversight function of hearings is thus only effective
when it is least likely to be used: when the congressional committee and the bureaucrat
(as representative of the president) agree on policy. In addition to providing insight into
a longstanding question about whether hearings serve as effective oversight, this paper
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demonstrates the value of a new, but widely applicable technique for quantifying the
informativeness of communication, a central concept in the study of political information
and knowledge.
The sharing of information impacts representation, accountability, oversight, and more.
Voters that cannot even identify when a candidate is delivering certain messages cannot
adequately hold them accountable during an election. On the other hand, a voter rendering
judgment of a result she is only partially qualified to evaluate may force delegation-style
representation that prevents compromise and policy improvement. Political control is
called into question if Congress cannot evaluate the information it receives from the
bureaucracy. The essays in this dissertation attempt to expand our understanding of the
competing issues that arise in how information is shared among actors.
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2.0 DOG WHISTLING
For of the three elements in speech-making — speaker,
subject, and person addressed — it is the last one, the
hearer, that determines the speech’s end and object.
Rhetoric, Book I
Aristotle
Senator Claire McCaskill (D-MO) credits the use of dog whistling with her successful
reelection in 2012. During Missouri’s Republican primary for the Senate her team
manipulated voter behavior by running advertising that, she suggests, convinced a portion
of voters that Todd Akin was their kind of conservative:
“Using the guidance of my campaign staff and consultants, we came up with the idea
for a “dog whistle” ad, a message that was pitched in such a way that it would be heard
only by a certain group of people. [. . . ] And we needed to run the hell out of that ad.”1
McCaskill chose language to run in a single television advertisement that simultaneously
motivated extreme Republicans to support Akin, while cautioning moderate voters against
him. Of course, the McCaskill ad was observable by any viewer; the important facet is
the intent to communicate a particular message to one audience subset that bypasses
the complementary set. This changed the competitive landscape, she argues, by shifting
voter support away from more moderate, and thus harder to beat, Republican challengers.
McCaskill went on to decisively win her re-election bid. This raises questions about
the mechanism that allows multiple voters to have different interpretations of the same
message, and whether that mechanism can actually produce the shift in voting behavior
McCaskill attributes to it. In this paper, I develop a signaling game played among
1Senator Claire McCaskill, “How I Helped Todd Akin Win — So I Could Beat Him Later.” Politico
Magazine, 11 August, 2015
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candidates and voters that includes just such a mechanism, and demonstrate that yes,
this purposeful manipulation of voter information can alter a candidate’s support.
Dog whistling is frequently an epithet, used by media commentators to suggest
politicians are attempting to hide their true, and, according to the commentator, distasteful
views. If all the claims about whistles and the whistlers were true, the list of offenders
would be long, notable, and multinational.2 Prominent members of both U.S. political
parties – Ronald Regan,3 Newt Gingrich,4 George W. Bush (Grossman and Matthews
2009, p. 39), both Bill5 and Hillary Clinton (Haney-Lo´pez 2014, p. 111) – willfully
exacerbated economic inequality through the use of racially-based dog whistling. Current
President Barack Obama revealed his antisemitism during his push to gather support for
an agreement with Iran.6 Member of the British Parliament and Labour Party leader
Ed Miliband sent a dog whistle to opposition loyalists that his normally stout support
of labor-union relations had softened.7 Current U.K Prime Minister David Cameron
revealed his xenophobia by whistling his intention to limit immigration, a particularly
divisive topic in British politics during the recent economic recession.8 And in one of
the more chilling cases, a major telecommunications company in Egypt signaled tactical
instructions for a terrorist attack to the Muslim Brotherhood.9 Of course, whether their
authors intended these messages to carry the secondary connotations is, and will remain,
unknown. To address the phenomenon, I set aside any normative debate about the choice
to use a dog whistle, and focus instead on identify a general mechanism for the whistle in
any context, and how effective it might be.
2Indeed, the phrase “dog whistling” most likely originated in Australia, and was prominent in the
United Kingdom before entering into common usage in the United States
3Joseph Crespino, “Did David Brooks Tell the Full Story About Reagan’s Neshoba County Fair Visit?,”
History News Network 11 December, 2007.
4Gwen Ifill, “Dog Whistle Politics: You Talking to Me?,” PBS Newshour , 20 May, 2011
5Nancy LeTourneau, “Democrats and Dog Whistles,” Washington Monthly’s Political Animal, 9 April,
2015.
6Lowi Lorenthal Marcus, “Obama ’Dog Whistles’ Netanyahu (and Insults Congress, too),” The Jewish
Press, 20 January, 2015.
7Patrick Wintour, “Ed Miliband’s reform plans rejected as ’dog whistle’ politics by union leader,” The
Guardian, 9 July, 2013.
8Daniel Knowles, “David Cameron’s dog-whistle politics on immigration,” The Telegraph, 10 October,
2011.
9Associated Press, “Egypt: Puppet Ad Draws Terror Accusations,” The New York Times, 1 January,
2014.
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Investigating the use and impact of dog whistling – or, “coded speech” more generally
– is important because voter behavior is sensitive to messaging from politicians and their
communications staff. Presidential pleas can engender public support for initiatives
(Vavreck 2009), while small changes to word choice can invert a person’s policy views
(Hurwitz and Peffley 2005; Nelson 1999). Certainly, while any word may carry multiple
meanings, some are imbued with distinct connotations that are more politically salient
than their primary definitions. Some exert only indirect influence, which, I argue, makes
them more powerful in certain circumstances than the direct phrasing in framing studies
(Kahneman and Tversky 2000; Monroe, Colaresi, and Quinn 2009; Sniderman and
Theriault 2004). Their importance, in fact, arises precisely because of this obliqueness,
since it drives a wedge between voters’ beliefs and a candidate’s true intentions for
governing (Goodin and Saward 2005).
This paper makes several contributions, both substantive and methodological. First, I
consider dog whistles as a general phenomenon, independent of any specific political issue.
Other studies have considered only a single topic at a time, such as religion (Albertson
2014) and race (Haney-Lo´pez 2014). Second, I make message content a function of the
voter’s characteristics, explicitly connecting our understanding of political identity with
formal models of information transmission. Finally, I show that the common wisdom
about dog whistling is incorrect. The results of the analysis demonstrate that the value
of whistling stems from inducing uncertainty in all potential voters, rather than, as the
media suggests, acting as a klaxon for a select few while going unheard by the rest.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: First I define dog whistling and distinguish
it from other forms of frequently studied forms of political communication. Next I discuss
how the whistle impacts voter information gathering, and what this implies for voter
behavior. I then describe and analyze one- and two-dimensional versions of the dog
whistling model. The paper ends with a discussion of what I contribute to understanding
the dog whistling phenomenon.
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2.1 “YOU KNOW HOW TO WHISTLE, DON’T YOU?”
Dog whistling can be concisely defined as a single piece of communication that has at least
two distinct meanings, delivered by a speaker with the intent that only a subset of the
audience will hear the second meaning (Albertson 2014; Fear 2007). While I structure the
model as a single speech, television ads, posters, even mailed postcards are all included
within this definition.
A simple example helps to fix the concept. Ronald Reagan gave his 1979 post-
nomination speech in the same Mississippi county where three civil rights activists were
murdered 16 years earlier. During the speech, Reagan used the phrase “state’s rights,”
the specific meaning of which is still debated (Smith 2013). Whether a standard trope
among conservative politicians, or coded language to indicate Reagan would not interfere
in race-based policy making, the effect of the phrase was important and observable. Soon
after the speech, Reagan received — then publicly disowned — an endorsement from
the far-right, white-supremacist, Ku Klux Klan. In the end, Reagan got to have it both
ways: he received the group’s support and plausibly denied that he courted them directly
(Cannon 2005).
I use an electoral primary as the setting for my model of political speech in order
to capture a richer strategic setting. Here, two candidates vie for votes by sending
two-dimensional messages about their types. A “whistling function” divides what voters
hear such that voters hear only one message or the other. Casting votes in the presence
of a dog whistling strategy reflects voters knowing, perhaps via the news, that while a
candidate may have sent a dog whistle, this is equivalent to seeing a candidate make the
same statement with complete sincerity. Voters choose a candidate based on their beliefs
about the messages, which are, according to the model, manipulable through the use or
absence of a dog whistle. Several key features of the model require explanation.
First, what allows a speaker to whistle at all? Some portion of an audience must share
an interpretation of images, words, or phrases of which a speaker is aware and able to use.
Where code-breaking requires a key to find hidden messages inside plain text, hearing
a (political) dog whistle uses shared understanding to uncover the secondary meaning.
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Shared understanding derives from shared cultural identity which produces (and, to some
extent, is defined by) norms of behavior and language (Geertz 1973; Hechter and Opp
2001). Social norms, in other words, generate correlated interpretations among group
members. I break the candidates and voters in two, identifying them as either “in-group”
or “out-group,” leaving the exact group identity abstract.10 As a brief example, consider
that Bush’s 2003 State of the Union address featured the phrase “wonder-working power,”
an encomium to American voluntarism (Bush 2003). The term references - but does not
cite - a phrase found in the Christian hymn “There is Power in the Blood” (Howard
1994). Those in the audience who sung the hymn in church would know the phrase
and its origin, while others would fail to recognize the allusion. This kind of common
inferring of information is a sort of focal point, where each person has an expectation
of what other group members expect the rest of the group to believe (Schelling 1960).
Differences between groups — or “in-group” versus “out-group” as in the following model
— imply different focal points. For modeling purposes, I assign each group a single, and
different, probability of hearing a speaker’s whistle. The probability value serves as a loose
formalization of focal points, indicating that members of the same group share cultural
knowledge allowing them to “coordinate” on a single interpretation.11 Differences in the
two probabilities reflect the difference in cultural norms between the groups.
I include multiple receivers in my models, as I am motivated by the primary election
setting. To study the effects of a coded message intended for a subset of the audience, the
audience must contain more than one person, each with a distinct likelihood of hearing one
or the other meanings. Moreover, whistling’s effect need not be outright electoral victory
for it to be politically important. My interest is to closely tie the action of coded speech
to the result of garnering a voter’s support following a speech. Beyond the one contest,
a candidate may seek to increase her vote share even if she has little chance of winning
10Albertson (2014) uses this in/out distinction to inform an empirical test of the use of religious code
words.
11For more developed treatments of focal points in games, see R Sugden (1995) and Mehta, Starmer,
and Robert Sugden (1994). I am less concerned than these authors with specific mechanisms for focal
points in a game, though I do address a difference between “cheap talk and convention” raised in Farrell
and Rabin (1996). Convention arising from group identity can be triggered in speeches, allowing for
coordination on a choice. While I do not use a cheap-talk structure, no aspect of the probability-based
focal points relies on costs.
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the primary. A good showing in an election, even without winning, may increase the
candidate’s stance within a party. During the 2008 U.S. presidential primary, a number
of Republican candidates, each with very small chances of garnering the nomination of
the party, appeared to use dog whistles aggressively (Desmarais 2012).
When I include a second dimension in the subsequent model, candidates and voters
are endowed with a political ideology. In this case, however, the ideology only ranges
from moderate to extreme. This restriction both reflects a substantive condition and
simplifies the analysis. Targets of whistling are correlated with ideology; conservatives
do not whistle to labor unions, and liberals do not whistle to religious fundamentalists.
The coded appeal reaches out to possibly skeptical portions of the politician’s natural
constituency (Albertson 2014), attempting to convey solidarity without giving away too
much to the larger group. Restricting the ideological spectrum removes considerations of
conservative speakers attempting to sway liberal sub-populations, and vice versa. The
practical effect is to place candidates in competition against opponents on the same side
of the political divide.
Primary elections are a natural setting for modeling contests between candidates of
similar ideology. Politicians of similar bent will search for ways to differentiate themselves
from their competitors. Using coded speech could achieve this differentiation by allowing
some voters to believe the candidate is of a certain type, revealed (possibly) via dog
whistle. Candidates and voters are members of two groups, each with binary indicators:
moderate or extremist, in-group or out-group. To keep analysis as general as possible,
I make no assumptions about the distribution of these types for the voters. There are
different underlying probabilities that candidates will be of one ideology or the other,
and either in- or out-group. The dichotomous structure emphasizes in-group/out-group
distinctions (Winter 2006): one is either a populist or not, is Methodist or not, is in the
Tea Party or not.
Dog whistling is not always cheap talk; both whistles and outright misrepresentations
can be costly choices. My first, one-dimensional model imposes no costs, while my
two-dimensional model incorporates penalties for both dog whistling and outright lying.
These costs arise at least two possible ways: reputational losses from being accused of not
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speaking truthfully, or from a personal aversion to misrepresentation of any form. In the
first case, consider that the media rarely lets a potential dog whistle go unremarked, despite
their inability to make dispositive claims about their existence. Alerting voters to their
existence, however, incurs a reputational cost to the candidate.12 This media focus also
appears in claims of “pandering”, where a politician is chastised for making perfunctory
remarks about particular group, or making insincere – in the commentator’s estimation –
appearances at events held by a group. Think of Republican candidates giving talks for
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), or Democrats
addressing police violence towards minority groups. Like dog whistling, we cannot know
the sincerity of the candidate, leaving the act open to audience interpretation. One
important distinction, however, is that the media’s usage is not the pandering addressed
by Canes-Wrone, Herron, and Shotts (2001). There, pandering is specifically defined
as politicians acting in what the public believes to be their best interest, but may not
actually be. In whistling, and indeed in the less-defined but media-preferred version of
pandering, voters cannot ever know the politician’s true information. Thus, dog whistles
are distinct from both forms of pandering. In terms of the second, psychic, form of
cost, note that people are often averse to misrepresenting their true selves. Substantive
motivation for lying aversion deviates from the common view of candidates being solely
focused on achieving office (Mayhew 1974), but is consistent with recent literature that
suggests individuals may have an innate aversion to lying (Gneezy 2005; Hurkens and
Kartik 2008; Sa´nchez-Page´s and Vorsatz 2007). Indeed, such work has been put to use in
formal models of political communication and as motivation for laboratory experiments
(Kartik 2009; Lightle 2013; Lo´pez-Pe´rez and Spiegelman 2012; Minozzi and Woon 2013).
Dog whistling is distinct from framing, though the result of framing and the effects
of using whistles are comparable. Differences in question wording and presentation —
framing the issue — produce varying, even contrary, views on a single topic from the
same person (Chong and James N. Druckman 2007). Political candidates are particularly
12Effort required to identify and use an appropriate whistle for a particular audience or topic is another
interpretation of costly messages. Political speeches are products of numerous hours of work by multiple
parties; a whistle arising entirely unintentionally is unlikely. Of course, plain political speech is similarly
costly, though it is often treated — usefully — as costless.
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advantaged in using framing effects because of the credibility sometimes conveyed just by
dint of being a candidate (James N Druckman 2001a). And framing can guide question
responses through choosing how to present information in a light that favors a particular
outcome (Cobb and Kuklinski 1997; Kuklinski and Quirk 1998; O’Keefe and Atwood
1981; S. L. Popkin 1991). Campaign advertising makes extensive use of this advantage.
For instance, using an African-American convict’s face in 1988 presidential campaign ads
could, as Hurwitz and Peffley (2005) argued, have been an attempt to communicate not
only a policy message, but also to incite racial tensions. Indeed, race-based intentions in
coded speech have received considerable attention. Appeals that make racial divisions
salient, first through implicit and then explicit language, are known to be critical to
choosing a candidate (T. B. Edsall, M. D. Edsall, and D. 1991; Mendelberg 2001; Valentino,
Hutchings, and I. K. White 2002). Framing may also be used in competitive fashion,
with counter-frames created to shift perspectives from one frame to another (Chong and
James N Druckman 2013). Whistles, by comparison, lack the pre-emptive nature of
frames, since the whistle has divergent effects on the same population. While a frame may
have differing resonance, it cannot separate audiences based on its content, producing
differing understandings of the same message. Moreover, the whistle carries both the
manipulation and the content, whereas a frame alters interpretation of a subsequent
message.
2.2 VOTER INFORMATION AND WHISTLING
Voter preferences are heavily dependent on the information they obtain (James N Druck-
man 2001b), information that can easily be manipulated by careful construction of the
transmitting message. To quote Edelman (1985, p. 11):
In short, it is not “reality” in any testable or observable sense that matters in shaping
political consciousness and behavior, but rather the beliefs that language helps evoke
about the causes of discontents and satisfactions, about policies that will bring about a
future closer to the heart’s desire, and about other unobservables.
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Whether that language is delivered directly by a politician or filtered through the media,
it is controlled by both the subject and the source of voter interest (Zaller 1992). The
way a candidate speaks thus shapes what people learn about current economic conditions,
candidate positions, policy debates, and more (Gilens, Vavreck, and M. Cohen 2007;
S. L. Popkin 1991). Carefully chosen coded language alters beliefs citizens have about
distributional consequences of policy Nelson and Kinder (1996), and can even reverse
prior support for various policies based on the how the race of beneficiaries is presented
(Hurwitz and Peffley 2005). Even the course of a campaign can be influenced by the
process of voters seeking, finding, and evaluating new information, resulting in a “discover,
scrutinize, decline” cycle of popular support for candidates (Sides and Vavreck 2014).
I build on these insights, but depart by relaxing the assumption that everyone in the
audience heard exactly the same content in that language. Using a dog whistle violates
this assumption, and makes it possible for two audience members to hear the same speech,
yet depart with two distinct beliefs about the substance of what was said. Politicians
can, and if the accusations are correct they frequently do, confound voters attempting to
develop knowledge and preferences, calling into question the validity of elections (Goodin
and Saward 2005).
Politicians chase partisan ends through rhetorical means, including careful considera-
tion of message content. Riker famously defined heresthetics as concerning “the strategy
value of sentences,” noting that it “involves the use of language to accomplish some
purpose” (Riker 1986, p. x). In assessing their persuasive ability, presidents are hailed for
their rhetorical brilliance, or lack thereof (J. E. Cohen 1995). Presidents have a powerful
tool in “going public” to deliver the specifics of policy positions, attempting to use their
pulpit to shift public opinion and pressure Congress into action, though notably only when
public and executive views already align (Canes-Wrone 2010). Related to dog whistling,
political pandering — where the speaker parrots back what they believe the public wants
to hear — is a useful tool to improve reelection chances(Canes-Wrone, Herron, and Shotts
2001; Fox and Shotts 2009). My contribution to this work is to make the selection of
rhetorical content strategic, and conditional on voters’ social characteristics.
15
Work on candidate ambiguity is a natural comparison to this study, since I embrace
the notion that politicians have rational reasons to shade their true ideological or policy
preferences (Alesina and Cukierman 1990; Glazer 1990; Page 1976; Shepsle 1972). This
prior work shows that candidate evasiveness, and voters being less than perfectly informed,
does not necessarily result in hollow elections (Chappell 1994). That said, facing less risky
choices over candidates is generally preferred by voters, all else equal, while the candidates
always have an incentive to make fuzzy statements (Page 1976). In game-theoretic terms,
vagueness is often represented by allowing messages to represent more than one distinct
state of the world. Blume and Board (2009) directly confront imprecise language by
examining how a sender’s single message can result in two receivers having two different
interpretations. However, as the authors note, this “measure of vagueness operates in
the message space as opposed to the type space” (p.4). My formulation operates in
the type space: the speaker is fully informed about her own type, and sends a single,
distinct message chosen specifically to trigger a (known) chance of a carefully chosen
alternative interpretation that is a function of receiver types. Further, a coded message is
not analogous to one privately sent (an option in Farrell, Gibbons, et al. (1989)), since
the purpose of the code is to (potentially) prevent one group from identifying its true
content.
Finally, mendacity has a long political tradition, with both clearly deleterious effects
and even some potential upsides (Jay 2010). Audiences mis-apprehending a message’s
content, whether the plain or coded, cannot be the sole fault of the speaker. In a lie,
however, a message has been chosen in such a way that the sole content is actually the
opposite of the underlying truth. Receiving the lie occurs without regard to the audience’s
traits. In my model, audience traits explicitly contribute to the message they receive,
making them a more active part of the process. Formal exploration of lies in politics
note their potential value. Recent work (Callander 2007; Sobel 2007) addresses the use
of lies by political candidates during campaigns, finding that candidates with a higher
willingness to lie may actually be preferred during an election. Dog whistles differ from
these lies, however, in that a lie does not contain the information being both obscured
and transmitted.
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2.3 MODELS AND RESULTS
The results of the forgoing discussion is distilled into the following two games between
political candidates and an audience of voters.13 All the actors in the first model have
types in a single, group-membership dimension, and play a cheap-talk signaling game. The
second model adds a second, ideological dimension and imposes costs for some messaging
choices in the game. Keeping the first model simple and costless emphasizes the effect
dog whistling has on voters. The second model develops a richer messaging environment
for candidate competition, allowing communication in two dimensions, and making some
of those messages costly.
2.3.1 One Dimensional Model
The first model of dog whistling restricts the actors to just two types in one dimension,
in order to focus on the function of the dog whistle. The game is played between two
senders – political candidates competing for votes – and a population of receivers – voters
in an audience. Only one candidate is a strategic actor, though the second candidate’s
type is relevant for the audience’s decisions. I denote the two candidates, Ci ∈ {1, 2}.
Candidate i’s type is γi ∈ {O, I}. C1’s type is private information, while C ′2s type is
common knowledge. In this structure, C1 can be thought of as a challenger attempting to
sway voters away from the known incumbent, C2. The types identify group membership,
with O denoting the candidate is “out-group,” and I denoting “in-group”. Candidates
are out-group with Pr(γ = O) = g for g ∈ (0, 1),14 and in-group with the complementary
probability.
Similarly, the two types of voters are identified by their group membership, denoted
β ∈ {I, O}, matching the type space for candidates. Rather than identify probabilities of
each voter being of a certain type, denote the size of each group by vβ, where ∀β, vβ ≥ 0
and
∑
vβ = 1.
13For this paper, candidates are identified as female, while voters are identified as male.
14I exclude the limits of this range to avoid edge cases that do not affect the analysis. If group identity
is known perfectly, g = 0 or g = 1, voter choices are effectively independent of C1’s message.
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The play of the game is as follows. Nature chooses each candidate’s type. The first
candidate’s type is private information, while the second candidate — the incumbent
— is a type known to all players in the game. Candidate 1 chooses a message: sx for
x ∈ {i, o, w}. This introduces the form and effect of the dog whistle. Candidate 1 may
choose to send sw, indicating she sends a coded message. When this occurs, Nature
chooses what voters hear from Candidate 1: h ∈ {i, o}, which depends on both the
candidate’s message and the voter’s type. Voters hear a message about the candidate’s
group membership according to the whistling probability function:
Pr(hi | β) =
 p if β = Iq if β = O (2.1)
This notation is worth emphasizing Beginning with this function, I introduce a difference
between what a candidate says, denoted sx,y, and what the voter hears, denoted hx,y. This
reinforces the idea that the message spoken by a candidate is, in terms of informational
content, different from what the voter may perceive.
Substantively, this function operationalizes Aristotle’s insight: the hearer’s type
determines the final form of the message. Group membership, in this process, significantly
impacts the beliefs voters form. For the duration of this paper, I set p > q by assumption.
This is motivated by the view that in-group members are more likely to recognize words
and phrases as carrying secondary content than are people outside the group.15 If the
candidate does not use a whistle, she may either report her true group membership, or
lie by claiming the opposite of her group membership. In technical terms, nature does
not change either of the other messages, so when candidates send m 6= w, voters hear
h = {i, o} with certainty. To clarify the mapping of candidate messages to what voters
may hear, a likelihood matrix of the various probabilities, given candidate and voter
types, is presented in Table 1. Finally, voters hear the message determined by nature,
then choose for whom to vote in the election.
Candidates’ payoffs are equal to their vote share:
UCγ (vβ) =
∑
v. (2.2)
15For instance, particular religious groups are more likely than others to have recognized President
George W. Bush’s phrase “wonder working power” as a reference to a church hymn Albertson 2014.
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Table 1: Probabilities that Voter Types Hear Possible Message
C1 Message Sent Pr(h | β)
vI vO
hi ho hi ho
si 1 0 1 0
so 0 1 0 1
sw p 1− p q 1− q
A voter receives positive utility by voting for the candidate that matches his type.
That makes this model one of vote-maximization for the candidate, not one of electoral
victory. Candidates seek any increase in vote share, even if it does not produce an electoral
victory. Similarly, voters gain utility from voting for the “correct” candidate even if the
candidate does not gain a majority of votes. Voter utility is given by:
Uvβ(Cγ) =
 0 if Cγ = vβ−1 if Cγ 6= vβ (2.3)
Finally, strategies for each player are specified. For Candidate 1, strategies are mappings
from types to messages: σ(C1γ ) : {I, O} → {i, o, w}. For voters, strategies are mappings
from what they hear to candidates σ(vβ) : {i, o} → {1, 2}. Note that voter strategies
explicitly consider only what is heard, not the message the speaker sent. To reinforce this
difference, m = x is used when describing C1’s choices and utility, while h = x is used
when describing the voters’ choices and utility. In the event that a candidate chooses to
use a dog whistle, the voter only hears (and thus updates his beliefs on) an indication
of group membership. Since voters never directly hear h = w, highlighting the voter’s
ignorance about whether the message chosen by the candidate was a dog whistle or not.
The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian.
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2.3.2 One-Dimensional Model Results
The general finding from the model is that at least one candidate will opt to either claim
group membership that differs from the truth, or will use a dog whistle. The strategic
incentives ensure a campaign marked by dissembling and dishonesty. The first piece of
this result is the lack of any situation where the candidates speak clearly and honestly to
all voters.
Proposition 1. Regardless of the distribution of voter types, no equilibria exist where
both types of C1γ adopt a strategy of always sending signals that match their true group
type: sγ.
I include full proofs in the appendix, but will introduce the basic logic to explain the
result. Given a strategy of full separation, voters believe any messages they hear. Thus
the evaluation of candidate choice is based entirely on matching group identity, which
yields the highest utility. If they have any uncertainty about candidate group membership,
the voters discount the utility of voting for that candidate. In this case, however, the
voters can do no better than voting for the candidate whose message matches the voter’s
group type. Recall that there are no distributional assumptions on the voter groups; one
group may be the majority, the minority, or in perfect balance. Given voter credulity,
both candidates will claim the majority group-type. This occurs because the minority
voter group will consider both candidates equally (un)appealing, and will choose based on
a coin-flip.16 Both candidates will, when their base is the minority, deviate from telling
the truth to lying. In the knife-edge case of voters being perfectly balanced, both in-group
and out-group types of C1 would choose to use a dog whistle. Indeed, the dog whistle
provides C1 a utility gain over sending a truthful message when the voters are unbalanced,
though not as much as claiming majority-group identity.
16Focusing here, and in the proofs, on a perfectly even chance for choosing one or the other candidate
simplifies the analysis without sacrificing substantive content. Any vector of ways each type of voter
might randomize a choice produces a new set of parameters that support both truth-telling and whistling
equilibria. Crucially, in every set the support remains knife-edged, requiring single values (such as 0.5).
If there is reason to suppose the voter chooses the incumbent with greater likelihood – such as 90%
of the time – the challenger will simply choose to mimic the incumbent’s message, again proving the
Proposition.
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The effect of the dog whistle is to make clear speech unappealing even when speaking
the truth earns the candidate full support from her base. Competition for more votes
makes the whistle useful when the population is balanced, otherwise, given the logic of
cheap talk, mimicking the advantaged C1 type maximizes vote share. Clear speech, as an
equilibrium, cannot occur.
What happens when dog whistling is explicitly part of C1’s strategy? Consider the
situation where, when C1 is a member of the out-group she adopts a dog whistling strategy:
σ(C1γ ) =
 m = w if γ = Om = i if γ = I (2.4)
Whistling introduces uncertainty about candidate types since the message is prob-
abilistic, resulting in equilibria where using the whistle requires very particular voter
beliefs. Denote these beliefs by µβ, β ∈ {O, I}. Voters update with the standard Bayesian
process (where possible), though now a difference arises because of the whistling portion
of the strategy. The likelihood term in the updating equation is neither certainty (as
it would be for a strategy positing a speaker always issuing one message) nor zero (a
it would be in a strategy positing a speaker never issuing a particular message). In the
case of whistling as part of C1’s strategy, the likelihood equals the voter’s group-type’s
probability of hearing a particular message (as defined in Equation (2.1)). Since only
C1O ever sends so, voter uncertainty only occurs when they hear h = i. Out-group voter
beliefs about C1’s potential type, given they hear h = i, become:
µO(C1O | hi) =
Pr(h = i | C1O)Pr(C1O)
Pr(h = i | C1O)Pr(C1O) + Pr(h = i | C1I )Pr(C1I )
=
qg
gq − g + 1
µO(C1I | hi) =
Pr(h = i | C1I )Pr(C1I )
Pr(h = i | C1I )Pr(C1I ) + Pr(hi | C1O)Pr(C1O)
=
1− g
gq + 1− g
(2.5)
The process is, of course, the same for in-group voters and produces analogous terms
for beliefs (see the appendix for details). The practical effect of this change in beliefs is
to shift the choice of some voters, depending on the type of incumbent C2 is known to
be. Out-group voters who are certain of C1’s type when they hear h = i would receive
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UvO = −1 by voting for C1I . Now, the uncertainty means they would expect to receive
µO(C1γ = O | m = i)(UvO(C1O)) + µO(C1I | s = i)(UvO(C1I )) =
gq
gq + 1− g > −1. Voters
choosing between two candidates of the same type are indifferent to the choice, and use
a toss-up rule to decide. By using the dog whistle, C1 has broken the indifference some
voters feel for the two candidates, making the uncertain choice better in expectation than
choosing the known quantity. The dog whistling type of C1 draws votes from C2, but also
loses to C2O those vO voters who hear h = i (for this particular case; more generally it
occurs when hearing a message that differs from their own group type) since they would,
in expectation, incur some negative utility in voting for C1. This is the bases for the
following result:
Proposition 2. There exists an equilibrium where the in-group (out-group) type of
Candidate 1 will use a dog whistle while the in-group (out-group) type speaks clearly if,
and only if, voter beliefs are p = q(1−vI)+2vI−1
vI
(q = p(1−vO)+2vO−1
vO
).
Any other value for p (or q) does not support the equilibrium, and instead results in both
types of C1 preferring to use a dog whistle. The precarious nature of this equilibrium,
resting on knife-edge values for beliefs, is a result of both types of C1 having identical
motivations.
The probabilistic nature of the whistling function is important for the results, but also
substantively contradicts a common argument for why dog whistling occurs: the message
is not perfectly tuned for just one group, and some people outside the target audience
do hear it. This aspect of whistling is often drowned out in a pundit’s claims about the
presence of a specific whistle. Indeed, if candidates could keep a perfect division between
the targets of the whistle and the rest of the audience the ideologically opposed pundits
would never hear the whistle in the first place.
Leakage between groups is an empirical regularity that my model not only allows
for, but makes a specific part of the strategic calculation. A comparison of p and q from
Equation (2.1) shows that as p− q grows, the less the spillover into the out-group matters,
since the number of in-group voters that hear the whistle gets much larger than the
out-group that do. The decision to use a whistle, whether as part of the stated strategy
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or as an option for deviation, requires the candidate to weigh these proportions of voters.
Substantively, an increasing divide between p and q reflects a greater cultural division
between the in- and out-group; the language the in-group uses is increasingly opaque to
the out-group. President Obama’s use of the terms “bamboozled,” “hoodwinked,” and
“okey-doke” were criticized as dog whistles, but ones that were especially hard for white
citizens to understand since they (may have) come from speeches attributed to Malcolm
X and Jesse Jackson.17 While the names of these public activists are well-known, the
nuances of their speech are grasped far more by African-Americans than others. This
distinction between the in- and out-groups is far higher there than when President Obama
(allegedly) whistled to suggest Mitt Romney was cruel to animals by promoting actual
dog-related Obama campaign merchandise.19
Proposition 3. Three equilibria exist where both C1γ (for γ ∈ {O, I}) pool on sending
the same message, either s = i, s = o, or s = w.
Given the pooling strategy, neither type of C1 ever benefits from choosing a different
message other than the one posited in the equilibrium. Utility calculations are shown
in the appendix, so suffice it to say here that, given the pooling strategy, voters learn
nothing from hearing any message from C1 and so would not change their vote on hearing
a different message. To see why, recall that the expected utility of voting for C1 is now
strictly in [0,−1) for either voter type. C1 thus gets all the votes from the opposite
group-type of C2 since those voters get some amount less than −1, which would be their
payoff for voting for C2. For example, vO voters will always prefer C2O over C1 regardless
of the message heard, since there is some positive probability they would be voting for a
C1I . And, in this example, vI voters are not indifferent between the two candidates since
there is some positive probability of C1I . Thus, for C2O , C1γ for γ ∈ {O, I} attracts all
vI voters, and no vO voters. Importantly, returning to using a clear message of group
type is not beneficial for either C1O or C1I . The uncertainty about the candidate’s true
17Jan Freeman, “Is Obama speaking in code?,” The Boston Globe, 10 February 2008.18
18Complicating the issue further, the word choice may stem from a movie depiction of Malcolm X,
and not his actual speech. Still, the audience for the movie “Malcolm X” was likely predominantly
African-American.
19Michael Sherer, “The Obama Campaign’s Humorous Dog Whistle,” Time, 31 January, 2012.
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type remains, and the voters are unmoved. The same logic explains why both types of
C1 pooling on dog whistling is an equilibrium: switching to a different messaging rule
does not resolve voter uncertainty, and so does not bring back the voters lost by using
the whistle.
Voters, however, frequently consider multiple aspects of candidates before making
a decision. The whistling function addresses not only how this strategic tool can be
represented as part of a signaling game, but has also shown the effect it has on voter
information in a limited setting. I now expand the setting to include a second dimension
for both candidates and voters to examine the use of dog whistling in a richer strategic
setting.
2.3.3 Two Dimensional Model
I extend the basic model by adding an ideological dimension to the candidate and voter
types, and introduce costs for candidates either lying or using a dog whistle. Candidates
again play on voter uncertainties raised by the whistle, but do so to gain the support of
voters who would otherwise be indifferent over the candidates. Extending the model to
two dimensions changes candidate messaging strategies and player utility, but not the
substantive process of the game.
Candidate i’s type is now a pair (τ, γ) ∈ {M,E}×{I, O}, which is private information
for C1. The pair identifies ideology and group membership; τ indexes ideology, where
τ = M indicates Ci is a “Moderate” type, and τ = E indicates an “Extreme” type.
Candidates are moderate with Pr(τ = M) = t. γ indexes group membership, where
γ = I indicates Ci is “in-group,” γ = O indicates she is “out-group”. Candidates are
out-group with Pr(γ = O) = g.
There are four distinct groups of voters, also identified by their ideology and group
membership. Types are defined by (θ, β) ∈ {M,E} × {I, O}, matching the type space
for candidates. Rather than identify probabilities of each voter being of a certain type,
denote the size of each group by vθβ, where ∀ θ, β, vθβ ≥ 0 and
∑
vθβ = 1. This reflects
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the concern of winning portions of the electorate according to how many may hear the
dog whistle.20
In addition, I add a weight to the voters’ ideological dimension, denoted α ∈ (−∞,∞).
This weight changes a voter’s preference for matching in one dimension over another.
Highly ideological voters, for instance, may prefer a candidate that is a close adherent
to some ideological stance – say, anti-immigration or anti-genetically modified foods –
regardless of the group identity. On the other hand, some voters may simply prefer a
candidate who unswervingly supports a single group, regardless of the ideology of its
members. This results in the following utility function for a voter:
Uvθ,β =
 0 if vθ = Ciτ−α if vθ 6= Ciτ
+
 0 if vβ = Ciγ−1 if vβ 6= Ciγ
 (2.6)
Candidates’ payoffs are a function of the vote share and whether the message matches
their type:
UC =
∑
vθβ +
 0 if x = τ−λ if x 6= τ
+

0 if y = γ
−c if y = w
−λ if y 6= γ, w
 (2.7)
There are two parameters in the utility function that require explanation. One parameter,
c (with 0 < c < 1 by assumption), is a constant, used to capture a cost to the speaker for
using the dog whistle. While vague stances on policy often go unremarked, the media is
often quick to call out what they perceive to be a dog whistle, which candidates must
engage, expending valuable time and resources. The λ parameters reflects an individual
cost to lying outright, with higher values indicating greater aversion.
20I use a combined subscript to denote voter groups when two subtypes are to be considered together.
For instance, vO denotes all of the out-group voters of both moderate and extremist types, vE,O + vM,O.
This both saves on notation and facilitates comparison.
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2.3.4 Two Dimension Model Results
While the one-dimension model shows how whistling allows one candidate to mimic the
other in order to secure votes, the two-dimensional model shows that whistling is primarily
useful as a method for C1 to distinguish herself from C2 in the eyes (or, ears) of one group.
The first situation I consider is a single type of C1 choosing to adopt a dog whistling
strategy, while all other types clearly reveal their true type on both dimensions. As the
next proposition states, the single type of C1 will choose to use a dog whistle, given that
she is identical in type to C2. More specifically:
Proposition 4. Given a sufficiently high cost of whistling (c), and a sufficiently low cost
of lying (λ), when C1τ,γ = C2τ,γ , there exist equilibria where that type, and only that type,
of C1 uses a dog whistle and any C1τ,γ 6= C2τ,γ reveals her true ideological and group types.
Whistling, in this instance, is a surreptitious method for the candidate to distinguish
herself from the incumbent. Voters who would have been indifferent between a type of
C1 that is identical to C2 are swayed to vote for C1, since the whistle makes the voter
uncertain about the candidate’s type. In expectation, voting for C1 is an improvement
over just choosing randomly between C1 and C2
This first result also demonstrates the impact costs have on the candidate’s choice
of message. As with any costly signaling, the higher the penalty for the signal, the less
frequently it will be used. In this instance, the costs of whistling must be low enough to
induce C1τ,γ = C2τ,γ to not switch to stating her true group membership (sx,y = {τ, γ}).
Recall that with whistling as part of the stated strategy, voters remain uncertain about
C1’s type whether they hear hx,y = {e, i} or hx,y = {e, o}. That is, even when C1τ,γ 6= C2τ,γ ,
voter beliefs are still affected by the presence of whistling. C1τ,γ sending either sx,y = {τ, o}
or sx,y = {τ, i} means that no voter hears the other message, eliminating the cost, but
ceding votes to C2. Costs, then, are roughly akin to losing a number of votes. This could
be readily observed in actual campaigns, though it does not discount the potential psychic
costs the candidate faces from deceiving voters.
One might consider whistling to be a tactic employed by a certain kind of candi-
date; certainly Republicans are more often accused of engaging in the behavior than
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are Democrats.(Haney-Lo´pez 2014) Or, whistling may be a machination of out-group
candidates to surreptitiously indicate membership with a group out of mainstream favor.
Whistling might also be used indiscriminately by all types, as a matter of routine commu-
nication during a campaign. Interestingly, however, none of these options garners C1τ,γ
more votes under the dog whistling strategy. This result is a combination of three related
results that differ only slightly in their analysis, but together have a larger implication for
campaign rhetoric. The three facets of this result are as follows:
Proposition 5. There are no equilibria supported by the following strategies:
• Ideological types pool on whistling: σC1τ,γ = sτ,w ∀ τ ∈ {M,E}
• Group types pool on whistling: σC1τ,γ = sτ,w ∀ γ ∈ {I, O}
• All ideological and group types pool on whistling: σC1τ,γ = sτ,w ∀ τ ∈ {M,E}, γ ∈
{I, O}
This result says, in essence, that whistling only serves a useful purpose when it is
done used by select types of challenger. Pooling, as a strategy, results in voters ignoring
the message entirely, and returning to their prior beliefs about the type of candidates
they are considering. The logic for each of the facets of the result follows.
Pooling messages by ideological type – both Moderate and Extremist types within
either the in- or out-group – does not increase C1’s vote share. The result occurs because
messages end up “clashing”. When both ideological types within a single group send a
whistle, the voters effectively learn no new information, and their posterior beliefs about
candidate type equal their prior beliefs about the candidate’s possible group-type. Note
that this is different than the voters being certain about the candidate’s type. Uncertainty
remains, as the calculations in the proof show, but does not differ for each ideological type,
as occurred when only one type whistled in Proposition 4. Because of the clash, the vote
share C1 obtains when sending a whistle is the same as when she reveals her true type,
but incurs the cost of whistling, λ. Clearly, then, whistling is not the optimal message,
and there is no equilibrium where the ideological types choose a pooling strategy.
The same process prevents group-types from pooling on whistling regardless of their
ideology. Clashing messages, and the lack of information transfer to the voters, again
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keeps candidates from increasing their vote share via dog whistling. The flavor of this
facet is identical to the previous one, except here the strategy indicates that all out-group
(or in-group, but not simultaneously) types of C1τ,γ use a dog whistle, regardless of being
a moderate or extremist. Finally, the logic carries over to considering whether all types of
C1 would pool on sending a dog whistle.
2.3.4.1 Empirical Implications Assuming for the moment that dog whistling can
be clearly identified when it occurs, there are clear expectations that come from the
results above.
First, and most generally, dog whistling appears in many campaign situations. That
is, it is either the equilibrium messaging strategy for candidate one, though under
very specific (and thus likely to be empirically rare) conditions. The ability to whistle
does, however, make clear speech less attractive in a number of situations. The single-
dimensional model rules out the possibility of clear speech entirely, since candidates can
amass more votes through either whistling or outright lying. Expanding the model to two
dimensions and adding costs does not entirely mitigate the endemic nature of dog whistling.
Certainly, exogenous costs can be raised to the point where no prevarication occurs; the
practical question is how to raise penalties for dog whistling high enough to tamp it out.
One attempt was made in Kenya, during the 2013 campaign for Prime Minister. An
independent organization monitored radio stations, newspapers, and television, catch
the use of “retrogressive utterances” (words one ethnic group would use in an opaque,
and derogatory, reference to members of a different ethnic group). A widespread media
campaign, accompanied by the government threatening large fines and jail time, failed to
eradicate the practice.21 Pundits decrying potential dog whistles on popular U.S. media
outlets cannot be considered sufficient penalty.
More particularly, the results suggest that dog whistling should be prevalent when
the challenger and the incumbent are considered nearly identical. The 2012 Republican
Primary contest is a useful case to compare against these results. The only concession to
the real world I need to make is to cast Mitt Romney in the role of the incumbent, rather
21Staff, “Kenya cracks down on hate speech ahead of poll,” BBC News, 26 February, 2013.
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than make comparisons against President Obama. Recall that the model is restricted to
the case of primary contests, and considers only a single political party. Romney, then,
as the most prominent contestant for the nomination, measured by his time leading the
polls (Sides and Vavreck 2014), serves the incumbent function well. Claiming a position
as a fiscal and social conservative, Romney could be viewed as the extremist, out-group
candidate (ignoring his Mormonism for the moment). The other extremist candidates
attempting to “play to their bases” of social and fiscal conservatives in the case of the
Republican Primary – included Michele Bachmann, Rick Perry, and Newt Gingrich, all of
whom thus had a need to distinguish themselves from Romney through the possible use of
dog whistles. John Hunstman, on the other hand, ran expressly as a moderate alternative
to Romney.22 And, as expected, all three of the extremists (possibly) resorted to sending
dog whistles: Michele Bachmann opposed immigration;23 Rick Santorum accused African
Americans of being totally dependent on the federal government;24 Rick Perry says
President Obama is muslim;25 and Newt Gingrich made multiple coded appeals.26 The
varied issues and disparate (purportedly) targeted audiences for these whistles reinforces
the result above that dog whistling can be a tacit method to distinguish oneself from
the competition. While this means that more than one person in the campaign used a
dog whistle, the lack of any real difference between the challengers on the dimensions
captured in my model means that these are simply repeated instances of the same, single,
type of challenger.
A more subtle implication of my results suggests that voters who hear whistles from
multiple types of challenger should ignore what they hear and rely on their initial beliefs.
If differences among Bachmann, Perry, and Gingrich are sufficient to make them distinct
types of candidates, my results suggest that the whistling from all three will collide, and
render the content meaningless for voters. Sides and Vavreck (2014, pp. 45–52) examine
Rick Perry’s cycle of media coverage and support in the polls during his “boomlet”. While
22Staff, “Not just too moderate,” The Economist, Democracy in America, 16 January, 2012
23Van Le, “Michele Bachmann Blows the Dog Whistle on Immigration,” America’s Voice, 14 September,
2011.
24Joan Walsh, “Rick Santorum flip-flops on black people,” Salon, 5 January, 2012
25Staff, “Why Rick Perry is airing an ’anti-gay’ ad: 5 theories,” The Week , 8 December, 2011.
26Melinda Henninberger, “Newt Gingrich: Against racial dog whistles before he was for them,”
Washington Post , 31 January, 2012.
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media attention varied sharply in response to particular words and phrases (such as a
dog whistle claim to being a member of the “birther” movement that claimed President
Obama was not born on U.S. territory), his support in the polls was largely unmoved as a
result. Whistling from the rest of the field may have rendered his coded appeals impotent.
2.4 DISCUSSION
The model and results presented here offer a single framework for an important political
phenomenon that has only been approached in a piecemeal fashion (Albertson 2014; Fear
2007; Haney-Lo´pez 2014). By abstracting away from the specific content of the messages, I
show that dog whistling is a powerful tool for manipulating voter choice, usable regardless
of candidate group identity or political affiliation. Moreover, there are several key insights
produced by this work.
First, individual audience characteristics determine, in part, the effect of political
speech. In this work, a candidate is able to use the different group likelihoods of
hearing the whistle to gain enough votes from one audience to offset potential losses in
the other. Moreover, this difference between the groups need not be pronounced, and
candidates benefit by playing to a minority group even in the face of higher whistling
costs. Substantively, prevarication or outright lies have entirely different effects, since
they do not harness the fundamental difference in audience interpretation.
Next, while dog whistling is, by construction, a slippery tool, imperfectly identified
when used, we can make clear statements about why the tool works, and in what situations
we should anticipate its use. Identical candidate types, as noted in Proposition 4, make
the use of a dog whistle profitable, given specific conditions on the costs of mendacity.
Whistling serves as a method for a challenger to distinguish herself from an incumbent, or
a single candidate from a field of similar contenders, by appealing to all voters, including
those who would otherwise be indifferent in their dislike over options. When neither
the challenger nor the incumbent are members of the in-group, whistling is still useful;
in-group voters move from their prior beliefs to their focal point belief, earning votes from
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the portion that hear the whistle. Dog whistling in more general cases reaches a limit of
usefulness, however. Candidates with the same ideological types cannot increase their
vote share by adopting a whistling strategy, since voters simply ignore the message they
hear, whistle or not, and act on their prior beliefs about types. For the same reasons,
Candidate 1 will not simply opt to whistle regardless of her type in either the ideological
or group dimensions. Dog whistling might be a tool with wide applicability, but it cannot
be used indiscriminately if it is to be profitable. Indeed, for dog whistling to have any bite,
it must be used in specific instances in relation to how similar or distinct one candidate is
from another in the minds of voters. We should expect to see whistling occur, then, as an
increasing function of candidate similarity, and not, as popular accounts imply, simply
because of minority (or extreme) racial and religious views.
Without more statements of intent, like Senator McCaskill’s, we cannot be certain
when a candidate has specifically opted to use a whistle. That said, my model suggests a
second empirical regularity: once one candidate is accused of whistling, other candidates
should soon follow suit. Newt Gingrich and Michelle Bachmann both were accused of using
whistles during the 2012 Republican Presidential Primary. Claims that Mitt Romney
and Rick Perry engaged in whistling were not far behind. Introducing a dog whistle
into campaign messaging makes it difficult, if not impossible, to return to unambiguous
rhetoric. Candidates clearly benefit from being vague about future policy choices (Alesina
and Cukierman 1990; Glazer 1990; Shepsle 1972; Tomz and Van Houweling 2009), but
usually suffer at the hands of the media from outright falsehoods. Dog whistling, by its
nature, shifts the source of uncertainty onto the audience, allowing candidates to credibly
deny some aspect of the message. However, once a message is identified as a possible
dog whistle — identifying the candidate as adopting a whistling strategy, in terms of the
game — the audience will be left wondering, even if the candidate has shifted back to
speaking clearly. The very existence of the dog whistle, then, makes its use viable.
Dog whistling, despite its now-cliche´d name, provides a starting point for analyzing
more nuanced aspects of speech, campaigning, and candidate manipulation of voter
beliefs (and thus actions). Extensions to the models presented here include making the
relationship between the dimensions correlated: as candidates grow more extreme, there
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is a corresponding increase in the belief that she will dog whistle. Expanding the game
to explicitly include the media might allow voters to have correlated beliefs about the
candidate’s types. Issues related to deliberation and discourse might be addressed by
allowing the voters to communicate their beliefs to each other, reflecting the wider use
of social media in modern elections. Empirical investigations of coded speech can focus
on both their active use by candidates, as well as the source of individuated beliefs in
the audience. For the former, analysis of speeches and campaign material, compared
against a reference corpus, may identify the number of times the source material is
references without citation. For the latter, individuals could respond to prompts to see
what associations arise. Any and all of these additions would build on this first step to
flesh out the strategic interaction present in Aristotle’s triumvirate of rhetoric.
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3.0 TIME AND PUNISHMENT: BLAME AND CONCESSION IN
POLITICAL STANDOFFS
Coauthor:
Jonathan Woon, Associate Professor of Political Science and Economics
Faculty Affiliate, Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Laboratory
University of Pittsburgh
“Our message to the United States Senate is real simple:
The American people don’t want the government shut down,
and they don’t want Obamacare.”
Rep. John Boehner
“I want to be absolutely crystal clear: Any bill that defunds
Obamacare is dead. Dead.”
Sen. Harry Reid
Political negotiation often resembles a staring contest, rather than the back–and–forth
offer–counteroffer process usually associated with deal-making and compromise.1 Consider
recent struggles over U.S. fiscal policy. In September 2013, congressional Republicans
demanded the elimination of funding for the Affordable Care Act as a condition of passing
continuing appropriations to keep the government operating. Democrats refused to back
down, and a 17-day government shutdown ensued. During the shutdown, polls indicated
1We generally avoid the term “bargaining” throughout the paper. While standoffs occur during a
bargaining process, our interest is on the impasse and potential failure of the bargaining event, rather
than choices of offers during bargaining. Both our model and experiment are sufficiently different from
the usual models of bargaining that we want to keep the distinction clear for the reader. We make an
exception in the discussion of prior literature, where commonalities between our study and work on
bargaining is clear.
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that the public largely blamed Republicans and eventually the Republican leadership
capitulated.2 Four months later, having reasoned that allowing the shutdown had been a
mistake, Republicans would not be so intransigent.3 Facing a looming deadline over raising
the debt limit, they acceded to Democratic demands well ahead of the potential default,
and the public hardly noticed.4 Similar events unfolded in 1995 between Newt Gingrich
and Bill Clinton. These events suggest that incurring blame is costly for politicians,
and that the anticipation or avoidance of blame can feature prominently in strategic
calculations.
How do observers of political stalemate allocate blame for outcomes, and how does
the expectation of blame affect the behavior of negotiators? Answering these questions is
important for understanding how citizens can exert influence over their representatives
through non-electoral means. To study these questions we conduct an experiment that
contrasts standoffs with and without an audience. In our setup, subjects play a war of
attrition game in which the only choice is when to back down and waiting is costly. A
single-shot game is used to isolate the incentives for allocating blame for the outcome
from concerns about discounting, reputation effects, and potential unraveling results.
When we add an audience, we operationalize blame by allowing the observer to punish
the standoff contestants. The war of attrition framework captures the essential features of
standoffs outlined in the example above. It is also important for our purposes because ex
ante negotiating power is symmetric, permitting us to investigate how observers ascribe
blame as a function purely of outcomes, free of considerations of structural power.
This paper proceeds as follows. First, we emphasize the importance of studying blame
in negotiations and standoffs, then demonstrate that our approach is both novel and
substantively appropriate. Next, we describe the design and procedures of the experiment.
From this we describe what payoff maximizing behavior predicts for Staring Contest
outcomes and the use of blame. Briefly, if observers engage in rational punishment and
2Andrew Dugan, “Republican Party Favorability Sinks to Record Low.” Gallup Politics, 9 October,
2013.
Scott Clement, “Republicans are losing the shutdown blame game”, The Fix, 4 October, 2013.
3John Breshnahan, Manu Raju, Jake Sherman, and Carie Budoff Brown, “Anatomy of a shutdown”,
Politico, 18 October, 2013.
4Paul Kane, Robert Costa, Ed O’Keefe, “House passes ’clean’ debt-ceiling bill, ending two-week
showdown”, Washington Post, 11 February, 2014.
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contestants correctly anticipate this, then the presence of an observer in the Staring
Contest will shorten the time players hold out before conceding. In addition, the contestant
whose preferences are aligned with the observer should win more often. This occurs
because the observer adopts a strategy that punishes the winning player, thereby reducing
delay. The empirical results provide mixed support for the predictions of rational play;
behavioral models that incorporate preferences for equity of winnings may explain some of
the gap. The observer frequently uses blame to target the winning player, and contestants
decrease their waiting times in the presence of an observer. Outcomes, however, change
only slightly, if at all. Contestants, it seems, inadequately anticipate how they will be
punished and fail to take action to improve their payoffs. We conclude with a discussion
of these findings and their general implications.
3.1 THE POLITICS OF BLAME
We consider blame to be a form of punishment citizens use to register their displeasure
concerning some event or action. Political decision makers seek to avoid punishment at
all levels, from elites (weaver1986; Hood 2010; Weale 2002) to street-level bureaucrats
(Brehm and Gates 1997; Lipsky 1980). Doling out punishment to sitting politicians
entices some voters to the ballot box (Brown 2010; Iyengar 1989; Peffley 1984). Negative
assessments of political culpability, such as opinion polls, are weak forms of blame, but
arise in numerous contexts (e.g., Alcan˜iz and Hellwig 2011; Bengtsson 2004; De Vries and
Hobolt 2012; Malhotra and Kuo 2007). We build on prior research about responsibility
attribution, as well as work on strategic interactions between bargainers and an audience.
Attributing blame requires an observer to make a valid link between the causal
drivers and the outcome. Citizens have weak, and malleable, understanding of these
links when considering large scale failures (Malhotra and Kuo 2007). Indeed, they
mostly rely on partisan identification when deciding who is most responsible for economic
conditions or policies (Brown 2010). Blame is, however, more nuanced when citizens
have better information (De Vries and Hobolt 2012). In contrast to our setting, these
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studies present large, often highly complicated problems (massive environmental disasters
and macroeconomic conditions) to voters with varying internal motivations for devoting
attention and thought. We isolate these competing pressures in the experiment by
providing complete information and clearly delineating incentives, and making the causal
link transparent.
Blame, as a logical subset of responsibility (Lagnado and Channon 2008; Shaver
1985), carries similar importance to the study of economic voting. However, while
theories of prospective and retrospective voting entail the attribution of responsibility
for economic conditions (Hellwig 2010; Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000; Lewis-Beck and
Stegmaier 2000; Paldam 2008), they do not address how voters apportion blame for
producing those conditions. Psychologists define blame as the impulse to punish an actor
for a negative outcome over which the actor has some direct control (Alicke 2000; Brewin
and Shapiro 1984; Weiner 1995).5 The distinction between responsibility without blame
and responsibility with blame is important because it implies potentially different voter
behavior. For example, voters may hold the president responsible for employment levels,
but do not blame him for conditions inherited from the last administration. Voters may,
however, blame a political party that blocked job-creating legislation, then punish them
at election time. Treating blame as a distinct concept provides a richer view of voter
behavior.
Blame and reputation are interrelated, but not synonymous; distinct models of
each are necessary. Repeated games often model reputational concerns as beliefs about
an opponent’s promised future actions, given the opponent’s history of behavior, or
unobservable payoff-relevant types (Abreu and Gul 2000; Celetani et al. 1996; Embrey,
Fre´chette, and Lehrer 2014; Kreps, Milgrom, et al. 1982; Kreps and Wilson 1982; Roth
1985). These models do not address punishment as a distinct mechanism, and reputational
concerns arise only between bargainers, since no audience is present. Another form of
reputation arises in games of incomplete information, such as in Groseclose and McCarty
(2001), who incorporate both blame and an audience in a model of veto bargaining. Voters,
5 This is a counterfactual-based definition of causality. A caused B (in whole or part) if B would
not have happened without A’s presence. The desire to punish this causal connection is sufficient for
psychology, though we choose to make it tangible.
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as the audience, apply blame by lowering approval ratings for the president if he vetoes a
certain bill. In this model, the voters assign both full responsibility, and thus full blame,
to only one side of what is a strategic interaction. In contrast, our experiment allows the
audience to blame neither, one, or both parties according to their assessment of both
actors’ choices. International relations studies of bargaining often include audiences that
can impose a cost on political leaders as a function of the bargaining outcome (Fearon
1994; Tomz 2007a,b; Weeks 2008). Moreover, we follow Fearon (1994) in employing a
war of attrition model. Domestic politics, too, are often described as wars of attrition
(Wawro and Schickler 2006), and have been explicitly modeled this way (Kousser and
Phillips 2009; Kovenock and Roberson 2009). We complement this by making the cost
mechanism – a subject of some debate (Schultz 2001; Trachtenberg 2012) – explicit.
Our operationalization of blame is similar to the use of punishment in public goods
experiments, making them appropriate bases on which to build our examination of
standoffs and players’ outcome preferences.6 We choose to make blame costless to the
observer, to render the application of punishment independent of the game’s structure.
That said, experiments report significant use of punishment even when the punisher incurs
a cost to do so (fehr2000; Fehr and Ga¨chter 2002; Masclet et al. 2003). Punishment has
proven useful in studying a wide array of social situations, despite debates about what
the findings mean (Guala 2012). Blame may prove a similarly useful experimental tool
for understanding political phenomena.
3.2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES
To investigate how the presence of an audience and the potential for punishment affects
behavior during a standoff, and how an audience might actually punish the standoff
contestants, we designed a simple experiment that contrasts standoffs with and without
an audience. For our framework, we chose to use a war of attrition game in which waiting
6The general public goods literature is expansive. For a useful summary of punishment and cooperation
in experimental settings, see Chaudhuri (2011).
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is costly. When we add an observer, the observer’s payoffs depend on the outcome of the
attrition game, and we operationalize “blame” by allowing the observer to punish the
players by deducting points. We also vary the alignment of interest between the observer
and the players by modeling outcomes as spatial policies and varying the ideal point of
the observer.
We chose the war of attrition framework rather than a sequential bargaining game for
two reasons. Substantively, we are interested in the duration of standoffs, as we believe
that recent episodes of presidential-congressional and inter-cameral negotiating over the
federal budget, debt limit, and sequestration seemed to resemble a process in which each
side stakes out a position and waits for the other to concede rather than a process of
negotiation that leads to compromise outcomes. From a design standpoint, the war of
attrition framework allows us to keep proposal power symmetric between the standoff
contestants. This is important because we are interested in understanding how observers
endogenously assign blame as a function of the choice to prolong or end the stalemate,
free of considerations arising from exogenous structural features of a standard bargaining
situation (such as proposal power or a first mover advantage).
The experiment utilized a within-subject design and consisted of two parts. In Part 1,
subjects played a war of attrition game without an audience, while in Part 2, they played
the same game with an observer who was permitted to administer ex post punishment.
In each part, they played the game multiple times. We read the instructions aloud and
had subjects complete a comprehension quiz prior to each part of the experiment. Thus,
in Part 1, subjects did not know the rules of the game they would be playing in Part
2, thereby precluding any incentives to form reputations in anticipation of Part 2. We
also implemented standard design features to minimize the interaction between rounds,
ensuring as much as possible the one-shot nature of the incentives of each play of the
game. First, we used anonymous, random rematching of groups between rounds so that
subjects never knew which of the other subjects they were paired with. This feature
reduces any reputational incentives subjects may have. Second, we randomly selected one
round from the entire session to count as payment. This feature eliminates wealth effects
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and ensures that a subject’s payoffs in later rounds are independent of their payoffs in
earlier rounds.
In Part 1, subjects played 12 rounds of a two-player war of attrition game without
an audience. In our experimental instructions, we referred to the war of attrition as a
“Staring Contest Game” to emphasize its dynamic nature and to convey the intuition
that the player who waits the longest in the game obtains a better outcome. We can
think of the player who “stares” the longest as “winning” the game and the player who
“blinks” first as “losing.” Although we referred to the game as a Staring Contest, we did
not otherwise use the terms “staring,” “blinking,” “winning,” or “losing” to describe the
game.
The Staring Contest Game is played by two players, which we designate Player A and
Player B. Each subject played 6 rounds as Player A and 6 rounds as Player B. The game
lasts for 30 seconds, and each player’s only decision is when to “concede” by ending the
game. In our graphic interface for the game — programmed in z-tree (Fischbacher 2007)
— each player sees a timer bar that decreases in size at 1-second intervals, and chooses to
concede by moving the cursor over the timer bar. We designed the interface in this way
so to avoid audible clicks of the mouse that would signal to other subjects when players
in other groups conceded. If both players concede at the same time, we use a random
tie-breaking rule.
When the Staring Contest is played dynamically, as in our design, we only observe the
actual concession time of the game for the losing player. We do not observe the time at
which the winning player would have conceded, so in a way, our data are censored. The
standard solution to this kind of censoring problem in experiments with sequential games
is to use the “strategy method,” in which subjects do not play the game dynamically but
instead indicate their complete strategies before other players’ choices are revealed. But
the strategy method removes the dynamic element of the game that interests us. Thus, we
opted to use a mixture of dynamic play and the strategy method. At the beginning of each
round of the Staring Contest, we asked each player to state an “Intended Stopping Time”
(between 0 and 30 seconds), and there was a 1 in 10 chance that we would implement
the Intended Stopping Time as the player’s actual stopping time. The realization of the
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Intended Stopping Time was independent across players and periods. We intended the
small chance that the Intended Stopping Time would be implemented as a way to make
the choice meaningful (rather than completely hypothetical) while ensuring that subjects
would play the dynamic version of the game most of the time.
We described the outcomes and payoffs of the game in terms of a one-dimensional
spatial model of policy.7 If Player A wins, the “outcome number” of the game is a = 10,
while if Player B wins, the outcome is b = 90. If neither player concedes, we consider
the outcome of the game to have broken down in so far as neither side gets the outcome
they prefer despite both holding out.8 To construct the players’ payoffs in the Staring
Contest, each player is described as having a “target number,” which we can think of as
the player’s ideal point. We assign A the target number 0, and B the target number 100.
If we denote the outcome of the game by x ∈ {a, b, φ} (where φ denotes disagreement)
and the game ends at time t (in seconds), then player i’s payoff (denominated in points)
is given by the function
ui(x, t) =
 350− |x− θi| − t if x 6= φ190 if x = φ
where θi denotes the player’s target number. Note that “winning” the Staring Contest
results in payoffs between 310 and 340 points, while “losing” results in payoffs between
230 and 260 points. Disagreement is the worst possible outcome, and it is equally “bad”
for both players in order to preserve the symmetry of the players’ incentives in the
game. Substantively, neither side of a political standoff needs to know the actual value of
getting one policy or the other. Instead, these actors only need an ordinal ranking: the
party getting exactly the policy they want is the best outcome; any policy between their
preference and the other party’s is worse; a policy exactly at the other party’s preference
is worse still; finally, the outcome corresponding to a government shutdown in which no
policy is enacted, not even the status quo, is the worst possible outcome for either party.
7When we introduce an observer in Part 2, this allows us to manipulate the alignment of preferences
between the observer and the two contestants.
8We do not use the terms “breakdown”, “bargaining failure”, “standoff”, or any similar term in
describing this outcome to subjects. We only refer to a default payoff if neither player concedes.
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In each round of Part 2, randomly matched groups of three participants played the
Staring Contest Game with an audience. We designated two players in each group to be
the “contestants” (Players A and B) in the Staring Contest and the third player to be an
“observer.” Every subject played 6 rounds in Part 2 as Player A, 6 rounds as Player B,
and 6 rounds as the observer. Play in each round consisted of two stages. The contestants
first played the Staring Contest Game exactly as they did in Part 1. The observers then
learned the outcome and their payoffs from the Staring Contest and chose how to allocate
“blame” or “punishment” by deducting points from one or both contestants’ payoffs. The
observer has the ability to allocate punishment to one, both, or neither of the contestants
and could deduct any amount of points as long as the sum of deductions was between 0
and 100 points.9 We chose to make punishment costless rather than costly so we could
observe the maximum amount of punishment subjects might be willing to give.
The contestants’ payoffs in this version of the game are their Staring Contest payoffs
minus the observer’s deduction, ui(x, t)− di, where di is an integer between 0 and 100
and the sum dA + dB is between 0 and 100. The observer’s payoff is given by the same
function u(x, t) that describes the contestant’s payoffs in Part 1, except that we varied
the ideal point of the observer, θO ∈ {0, 25, 50}, in order to vary the alignment of interests
between the observer and contestants. When θO = 50, the observer’s interests are aligned
equally with Player A and Player B. When θO = 25, the observer’s interests are more
aligned with Player A than Player B. And when θO = 0, then the observer is completely
aligned with Player A.10 This alignment models partisan bias in the audience, doing so
only for one side to keep the experimental conditions tractable. Information about the
observer’s ideal point was announced to all players at the beginning of every round and
therefore common knowledge. Each subject played two rounds in each role with each of
the possible observer ideal points.
9Van De Ven and Villeval (2014) develop a deception game with an observer that can reveal a player’s
lie. Both this model and ours make the player outcomes dependent on the choice of a second-mover
audience, though the negotiating parties in our model cannot take unobserved actions.
10Note that the observer can make conceding the worst possible outcome by deducting 80 points or
more from the conceding player.
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A total of 72 subjects participated in five sessions of the experiment, which took
place at the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Laboratory (PEEL).11 Subjects were
recruited from PEEL’s general subject pool, gave informed consent according to standard
procedures, and were privately paid in cash at the conclusion of the experiment (including
a $5 show-up fee).
3.3 THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS
In our theoretical analysis, we first consider how payoff-maximizing subjects would play
the baseline Staring Contest Game and then consider how the observer’s actions might
affect concessions and timing. Even though subjects play the game in real time, we can
analyze the game as a simultaneous move game in which a player’s strategy is the amount
of time (in integers) he or she waits until conceding, denoted by ti for i ∈ {A,B}.
In the game without the observer, each player always has an incentive to wait longer
than the other. For any strategy for Player B, tB < 30, Player A’s best response is to wait
a little longer and to concede at any time tA such that tA > tB. To see why, note that A’s
payoff for waiting longer than B is 340− tB while conceding at tA < tB yields a payoff of
260− tA. Since tB− tA is at most 30 points and the difference between winning and losing
is 80 points, it is better to wait and win the contest than it is to end the game quickly on
the losing side (because 340− tB > 260− tA). If both players wait until the last second,
ti = 30, then the random tie-breaking rule implies an equal likelihood of obtaining a payoff
of 310 (from winning) and a payoff of 230 (from losing). The expected payoff when both
players wait until the very last second to concede is therefore 270, which is still preferable
to conceding immediately and obtaining 260 points. Thus, the Nash equilibrium is for
both players to wait until the last second, ti = 30, to concede. Our first prediction is a
simple application of this result, provided subjects are risk neutral. However, if subjects
11One subject voluntarily left the experiment during the last rounds of Part 1, which also forced us to
involuntarily dismiss additional subjects. We use data from this session in the following results. The
number of subjects is reduced to 66 in cases where the excluded subjects did not participate. The basic
results do not change if these data are excluded.
42
are sufficiently risk averse, then they will prefer conceding immediately and receiving a
payoff of 260 points with certainty to waiting until the end of the game and receiving
a risky outcome with an expected value of 270 points. In this case, we would expect
immediate concessions. It then follows that if there is heterogeneity in subjects’ risk
preferences, we would expect to see a mixture of concession times at the extremes of 0
and 30.12
Hypothesis 3.1. In the Staring Contest Game without an observer, risk neutral players
will wait until the last moment before conceding while sufficiently risk averse players will
concede immediately. A mixture of risk neutral and risk averse players will produce waiting
times at the extremes of 0 and 30 seconds.
Now consider the game when an observer is present. In the spirit of backward
induction, we formulate expectations about what a payoff-maximizing observer would
do and then discuss how contestants would change their behavior in anticipation of the
observer’s response. Because the observer moves last and takes an action that has no effect
on her own payoff, she will be indifferent between allocations of punishment along the path
of play. In other words, any allocation of punishment can be supported in equilibrium.
However, the observer is not indifferent between all possible outcomes and can design a
punishment strategy that, if rationally anticipated by the contestants, induces the best
possible Staring Contest outcome for herself.
The level of blame used by an observer is endogenous and accounts for expressions
of partisan bias. The extent to which voters strictly side with one party or another,
however, is unclear since political ideology and party identification are not synonymous
for the modern U.S. electorate (Treier and Hillygus 2009). The gap between ideology
and identification is naturally embodied in our experiment: Observers can allocate blame
12Modeling the Staring Contest as a game of incomplete information would not substantively change
these hypotheses. Consider two players with unknown types, defined as their level of risk acceptance.
If player A believes her opponent to be more risk-seeking, and thus that Player B would be willing to
out-wait her, then it is strictly better for A to concede as soon as possible since waiting is costly and
waiting until t = 30 results in a toss-up. Conversely, if Player A believes Player B to be less risk-seeking,
then at every time t Player A’s incentive is to continue waiting until t = t+ 1 because she expects Player
B will concede at t, continuing until t = 30. (The argument for Player B’s choices are symmetric.) Thus,
as with the above model, we expect concessions to occur at the beginning or the end of the Staring
Contest.
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based on ideological distance between the outcome and their preference, party loyalty to
Player A regardless of the strength of affiliation, or some combination of both.
When the observer’s ideal point is θO = 50, she is indifferent between the outcomes
a = 10 and b = 90 and thus cares only about minimizing the duration of the Staring
Contest. That is, she does not care which contestant wins as long as tA = 0 or tB = 0.
The observer can force the contestants to end the game immediately by deducting at
least 80 points from the winning player. To see how this encourages the desired behavior,
note that deducting 80 points from the winner implies that the winner’s payoff will be
260− t. Note also that the loser’s payoff is 260− t, so the observer’s strategy effectively
makes the contestants indifferent between winning and losing.13 If contestants rationally
anticipate the observer’s strategy, their best response is to end the game at t = 0, yielding
the maximum payoff of 260 points.
In rounds where the observer’s ideal point is either θO = 25 or θO = 0, her ideal
outcome is for Player B to concede at t = 0 and for Player A to win the contest, which
yields the outcome a = 10. The observer can therefore design a strategy that encourages
Player B to concede at tB = 0 by deducting at least 80 points from B if and only if B
wins the Staring Contest. To illustrate how this strategy works, consider any outcome
where A is the first to concede at tA > 0. If the observer deducts the maximum 100
points from Player B, then B’s payoff would be 240− tA. By deviating to some other time
tB < tA, Player B increases his payoff to 260− tB and can maximize his payoff by stopping
immediately at tB = 0. To see that the stopping times tB = 0 and tA > 0 constitute an
equilibrium given the observer’s punishment strategy, note that this yields payoffs of 340
for Player A and 260 for Player B. Player A will not deviate to tA = 0 and risk obtaining
the lower payoff. Similarly, Player B will not deviate to any tB > tA because doing so
would incur the observer’s punishment and yield a lower payoff of 240− tB.
The following hypotheses summarize the effects of introducing an audience on contes-
tants’ behavior and the ways in which we expect payoff-maximizing observers to play. In
terms of standoff outcomes, the effect of the audience should be to decrease the observed
13For this strategy to work, the observer must also punish the winning player even if t = 0 because
otherwise each contestant has an incentive to deviate to ti > 0 given that the other contestant j 6= i
concedes immediately at tj = 0.
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and intended stopping times (Hypothesis 3.2). When the observer’s preferences align
with Player A’s, we also expect to see standoff behavior and outcomes in which Player
A wins the Staring Contest more often than Player B (Hypothesis 3.3). In terms of
blame and punishment, observers will generally punish the winning player in order to
create incentives that minimize delay in standoffs (Hypothesis 3.4). Finally, observers will
direct punishment towards Player B when she prefers Player A win the Staring Contest
(Hypothesis 3.5).
Hypothesis 3.2. Waiting times will be shorter and the Staring Contest is more likely to
end immediately with an observer than without an observer.
Hypothesis 3.3. As the distance between the observer’s ideal point and Player A’s
ideal point decreases, Player A’s waiting time will increase, Player B’s waiting time will
decrease, and Player A is more likely to win the Staring Contest.
Hypothesis 3.4. When θO = 50, the observer is more likely to punish the winning player
than the losing player.
Hypothesis 3.5. When θO = 25 or θO = 0, the observer is more likely to punish Player
B for winning than Player A.
3.4 FINDINGS
The results of the experiment support several of our hypotheses. We find support for the
two major aspects of the theoretical predictions regarding the outcomes of the Staring
Contest and the amount of punishment levied by the observer. In our analysis, we also
classify the types of strategies observers use and assess how behavior correlates with
individual characteristics.
3.4.1 Outcomes
In the baseline Staring Contest without an observer, 94% of plays of the game result in
a concession. Overall, the outcomes are close to evenly split between Player A winning
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(50%) and Player B winning (44%), but with a slight advantage for Player A in terms of
outcomes. Figure 1 shows the distribution of actual and intended concession times in the
baseline Staring Contest without an observer. Actual stopping times follow a bimodal
distribution, with the majority of contests ending around t = 0 and t = 30. The game
ends immediately (at t = 0) in 8% of rounds played and at the last possible second (at
t = 30) in 9% of rounds played. If we allow for some error in waiting times, we find that
25% of rounds played end within the first 5 seconds while 35% end within the last 5
seconds. Intended waiting times are roughly similar. Six percent of subjects indicated
they intended to concede immediately (at t = 0), while 16% indicated they intended to
wait until the very end (at t = 30). Further, 61% of all intended stopping times fall within
the first five seconds (19%) or the last five seconds (42%). Thus, without an observer,
the majority of games ended—or subjects stated their willingness to end the game—at
the very beginning or end of the waiting period, generally consistent with the prediction
stated in Hypothesis 3.2.14
Figure 1: Actual Stopping Times Bimodal, Intended Times Cluster
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Turning now to the effects of introducing the observer on Staring Contest outcomes,
we find mixed support for our hypotheses. Table 2 presents the average actual and
14Subjects do exhibit some learning effects as they play more rounds. Specifically, they are more likely
to concede near t = 30 the more rounds they play. However, we believe this has no substantive effect on
our findings. Details can be found in Appendix B.1.
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Table 2: Average Actual and Intended Stopping Times by Treatment
Intended Intended
Actual Player A Player B
No Observer Mean 16.4 20 18
N 398 426 426
Observer 50 Mean 15.7 19.7 19
N 128 132 132
Observer 25 Mean 14.2 19.6 17.5
N 122 132 132
Observer 0 Mean 14.8 18.7 18.2
N 125 132 132
Total Mean 15.7 19.7 18.1
N 773 822 822
intended stopping times by observer condition. Although there is a very slight decrease
in actual waiting times, the average waiting times are nearly identical across treatments
and between the contestants. These results suggest that introducing an observer has
little effect on the duration of the standoff. In every condition, we also note that the
intended stopping times are always longer than the actual waiting times, and Player A’s
intended stopping times are longer than Player B’s. For a more rigorous test of whether
the observer affects standoff durations, we estimate regressions of stopping times on a set
of treatment variables with subject fixed effects. The results, presented in Table 3, indeed
suggest that the observer has no statistically significant effect on average waiting times.
The exception is a statistically significant decrease in Player A’s intended waiting time
when the observer’s ideal point is 0, but this effect is the opposite what the theoretical
analysis predicts for Player A. Our analysis of average waiting times lends no support to
Hypothesis 3.2 or Hypothesis 3.3.
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Table 3: Effects of Treatment on Contestant Choice of Stopping Times
(1) (2) (3)
Intended Intended
Actual Player A Player B
Observer 0 -1.62 -1.63∗ -0.15
(1.22) (0.76) (0.82)
Observer 25 -2.14 -0.73 -0.86
(1.24) (0.76) (0.82)
Observer 50 -0.73 -0.65 0.60
(1.21) (0.76) (0.82)
Constant 16.39∗∗∗ 20.15∗∗∗ 18.15∗∗∗
(0.60) (0.37) (0.40)
R2 0.01 0.01 0.00
Observations 773 822 822
Standard errors in parentheses.
No Observer treatment omitted as reference category.
Models (2) and (3) use subject fixed effects.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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When we look at the distribution of waiting times instead of the average in the
observer conditions, shown in Figure 2, there do appear to be differences between the
conditions in terms of the proportion of early and late concessions. The number of players
conceding immediately (or very early) is higher under all observer treatments than under
the no observer treatment. In rounds when there is an observer, the proportion of rounds
with immediate concessions (t = 0) more than doubles, increasing from 8% to 18− 22%.
There is also an increase in terms of the proportion of rounds that end early (within the
first 5 seconds) from 25% in the baseline to 32− 37% with an observer.15 Table 4 shows
that these effects are statistically significant. The first column presents the estimates for
a probit model in which the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the game
ends immediately at t = 0; the probability the game ends immediately is significantly
higher for each of the observer conditions. The dependent variable for the second column
is an indicator for whether the game ends early (within the first 5 seconds); while the
coefficients are all positive, the effect of the observer when θO = 25 is significant at the 0.05
level, the effect is significant at the 0.10 level for θ = 0. The dependent variable for the
third column is an indicator for whether the game ended late (the last five seconds); there
are no significant difference from the No Observer treatment. The dependent variable
for the final model is an indicator for whether the game stopped at the last possible
moment (t = 30). Note that the coefficients in column four are negative, and the effect
of the observer when θO = 50 is significant at the 0.05 level, indicating that, under this
treatment, the game is less likely to end at the last second. In contrast to the analysis of
average waiting times, our analysis of immediate concessions suggests some support for
Hypothesis 3.2.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of outcomes from the Staring Contest by observer
condition. The most notable result is that the presence of an observer appears to have
little, if any, influence on the outcomes of the contest. There appear to be slight differences
in the proportion of rounds that end in breakdown, but since there is no clear pattern,
these may simply be noise. In terms of whether Player A or Player B wins the contest
15Conducting Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality of distribution tests shows that the distribution under
the No Observer treatment is statistically significantly different from each of the observer treatments
(p < 0.01 for each treatment).
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Figure 2: Distribution of Actual Stopping Times
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Table 4: Effects of Treatment on Likelihood of an Extreme Stopping Time
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Immediately First 5 Seconds Last 5 Seconds Last Second
Observer 50 0.50∗∗ 0.20 0.09 -0.33∗
(0.16) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16)
Observer 25 0.41∗ 0.34∗ -0.05 -0.12
(0.17) (0.13) (0.13) (0.18)
Observer 0 0.66∗∗∗ 0.23+ -0.01 -0.27
(0.16) (0.13) (0.13) (0.17)
Constant -1.42∗∗∗ -0.67∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09)
Observations 773 773 773 773
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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with an observer, it does appear that Player A is less likely to concede as the alignment
between the observer and Player A increases. Furthermore, Player A wins the contest
more frequently when the observer’s ideal point is θO = 0 than in any other conditions.
However, these differences are not statistically significant, so there is little support for
Hypothesis 3.3.
Figure 3: Distribution of Outcomes by Treatment
6.6
42.7
50.7
3.0
49.2 47.7
7.6
45.5 47.0
5.3
40.2
54.5
0
20
40
60
Pe
rc
en
t
No Obs Obs 50 Obs 25 Obs 0
Breakdown B Wins A Wins
To summarize, we find modest effects of the presence of an observer on the duration
of the standoff. The basic outcomes of the staring contest (who wins or loses) appear
to be insensitive to the addition of an observer. However, the distribution of stopping
times changes: when an observer is present, subjects are more likely to end the game
immediately.
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3.4.2 Punishment
Broadly speaking, we find that observers allocate punishment in ways consistent with
our theoretical expectations. They appear to punish a contestant for winning the contest
more than they punish a contestant for losing, and they also appear to punish Player B
for winning more often than they punish Player A. We also find evidence that observers
punish both contestants heavily for breakdown.16
In Table 5 we present the average number of points the observer deducts from each
contestant by outcome and treatment condition. The pattern of behavior appears to
lend support to both Hypothesis 3.4 and Hypothesis 3.5. First, we see that observers
punish the winning player more than they punish the losing player. When Player A wins,
the observer deducts an average of 4.4− 7.3 points from A and 15.4− 27 points from B.
Similarly, when Player B wins the Staring Contest, the observer deducts an average of
6.4− 22.5 points from A and 23− 40 points from B. These patterns are consistent with
Hypothesis 3.4. Second, the deductions from Player B appear to be much more sensitive
to the outcome than deductions from Player A. For example, when the observer’s ideal
point is θO = 0, the observer deducts nearly 10 times more points from Player B when B
wins as when A wins. In contrast, the observer deducts about the same number of points
from A for both outcomes. Table 5 also suggests that Player B’s punishment for winning
increases as the alignment between the observer and Player A increases, while Player A’s
punishment for winning decreases. These results appear to be consistent with Hypothesis
3.5.
Another pattern we observe in the data is that observers tend to punish both contes-
tants heavily in the (relatively rare) case of breakdown. When neither player concedes in
the Staring Contest, the observer deducts between 36.4 and 47.5 points from Player A and
between 37.5 and 43.6 points from Player B. These deductions are roughly equal for both
players and do not appear to depend on the alignment of interest between the observer
and Player A. We did not anticipate this result in our theoretical analysis because the
16Subjects do not exhibit any learning effects due to punishment. The allocation of punishment by
subjects is effectively equal before and after the first time subjects receives punishment themselves.
Details can be found in the Appendix.
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observer does not gain from punishing the contestants when there is breakdown; it is
already the worst possible outcome and contestants should seek to avoid it.
One possible explanation for these behaviors is inequity aversion (Hatfield et al.
1978): Subjects dislike the resulting point distribution, and attempt to smooth it out
by deducting points from the winning player. While our model does not account for it,
caring about equality can be rational, and economic models of behavior often incorporate
these preferences (Engelmann and Strobel 2004; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Goeree and Holt
2000). This does not rule out instrumental uses of punishment such as deducting points
from both sides in the event of breakdown. Rather, we suggest that deviations from our
precise definition of rational play are themselves behaviorally coherent and interesting.
Table 5: Average Deductions by Contest, Outcomes, and Treatment
Observer Ideal Point
Contest Outcome Obs 0 Obs 25 Obs 50
A Wins Punishment to A 15.4 21.7 27
Punishment to B 4.4 4.4 7.3
B Wins Punishment to A 17.5 22.5 6.4
Punishment to B 40 32.8 23
Breakdown Punishment to A 36.4 47.5 37.5
Punishment to B 43.6 43.5 37.5
Table 6 presents regression analyses of the observer’s punishment behavior. In these
models, we regress a measure of punishment on the actual stopping time, a set of dummy
variables for the standoff outcomes, and a set of dummy variables for the observer’s ideal
point. The excluded category is the case where A wins and the observer’s ideal point
is θO = 50. We used subject-level fixed effects to account for potential heterogeneity
in observers’ average deductions. The dependent variable for the first column is the
total amount of punishment used by the observer. We find that total punishment is
increasing in the duration of the Staring Contest, which is consistent with the notion
that observers seek to encourage contestants to end the game early. More substantial
differences in punishment behavior, consistent with the averages reported in Table 5, arise
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from differences in contest outcomes. Observers use the least amount of punishment when
A wins the Staring Contest, use more total punishment when B wins, and use the most
punishment when there is breakdown. We also find that observers use more punishment
when θO = 25 than when θO = 50 but that there is no difference in total punishment
when θO = 0.
Table 6: Effects of Outcomes and Treatments on the Use of Punishment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Blame Blame to A Blame to B % of All Blame to A
Actual Stopping Time 0.36∗∗ 0.04 0.32∗ -0.00
(0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.00)
B Wins 17.07∗∗∗ -7.37∗∗ 24.45∗∗∗ -0.48∗∗∗
(3.04) (2.79) (2.80) (0.05)
Breakdown 64.08∗∗∗ 25.82∗∗∗ 38.26∗∗∗ -0.22∗
(7.21) (6.62) (6.62) (0.11)
Obs 0 5.23 -1.07 6.30∗ 0.03
(3.40) (3.12) (3.12) (0.06)
Obs 25 9.12∗∗ 5.42 3.70 0.11∗
(3.40) (3.12) (3.13) (0.06)
Constant 17.07∗∗∗ 19.39∗∗∗ -2.32 0.79∗∗∗
(3.48) (3.20) (3.20) (0.06)
R2 0.13 0.05 0.20 0.38
R2w 0.29 0.10 0.26 0.40
R2b 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.31
N 396 396 396 223
Ng 66 66 66 57
Standard errors in parentheses.
Observer Ideal 50 and A Wins omitted as reference categories.
All models use subject-level fixed effects.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
In the second and third columns of Table 6, we examine the effects of standoff outcomes
and observer treatments on the points deducted from each player separately. Interestingly,
we see that the observer deducts significantly fewer points from A when A loses than when
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A wins. This appears to be consistent with Hypothesis 3.4. However, we do not see any
significant treatment effects of varying the observer’s ideal point in column 2. Inequity
aversion may play a role in this result: the observer may value a roughly equal point
distribution for Players A and B more highly than she values any particular outcome
of the contest. Different weightings on equity versus strictly rational play (as we define
it) does not disprove our hypotheses — we cannot parse the competing theories given
our data. In column 3, we see that B is punished significantly more for winning than
losing, which is also consistent with Hypothesis 3.4. And in this case, we also find that
the amount of punishment is slightly greater when θO = 0, which provides some support
for Hypothesis 3.5.
The dependent variable in the fourth column is the percentage of total punishment
used in the round applied to Player A. This captures the relative amount of blame assigned
to Player A whenever punishment is used. These results are consistent with the results in
columns 2 and 3. The intercept is 0.79, which means that Player A receives most of the
punishment when A wins in the symmetric condition θO = 50. But when Player B wins,
the negative and statistically significant coefficient implies that punishment shifts from A
to B—that is, to the winning player. Further, the coefficient for breakdown implies that
the punishment is approximately equal. There is some evidence of an effect of varying the
observer’s ideal point, as the proportion of punishment applied to Player A increases when
θO = 25 relative to the symmetric case where θO = 50, but it is in the wrong direction
predicted by the theoretical analysis. Overall, the regression analysis implies support for
Hypothesis 3.4. These choices in punishment allocation are, however, also consistent with
a subject attempting to produce a more equitable final distribution of points.
3.4.3 Classification of Punishment Strategies
In this section, we provide additional insight into punishment behavior by classifying
whether the observed allocations of blame are consistent with theoretical predictions or
with other empirical regularities. We also classify subjects using these same categories
by identifying subjects’ modal punishment strategies. We learn that, while adherence
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to strict rationality (in terms of the magnitude of punishment) is low, most punishment
follows the theoretical argument to punish the Staring Contest winner. This analysis
provides further qualified support for our hypotheses concerning blame.
Following our theoretical analysis, we classify punishment as generally rational if the
observer deducts points from the winner. More specifically, we say that punishment is
strongly rational if it creates the strongest incentives for the game to end at t = 0: when
the observer deducts 80 points or more from B when B wins (in any observer condition) or
from A when A wins (but only if θO = 50) and deducts 0 points from the loser. Weakening
this requirement, we say that punishment is weakly rational if it targets the contestant
according to the alignment of the observer’s interest but less than the full magnitude
required to induce a difference in contestants’ behavior (i.e., less than 80 points). An even
weaker version of this is for observers to punish the winner more than the loser under any
condition (regardless of θ0). These categories of rationality are also coded according to
observer ideal point; all results can be read as pertaining to rational play that accounts
for each particular value of θO.
We use two additional categories to describe allocations that also appear frequently
in our data. Punishment is equal if the observer deducts an equal number of points from
both players. We also classify rounds where no punishment is used at all.
We coded each instance of punishment with an indicator for the category that identified
the allocation in that round. Next, we categorized each subject by finding their modal
category. (Note that codings are not mutually exclusive at the level of observation since,
for example, rational punishment is a subset of weakly rational punishment, nor are they
mutually exclusive at the subject level in the case of ties.) This gives us a distribution
of categories of play across rounds, and a distribution of general types of play across
subjects. Table 7 presents these results.
We first note that subjects do not shy away from punishing the contestants. Non-zero
punishment is used in over half of all periods. When punishment is non-zero, punishing
the winner appears to be the prevailing strategy.17 Although a small percentage of
17One indicative comment from subjects in the post-experiment questionnaire explicitly noted “I would
deduct points from the player that did not concede. I was hoping this would make players more likely
to concede in future rounds when I would be playing against them.” Although this comment might
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Table 7: Distribution of Play and Subjects by Category
Behavior Percent of Rounds Percent of Subjects
(N = 375) (N = 66)
Rational Punishment 11% 2%
Weakly Rational Punishment 26% 6%
Punish the Winner 37% 32%
Equal Punishment 9% 9%
No Punishment 46% 52%
observations fit the requirements of strongly rational play (11%), we do find that a quarter
of observations can be classified as weakly rational (26%) and that even more rounds are
consistent with punishing the winner (37%). When we condition on the use of non-zero
punishment, 21% of such observations can be classified as strongly rational, nearly half
(48%) count as weakly rational, and more than two-thirds (69%) are consistent with
punishing the winner. We observe very few rounds with equal punishment (9%), while
the observer uses no punishment whatsoever in slightly less than half of the rounds
(46%). The subject-level classifications are generally consistent with the observation-level
findings except that few subjects consistently use strongly rational punishment. This
does not, indeed cannot, include explicit attempts at leveling the final point distribution
in our definition of rationality. Overall, our classification analysis finds a high level of
punishment targeted at the contest winner, which constitutes further qualitative support
for our hypotheses.
suggest repeated play considerations, it is also consistent with subjects’ understanding of learning and
experience—that behavior adjusts to incentives over time. In contrast, the comments of subjects who
did not use any punishment suggested they did so expecting reciprocity, for example: “I never deducted
anyone’s points, didn’t want it to happen to me[.]”
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3.4.4 Individual Differences in Behavior
At the end of the experiment, subjects provided their gender, ideology, party affiliation,
and a description of their approach (if any) to playing the game.18 We can use these data to
assess whether behavior in the Staring Contest varies with individual-level characteristics,
and indeed, we find that differences are associated with gender and ideology. In general,
we find evidence that women used more intermediate values for intended stopping times,
that women use less punishment relative to men, and that being more conservative is
associated with greater allocation of blame in general.
Recall that subjects entered an intended waiting time that had a small chance (1
in 10) of being implemented as their actual stopping time. These times are a form of
commitment to conceding by a certain time in a non-trivial number of rounds, and thus
are a significant strategic consideration for subjects. Plotting the distribution of these
times by gender demonstrates a distinct difference in the use of stopping times. Figure
4 shows women enter extreme stopping times less frequently than men, providing times
most often at intervals of five seconds.19 The most striking difference is that men enter
t = 30 for the intended stopping time over twice as often, and enter t = 29 almost as
frequently as they enter t = 30. Note also that times within 5 seconds of each extreme
(that is, t ∈ [0, 5) and t ∈ (25, 30]) make up a larger proportion of the distribution for
women than for men.20
Women exhibit different strategies for play than men, allocating less punishment
overall and deducting points in a more equitable manner. First, we show the gender-based
differences in the use of punishment. Table 8 summarizes the deductions made by men
and women, given the outcome of the contest and the observer ideal points. In line with
Hypothesis 3.5, both men and women tend to punish B more for winning than A when
the observer’s ideal is 0 or 25. However, except for A winning when the observer’s ideal is
18Subjects completed questionnaires via computer. They comprised a mixture of item selection and
free-entry text fields. Note that six subjects did not complete the experiment and therefore did not fill
out the post-experiment questionnaire. Thus, there are 66 subjects for this section of the analysis.
19A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects (at the p < 0.001 level) the null hypothesis that these distributions
are equal.
20Regression analysis supports the presence of a gender-based difference. However, the negative and
significant coefficient on the gender variable only shows that women enter lower intended stopping times
on average, a fact already obvious in the graph.
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Figure 4: Distribution of Intended Stopping Times, by Gender
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25, women deduct considerably fewer points than men in the same conditions. Further,
when the observer’s ideal point is 0 or 50, men punish breakdown severely, while women
punish breakdown either moderately (for θ = 0) or not at all (for θ = 50).
Women appear more even-handed in their allocation of blame than men. Table 9
reprises Table 7 by categorizing play at the subject-level, disaggregated by gender. None
of the women in our sample use strongly or weakly rational punishment, while fewer
women punish the winner. Conversely, none of the men use equal punishment and women
are more likely than men to refrain from using any punishment at all.21 These findings
support recent findings that men tend to play more (economically) optimal, or competitive,
21Some subjects might consider multiple rounds of the contest as a repeated game. If so, it is
possible that either evenly distributing punishment or deducting no points at all could be a rational
choice. Alternatively, the unwillingness to use punishment may stem from altruism, reciprocity, or
other-regarding concerns.
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Table 8: Average Deductions by Outcomes, Treatment, and Gender
Observer Ideal Point
Contest Outcome 0 25 50
A Wins Women 18.5 30.9 23.7
Men 21.3 20.7 44.7
B Wins Women 48.3 37.5 30.1
Men 67 70.9 28.5
Breakdown Women 53.3 94.3 0
Men 100 83.3 100
strategies in games of shared value and resource allocation than women, who are more
likely to adopt egalitarian, or cooperative, strategies (Croson and Buchan 1999; Kennelly
and Fantino 2007; Van den Assem, Van Dolder, and Thaler 2012). Furthermore, our
results extend the reach of such findings to explicitly political scenarios.
Table 9: Distribution of Rational Play by Gender
Behavior Men Women
(N = 32) (N = 34)
Rational Punishment 3% 0%
Weakly Rational Punishment 13% 0%
Punish the Winner 41% 24%
Equal Punishment 0% 18%
No Punishment 41% 62%
Subject ideology also appears to correlate with differences in the use of punishment.
Table 10 shows that more conservative subjects punish more heavily. The distribution
of ideological types is less even than for gender, with 23 liberal subjects, 29 moderate,
and only 14 conservative, making the estimates for conservatives noisier. Differences in
punishment are still notable. Biased observers increase their use of punishment as they
become more ideologically conservative. When the observer’s ideal point is either 0 or
25, punishment always increases under the same outcome: moderates punish more than
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Table 10: Average Deductions By Outcomes, Treatment, and Ideology
Observer Ideal Point
Contest Outcome 0 25 50
A Wins Liberal 13.7 20.2 34
Moderate 23.6 25.2 37.9
Conservative 24.4 37.2 28.3
B Wins Liberal 40.3 39.3 30
Moderate 62.8 56 32.2
Conservative 68.9 81.2 21.5
Breakdown Liberal 30 100 66.7
Moderate 100 87.5 100
Conservative 100 80 —
liberals, conservatives punish more than moderates. However, for conservative, neutral
observers, the trend reverses: they use less punishment than even liberals under the same
outcome. In line with rational play, Player B is punished more severely for winning than
Player A. The only deviation is the conservative, neutral observer who punishes Player B
less for winning than in any other treatment or outcome. Finally, breakdown is punished
most severely by all observer ideologies, with the exception of liberal subjects when θ = 0.
Examining rational play by ideology further supports our finding that subjects rarely
engage in strictly rational play, but do frequently apportion most blame to the Staring
Contest winner. Table 11 presents these results. Only liberal subjects can be classified
as using strictly rational punishment, and then only rarely (4%). Liberals are also most
likely to employ a weakly rational strategy (9%). However, conservative subjects are the
most likely to punish the winner, almost doubling the frequency for liberals (43% vs 22%,
respectively). Also, conservative observers are the most likely of the ideological types to
dole out equal punishment to all players (14%), at half-again the rate of liberals (9%),
and double that of moderates (7%).
Individual differences in play and punishment exist between men and women, and
among ideological types. Women and men conceded at different rates, and responded
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Table 11: Distribution of Rational Play by Ideology
Behavior Liberals Moderates Conservatives
(N = 23) (N = 29) (N = 14)
Rational Punishment 4% 0% 0%
Weakly Rational Punishment 9% 3% 7%
Punish the Winner 22% 34% 43%
Equal Punishment 9% 7% 14%
No Punishment 65% 41% 50%
differently when playing the same role; women concede roughly evenly as Player A or B,
whereas men concede less as Player A. The presence of this effect is independent of subjects’
strategic considerations, in contrast to work on gender in bargaining that generally makes
gender known to all parties (Cadsby, Serva´tka, and Song 2010; Holm 2005; Putnam
and Jones 1982; Sutter et al. 2009). Further research on this effect would contribute
to understanding differences that arise for intrinsic reasons rather than from strategic
responses to gender. Ideology also matters in this study, with growing conservatism
correlating with both greater use of punishment in general, and an unwillingness to
concede as Player A. Similar to gender, ideology in bargaining experiments is usually
modeled as common knowledge (Banas and Parks 2002; Wade-Benzoni et al. 2002) but is
important to understand as a personal trait affecting evaluations of politics.22
3.5 DISCUSSION
In this paper, we examined how blame could be used as a mechanism for voters to control
their representatives, focusing on how observers apportion blame and how the anticipation
of blame affects political outcomes. We found that, in our experimental setting, observers
use blame as punishment for delaying the resolution of a political standoff. Overall levels
22One interesting exception is Knight and Ensminger (1998), which considers personal ideology in the
development of social norms, rather than through mutual evaluation of a bargaining partner’s ideology.
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of punishment increase when observers’ interests are more closely aligned with one side
of the fight, though no one is entirely spared and both sides are heavily punished for
breakdowns. Thus, our findings suggest that interests alone do not determine the target
of blame, cutting against the conventional wisdom that observers rarely blame copartisans
for bad outcomes, as this behavior is broadly consistent with a rational strategy observers
can use to induce better outcomes for themselves.
We also found that while blame does not significantly alter Staring Contest outcomes,
it does induce representatives to reduce the duration of standoffs. The rational anticipation
of blame drives players to terminate contests earlier, thereby reducing waiting costs for
all players. Shorter delays can be seen as a “bipartisan” improvement in our experiment
as well as in political reality. But breakdown still occurs, of course. Our results suggest
breakdown also arises when political elites fail to fully anticipate the consequences of
protracted disagreements.
While the experimental evidence generally supports our hypotheses, inequity aversion
may help explain deviations. Punishment is widely used, but is only mildly affected by
observer ideal point treatments; subjects may care more about the final point allocation
than their induced affiliation with Player A. Furthermore, “Equal Punishment” is a rarely
used strategy for players of any gender or ideology. Deducting the same number of points
from both sides does not satisfy a desire for equality of outcomes. A different structure for
the Staring Contest would be necessary to fully tease out the prevalence of these incentives
(and to separate them from risk aversion (Carlsson, Daruvala, and Johansson-Stenman
2005). The gap between our predictions of rational play and actual subject choices cannot
be read simply as the inability to predict outcomes based on our model. Rather, we take
these findings to suggest that subjects demonstrate behavioral regularities that could be,
but in the current form are not, reflected in our model of political standoffs.
Extensions to our work would move beyond our focus on how voter blame impacts
negotiating behavior during standoffs that are already underway. A single-shot game
highlighted how an audience to the standoff decides to allot punishment at a single
point in time. Of course, politics is frequently a repeated game, and expanding our
experiment may add to the substantive findings reported here. Clearly, some subjects
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already considered the potential impact of punishment in one round on their outcomes
in future rounds. In addition, pre-standoff communication might introduce interesting
incentives, asking the observer to consider the possible avoidance of the standoff when
allocating blame. This paper serves as a foundation for examining the important, and
recurring, interaction between elected representatives and the expressed desire of voters
during high-stakes political brinkmanship In 2011, Standard & Poor’s downgraded the
U.S. Treasury partly because Congress’ partisan showdowns repeatedly threatened default
on loan service payments.23 Prompt resolution of subsequent debt limit battles convinced
another ratings firm to return the U.S. credit rating to full AAA status.24 Similarly, in
1995, Speaker Newt Gingrich stood firm against President Bill Clinton over the federal
budget, bolstered by the belief that the public would blame the president for a shutdown
(Drew 1997). Gingrich held out, and the government shut down for 27 days. While
media labeled Gingrich the winner, the public clearly blamed Republicans more than
Democrats.25 Speaker John Boehner overestimated public support for his stance, refused
to blink, and allowed the government to shut down again. Here too, despite Boehner
“winning” by (temporarily) preventing an increase in the debt ceiling, the public laid the
majority of blame at his feet.26 Following these episodes, Gingrich and Boehner seemed
to learn their lesson, as later battles ended in favor of their opponents.27
23Damian Paletta and Matt Phillips, “S&P Strips U.S. of Top Credit Rating”, Wall Street Journal, 6
August, 2011.
24Jim Puzzanghera, “Fitch takes U.S. credit rating off downgrade watch after debt deal”, Los Angeles
Times, 21 March, 2014.
25CNN/USA/Gallup Poll, “Americans blame GOP for budget mess”, CNN, 15 November 1995.
26Paul Steinhauser, “CNN Poll: GOP would bear the brunt of shutdown blame”, CNN Politics, 30
September 2013.
27Paul Kane, Robert Costa, Ed O’Keefe, “House passes ‘clean’ debt-ceiling bill, ending two-week
showdown”, Washington Post, 11 February, 2014.
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4.0 INFORMATION TRANSMISSION IN CONGRESSIONAL
HEARINGS
Hearings are the most public expression of Congress’ oversight function. They provide
ample opportunity for members of Congress to engage in all three famed Mayhew (1974)
activities: conducting a single hearing places the member at the center of a news-worthy
event, argues for the member’s ownership of the issue, and lets the member stake out a
position on the topic at hand. Those called to testify may burnish their reputation for
expertise, rehabilitate a tarnished public image, or simply demonstrate their importance to
the policy making process (Esterling 2004; Leyden 1995). Hearings also allow committees
to demonstrate a commitment to policy specialization to the full chamber (Diermeier and
Feddersen 2000). The question remains, however, as to whether the hearings are valuable
as vehicles for oversight in and of themselves.
Hearings shape political attention to important policy issues (Edwards and Wood
1999; Robinson and Appel 1979), and consume a considerable about of legislative time.
Whether or not relevant and useful policy information is conveyed during these hearings is
an important facet of understanding congressional control over executive branch activities.
While delegation of policy information to the bureaucracy is predicated on asymmetries of
information and a desire for efficient resource allocation (Bendor, Glazer, and Hammond
2001; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Holmstrom 1984; Krehbiel 1991; Patty 2005), Congress
cannot adequately audit policy implementation if it cannot extract accurate reporting
from its agents (Gailmard 2009; Gailmard and Patty 2013). The primary result of this
study shows that, while congressional hearings can enable this extraction, meaningful
information exchange is far more likely to occur when both the legislative and executive
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representatives agree on policy. Put another way, when the interests of committee members
and witnesses diverge, hearings serve primarily as political theater.
The informativeness of hearings has received less attention than its importance
warrants, perhaps in part because of the difficulty of conducting a meaningful content
analysis on a significant sample. Most research on the topic of congressional hearing
content focuses on the “metadata” related to the hearing itself, including the policy topic,
the convening committee or subcommittee, or the broad affiliation of external attendees
(Degregorio 1992; Leyden 1995). One notable example of exploring informativeness finds
that hearings do not have instrumental value in getting bills passed (Brasher 2006). Of
course, that study only examines whether the hearing was necessary for the subsequent bill
passage, and cannot address whether anything within the hearing was itself informative.
After all, the dynamics of passing legislation are largely independent of how revelatory a
hearing may have been. Del Sesto (1980) demonstrates the considerable effort required
to perform hand-coded content analysis of hearings, but supports the value of doing
so by clearly identifying how the committee acquired information through the hearing
process (even if it is sometimes ignored (Bradley 1980)). Sabatier and Whiteman (1985)
shows that extensive information flows between members of congress, their staffs, and
committee staffers, as well as the executive branch and private organizations, but assumes
that whatever is exchanged is actually useful information (vice being simply ceremonial
interactions intended as a signal to any observers). I tackle the informativeness problem
directly using automated text analysis to quantify the policy content of hearings across
both chambers and every committee over multiple sessions (limited only by the public
availability of transcripts). Such a broad sample of data starts filling in the gap in
knowledge about the effectiveness of hearings for congressional oversight.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. First, I build my theoretical structure
and resulting hypotheses on the foundation of Crawford and Sobel (1982) by showing
that a single hearing is a useful approximation of a signaling game between a Committee
Chair and an executive branch witness. The next section explains how a speaker’s
choice of specificity in language operationalizes the concept of message partitioning from
the signaling game. I then describe my data, and the method for calculating language
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specificity from hearing texts. Results from a model of information transmission are
presented, followed by a discussion of the importance of these results. Ultimately, this
paper demonstrates that the level of information conveyed in Congressional hearings is a
direct result of the ideological distance between a Committee Chair and a witness. We learn
that, precisely when the legislature may wish to exert greater influence – when the two
disagree about policy and Congress hopes to reorient its efforts – is when representatives
of the executive branch shade their private information in an attempt to retain autonomy.
4.1 HEARINGS AS SIGNALING
The actual conduct of a hearing closely resembles the strategic situation Crawford and
Sobel (1982) (henceforth, CS) analyze in their theory of information transmission.1 I
lean on their theoretical structure to identify the driving mechanisms and incentives for
participants in congressional hearings. Actors, incentives, choices, and the play of the
game map naturally from the theoretical to empirical setting. Of course, the comparison
is not perfect, and I note the most significant discrepancies along with the reasons they
do not significantly diminish the usefulness of this approach.
At least two roles appear in any signaling game – the receiver, R, and the sender, S –
which are filled in this study by the committee chair of a hearing as R, and any actor from
Executive Branch agencies as S. There are, of course, any number of other people who
may appear in hearings: private sector business leaders, athletes, academics, or any other
individual subject to Congress’ subpoena power.2 In the analysis, however, I restrict the
set of senders to Executive Branch representatives for two reasons. First, the functioning
of oversight pertains almost entirely to legislative control of bureaucracies. Second, data
on policy preferences (ideal points) for actors outside these two roles is insufficient to use
in analysis. Considering R, congressional committees comprise members of both political
1Analogies to non-strategic signaling games (e.g. Spence (1973)) are obvious, but entail the specification
of exogenous costs that are not applicable in this setting.
2For clarity and consistency, I use the pronouns “she/her” when referring to chairs/receivers, and
“he/him” when referring to witnesses/senders.
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parties and a range of ideological concerns even within one party. Considering the chair
of the committee as the central figure, however, does not remove these interests from
the game. Chairs coordinate the request for, structure of, and witness attendance at the
hearing in conjunction with the interested parties in the committee (Leyden 1992). During
a hearing the chair guides the pace of interaction, manages time allotted to committee
members and witnesses, and holds ultimate say over the hearing’s duration. Because of
this control over the forum, the chair is the focal consideration for any witness called to
testify.
Each side of the signaling game has distinct interests, with chairs representing the
committee, the chamber, and their own constituencies, and witnesses representing multi-
faceted organizations, or speaking for a community that may hold diverse views. While
this appears to unduly condense a large cast of characters, a theoretical model of hearings
that concentrates on the two actors with single utility functions (even when left largely
abstract here) is not as limiting as it may first appear. Testimony requires distilling diverse
interests and messages into a unified statement delivered by a single person. Multiple
witnesses in a hearing may represent similar positions, but in each case the speaker has
chosen to reveal a particular amount of information during the hearing. Witnesses have
every incentive to capture the position of the interest they represent, and indeed spend
considerable time and effort crafting statements, since they are opportunities to lobby
for a position (Leyden 1995), demonstrate competence to the audience, and guide policy
choices (Esterling 2004). Each side of the game, then, can be usefully said to have an
ideal point that guides their behavior during the hearing.
The two sides in the CS game are not equally informed about an issue, and neither
are the actors in a hearing. A better-informed bureaucracy is a fundamental, and largely
non-controversial, aspect of the delegation literature (Bendor, Glazer, and Hammond
2001; Bendor and Meirowitz 2004; Gailmard 2002; Huber and Shipan 2002; Kiewiet and
M D McCubbins 1991; Volden 2002). The committee chair is, ostensibly, seeking to
remedy this information asymmetry by requiring the better-informed actor to report what
they know about some topic. The potential effects of a policy choice is only one possible
topic, as committees routinely demand information about executive agency management
69
choices, private industry practices, or even the behavior of a key individual. I retain
this central feature by assuming that any witness delivering testimony is the relatively
more knowledgeable sender, and the committee chair is the receiver who must update
her beliefs about the information delivered before taking action. Crucially, the witness’
statements are thus conditioned by his expectation about the chair’s knowledge.
Each player in the hearing has the opportunity to make a strategic choice. The
sender is the CS game moves first, and systematically introduces noise into his message by
indicating only a range in which the true state of the world lay. In equilibrium, the amount
of noise — “partitioning” in CS — is a direct function of the distance between the sender’s
and the receiver’s preferences. Again, the connection to hearings is straightforward:
both the committee chair and the witness have individual interests that may diverge.
Bureaucratic agencies have both their own interests and the need to consider the needs of
their ultimate sponsor, the President. I leverage this connection through measurements of
committee chair and agency ideal points (Chen and Johnson 2015; K. Poole and Rosenthal
2007).
Divergence between ideal outcomes for a witness and a committee chairs stems from
numerous sources. First, and perhaps most prominent, is ideological differences between
the committee chair and the president, who is generally assumed to exert strong influence
over the policy goals of an agency (Huber and Shipan 2002). This control is not perfect
since agencies develop a measure of autonomy in defining and pursuing goals, though this
does not necessarily narrow the gap between the legislature and the agency (Carpenter
2001, 2010). The passage of time is itself a wedge, as the interests of new generations of
congress drift from an agency’s original mandate (Macey 1992). Non-bureaucratic actors
may not have such direct disagreements with the committee, but are certainly concerned
with any legislative results of the process. That said, both the CS game and my empirical
measures do not require positive divergence. For CS, perfect alignment coincides with
perfect information transmission. My measure allows for identical ideological positions
and perfect precision (though they are not, in actuality, ever seen).
After hearing the message, the receiver updates her beliefs, then makes a choice that
affects utility for both actors in the game. For hearings, this choice is the adoption,
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or not, of new legislation that governs the life of the witness in some way.3 Both the
committee chair and the witness have preferences over the outcome. The chair may have
some desire for good policy, or may simply be looking for instrumental utility obtained
by position-taking (Mayhew 1974) or communicating competence to the full chamber
(Diermeier and Feddersen 2000). Witnesses may have hopes of successfully arguing for a
new policy (a lobbyist, perhaps), or may hope to avoid budgetary restrictions (agency
leadership). Strictly within the signaling game played in the hearing, testimony is “cheap
talk,” but this does not mean the witness relates nonsense or lies. He does, however,
attempt to send the least precise information possible, in order to retain some of the
information advantage. The witness choice of precision, and conditions that drive it, is
the central concern of this paper so the definition of precision is explained in detail below.
Indeed, the process of holding a hearing looks like the sequence of play in the CS
game. First, S observes his private information, then chooses a message. R updates her
beliefs, then takes an action. The sender moving first is both theoretically important
and empirically valid: witnesses collect relevant information to craft their testimony,
then deliver it, to the congressional attendees.4 After hearing all relevant testimony, the
committee decides whether and how to pursue legislative change.
Rather than focus on the technical equilibria, the relevant insight is found in the
comparative static: congruence of actor interests. Only when the two sides have perfectly
aligned interests should anyone expect to see fully truthful communication, otherwise the
sender will choose a noisy message. To be specific, introducing some amount of noise in
the message is almost always a best response for S, considering the potential action R
may take. As the chair and witness preferences diverge, the amount of noise should grow,
or, equivalently, the amount of precision should decrease. Further, and just as important
for studying hearings, is the fact that amount of information transmitted is zero only in
3To use this choice as the receiver’s action only requires the possibility of new legislation. The sender
expects, correctly, that unwanted changes are possible, and conditions his signal accordingly. Indeed, the
sender may begrudgingly change his behavior to better suit the receiver in order to prevent legislation
the sender dislikes even more; observing altered legislation to force this change is not necessarily on the
equilibrium path.
4There is no chance in the CS game for either side to opt out and avoid the exchange. Similarly, and
because of the compelling legal force of Congress’ subpoena power, I make the assumption that appearing
at a hearing is a fait comply for the witness.
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the extreme case of precisely opposite preferences. Thus the CS actors are most likely to
coordinate on an equilibrium that always includes some positive amount of information.
This paper operationalizes this insight by measuring the level of precision in testimony,
then explores the impact of preference divergence, and other institutional factors, on that
precision.5
The empirical implications of this result for hearings are straightforward, so I state
them here as the first hypothesis I will test:
Hypothesis 4.1. As witness and chair ideal points converge, the witness will deliver
more information during a hearing.
I develop the full operationalization of ideal points and information in the next section.
Despite other signaling game models presenting technically and substantively opposing
views of how ideological difference affects information transmission, I rely here on the CS
framework, and choose to avoid any sense of a “horserace”. That said, this work does
contribute to understanding why CS is the best starting point for investigating hearing
informativeness. Specifically, work such as Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989), Krishna (2001),
Battaglini (2002), or Minozzi (2011) present direct challenges to the CS finding: ideological
distance is not found to matter for the amount of information transmitted. However,
those models posit interactions that are rarely, if ever, present in actual congressional
hearings that include only agency representatives. Agency witnesses address a range of
issues on a single topic, and are not repeatedly placed in pairs (or groups) of diametrically
opposed experts at opposition with each other on the same exact issue. The possibility of
transmitting information in just this latter contest is a central concern of those papers.
Second, the physical process of a hearing is a succession of witnesses testifying either
one-by-one (or, rarely, in highly-related small groups such as the highest ranking officers
of a corporation) in set order, and not, as is the case in the models noted, simultaneously.
That is, equilibria suggesting that ideological distance does not decrease (or, indeed,
increase) information revelation are predicated on each sender choosing a message without
5Diermeier and Feddersen (2000) use a model where the informativeness of a hearing is exogenously
given. The CS model makes the level of information endogenous, and my measure of information
corresponds to the CS model’s basic features.
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knowledge of the other’s. This effective simultaneity of messaging substantially changes
the sender’s incentives, and with it the receiver’s beliefs and ultimate choice of action,
while also not reflecting the process of testifying-through-interrogation each witness
undergoes in a hearing.6
Descriptive verisimilitude is not a useful discriminator of formal models. Instead, I
use the data from actual hearings to demonstrate that within-hearing transmission goes
from relatively similar agency witnesses to the committee chairs, thus supporting the use
of CS versus other models. Figure 5 shows the distribution of the difference between the
largest and smallest ideal points of the representatives testifying withing a single hearing.
This can be thought of as the largest ideological range between witnesses that occured
during the hearing. Across all hearings in the dataset, the difference between agency
representative ideal points is quite small, predominantly below 0.4. While that distance
is itself enough to separate viewpoints in a technical sense (after all, a Democrat and a
Republican may be different parties while still having ideal points closer than that), this
indicates that, substantively, the speakers hold kindred views (because the conservative
Democrat and liberal Republican have similar policy views by definition). Of course, this
does not rule out the possibility that, across multiple hearings, chairs may array opposing
viewpoints to gather diverse opinions. That situation is different than the one I present
in this paper, and thus does not argue against relying on the CS model.
While the similarity between the CS game and a hearing are clear, there are several
limitations. First, I cannot know with certainty the true level of knowledge either side
has about the policy under question. Oleszek (2004) notes that committee chairs may
conduct extensive review of a policy before conducting a hearing. In this case, the hearing
functions more like an audit with the chair measuring the witness’ truthfulness. Even so,
the witness will be aware of this effort since committee staff are engaging in background
research. Thus, even if the informational asymmetry is small or non-existent, testimony
is still based in part on the witness’ expectation of the chair’s knowledge.
6To anticipate a further objection: while a committee’s preparation for the hearing, and thus the
witness’ preparation for testifying, is simultaneous, testimony is observable by all players, and thus
adaptable at the time of delivery. Witnesses can, and often do, deviate from their prepared remarks.
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Figure 5: Distribution of Agency Witness Ideal Point Ranges
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Second, the final choice of the receiver is opaque. Because I concentrate here entirely
on the process within the hearing, I do not include any eventual change in legislation.
While Brasher (2006) look at the impact hearings have on the likelihood of new legislation
being offered, my design does not require validation with this data. Like the issue with
the information held by the chair, the important mechanism is the senders’ expectations
about the receiver’s actions; the action itself is identified in equilibrium.
A second hypothesis specifically about the amount of information delivered in hearing
testimony follows from informational theories of legislative organization (Krehbiel 1991).
The committee structure in Congress encourages policy specialization, with members
requesting committee assignments that comport with their constituent and personal
interests and further developing expertise through the creation of legislation within a
policy arena. The longer a member serves on the committee, the greater her topic
knowledge, as compared to both the average member in the full chamber and the newer
members of her committee. The important implication here is this information makes her
a better auditor of any messaging about that topic delivered during a hearing. Simply put,
the longer a committee member has served, the better she is at knowing if a witness is
being forthcoming. Moreover, this fact is known to the witness, who develops a statement
that is only as specific as it needs to be, without risking being caught in a falsehood.
Stating this as a testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4.2. Witnesses will deliver more informative testimony in hearings with
committee chairs who have served more terms.
In sum, congressional hearings are usefully modeled by the canonical CS signaling
game, allowing me to employ the logic of the game’s play and solution to investigate the
informative value of testimony. Preference divergence, as a comparative static, informs
my examination of testimony. Note that I do not mean to test the underlying theory of
the CS game; rather I mean that my theoretical expectations are founded on the insights
the CS model provides. The next step is defining how the actual content of the messages
is measured.
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4.2 LANGUAGE AS INFORMATION
On top of the clear correlation between the signaling model and the hearing, I develop a
measure of the political heart of the exchange: the policy information being transmitted.
Specifically, I quantify the language specificity (Li and Nenkova 2015) of all speakers in a
hearing, including both congress members conducting the hearing and witnesses giving
statements. First I explain how this serves as an empirical instantiation of the CS game’s
messaging, then I provide the technical details for arriving at the measure.
Spoken testimony and signaling can both be measured in terms of specificity. Messages
in the CS game transmit information about some variable, the true value of which is
known to the sender. A key result for CS is that a message, in equilibrium, will actually
transmit a range of values, partitioning the variable’s domain into multiple sets. S says,
in effect, the value of the variable may be below some value, above some value, or lie in
an interval. The size of that partition containing the true value (or, at least the range in
which S claims the value sits) is a measure of the message’s specificity.
Natural language can be understood using the same concept of specificity. Consider,
as an example, the following statements from then-Representative of the State of Ohio,
James Garfield made during Congress’ 1873 investigation of the Cre´dit Mobilier scandal.
First, Garfield makes specific claims about statements made to him, the amount of a loan,
and individual contacts:
“Nothing was ever said to me by Mr. Train or Mr. Ames to indicate or imply that the
Credit Mobilier was or could be in any way connected with the legislation of Congress
for the Pacific Railroad or for any other purpose. Mr. Ames never gave, nor offered to
give, me any stock or other valuable thing as a gift. I once asked and obtained from him,
and afterward repaid to him, a loan of $300; that amount is the only valuable thing I
ever received from or delivered to him.” –Garfield (1873)
Garfield’s statement could be called a fine partitioning of the underlying information: he
states a clear legal view, recounts the kind and number of items received from Mr. Train
and Mr. Ames, and a specific amount of money. The second statement again deals with
Garfield’s securing of loans and his personal contacts, but is far less specific:
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“I should think it was in the session of 1868. I had been to Europe the fall before, and
was in debt, and borrowed several sums of money at different times and from different
persons. This loan from Mr. Ames was not at his instance. I made the request myself.
I think I had asked one or two persons before him for the loan.” –Garfield (1873)
This time Garfield chooses a coarser partitioning for his message: his recollection of a
date is vague, notes receiving “several” loans instead of a precise number, and then notes
an indeterminate number of people he had previously ask. I argue that the difference is a
strategic choices made by any S when delivering testimony.
The strategic nature of vagueness is made explicit in more recent work on signaling.
Blume and Board (2014) analyze a signaling game where vague messages admit multiple
interpretations of the same signal. While this message-based uncertainty differs from the
CS type-based uncertainty, the important point for my purpose is the same: uncertainty
in messaging is reflected in language choice. Further, this uncertainty can be quantified
and utilized to study strategic information transmission. Indeed, prior work uses this
very method to study the level of information in arguments, a clear companion to the
kind of exchange CS capture with their model (Swanson, Ecker, and Walker 2015). The
next section provides details on how I measure information in hearings, as well as other
relevant measures that impact the game played during hearings.
4.3 DATA AND METHODS
My primary unit of observation is a single witness in a given hearing. For each hearing,
there is an associated committee that convened the hearing, and the chair of that
committee. These, then, are the two players in the CS signaling game: the witness is the
sender, and the chair is the receiver. The key comparative static in the CS game is the
difference between the sender and the receiver’s ideological positions, and the amount of
information delivered by the sender (technically, how finely partitioned the message space
is). Working with this theory thus requires data on the ideological positions of the two
sides of the game, as well as a measure of information.
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My primary source of data is the text of Congressional hearings for all committees in a
session of Congress. For reasons of data availability, I use the publicly-available transcripts
of Congressional hearings from the 105th − 112th Congresses (covering 1993 − 2012).7
Hearing transcripts include not only all recorded verbal exchanges, but also all the
relevant details to identify the committee (or subcommittee, or both) convening the
hearing, committee (and subcommittee) members, hearing title and date, as well as
information about all present witnesses, including any organization they may represent.8
Data for the congressional side of the game are taken from standard sources. Ideological
scores for members of Congress are the standard Common Space DW Nominate scores
from Carroll et al. (2008). Committees and their Chairs are obtained from Stewart III and
Woon (n.d.). I use scores from the 105th to the 112th Congresses, reflecting the overlap
between the congresses for which full sets of hearing texts, updated ideological scores,
and committee data are available.
Ideological positions for hearing witnesses are obtained from Chen and Johnson (2015).9
I restrict the set of witnesses to only those people who are, at the time of testifying,
representing an executive branch agency for two reasons. First, the theory presented
here applies most directly to actors whose utility Congress can directly affect. Certainly,
Congress might affect the operations and financial standing of private organizations
through actions like changes in tax codes, fiscal reporting to the Securities and Exchange
Commission, or other legal actions. That said, the empirical difficulty of obtaining or
developing ideological preferences for private sector actors is the second reason I restrict
the set of witnesses. Using ideological estimates of an organization as a substitute for
personal assumes the person testifying represents the general interests, and thus ideological
position, of the full agency. Multiple people usually engage in crafting the testimony, and
these people are most frequently at the higher ranks of the agency, making it plausible
that the message delivered is a distillation of agency views, which the ideological scores
7These transcripts are made available from the U.S. Government Printing Office’s Federal Data
System.
8These transcripts were obtained via automated download. The metadata concerning each hearing
were obtained in two ways: 1) extracted via text processing, and 2) parsing XML-delineated data provided
by the GPO. Both methods were used because of severe limitations in the XML.
9Clinton and Lewis (2007) offer alternative measures of agency ideology. I opt to not use these since
they are not directly comparable to the DW Nominate scores I use for the committee chairs.
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reflect. My key explanatory variable is thus Ideological Distance, which is measured as
the absolute value of the difference between ideal points for chairs and witnesses. The
resulting data set has a total of 130670 observations, with 81191 over 8342 hearings for
the House of Representatives, and 49479 over 6757 hearings for the Senate.
The next step is to define a measure of information in the context of congressional
hearings. To achieve this, I use the recorded text of statements and exchanges the occur
within a hearing. For each speaker in the hearing, I extract all the words they utter, and
combine it into a single set. Each speaker, then, has an associated corpus of words that
reflect their strategic choice of messaging. I capture this strategic behavior by calculating
a level of language specificity used in each speaker’s testimony.10 Witnesses choose how
much detail their testimony contains, opting to either provide vague abstractions, or
to relate precise dates, program names, dollar amounts, locations, and other facets of
agency behavior. Legislators armed with precise information can exert greater pressure
on witnesses that might attempt to gloss over areas in which their work does not satisfy
the committee. And, of course, both sides are aware the other is making a strategic
choice. Moreover, while there are usually multiple witnesses in a hearing, I consider the
informational content of each speaker to be independent of the content provided by other
speakers.11
I employ standard techniques in natural language processing and text analysis to
develop my main dependent variable: Speaker Specificity. Language specificity is calculated
for each speaker in each hearing for both chambers and all relevant committees. This
calculation is the output of a supervised learning process that categorizes a single sentence
as either specific or general. More precisely, the algorithm from Li and Nenkova (2015)
uses a logistic regression to produce the posterior probability that the sentence would
10Committee chair and member speech is also collected and analyzed. However, their language specificity
has no theoretical importance. Congressional speakers may appear to give vague statements either because
they are uninformed about a topic, or because the witness has provided sufficient information and no
detailed questioning is required. This observational equivalence makes including language specificity for
Congressional speakers unnecessary.
11This is not the same as saying all witness testimony is entirely independent. Witnesses are coordinated
by committee staff, so the subject matter of one expert is likely to depend on another, perhaps in order
to avoid redundancy. My measure of information is independent of topic, however. A violation of my
assumption, then, requires that one witness’ choice about specificity is conditioned on the testimony of
other witnesses.
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be classified as specific or general by a human reader. The Penn Discourse Tree Bank
2.0 serves as the reference corpus, the full details for which can be found in Prasad et al.
(2008). The basic process entails trained readers coding each sentence in the reference
text as either “general” or “specific,” along with tagging them with lexical information. A
machine learning algorithm is then run, or “trained,” to find the features of the sentences
that most highly correlate with the specific/general classification. A new body of text,
such as a corpus congressional hearing sentences, is then surveyed for these features.
Classification is carried out by running regressions run where the features are predictor
variables and the dependent variable is the likelihood of being tagged specific or general.
Also important to this project is that the sentences in this training corpus are gathered
from a news source that aims its writing to an educated audience. I expect the level of
discourse in a congressional hearing to be roughly equivalent, making this set of texts a
valid basis for comparison. The posterior probabilities generated by this process are for
single sentences, so I use the process noted in Equation 1 of Li and Nenkova (2015) to
develop a specificity score for each speaker. This score should be read as the word-average
specificity for that speaker, within a single hearing. In general, this scores the amount
of policy-specific information relayed during the speaker’s testimony (for witnesses) or
questioning (for committee members).
An example from an in-sample hearing is useful at this point. The following sentences
are from a House of Representatives hearing titled “Long-Term Care and Medicaid:
Spiraling Costs and the Need for Reform,” convened by the Subcommittee on Health of
the Committee on Energy and Commerce, during the 109th Congress. Both sentences
are made by Dr. Mark McClellan, then Administrator of the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services. The first sentence is given a value of 0.996, meaning it has a greater
than 99% chance of being classified as specific if given to a human reader:
“No, when Secretary Thompson was involved in all of those discussions, and people
looked at what the independent CMS actuaries, and what the CBO analysts had to say,
we went for the approach that was going to get the best costs for up to date access to
medications, and that is what we are implementing right now.”
The second sentence, by contrast, has a value of only 0.047:
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“And there are few Medicare beneficiaries who have more to gain from the new benefit
than our dual eligibles, who are often getting very fragmented care.”
In contrast to the first, the second sentence is far less precise about the topic under
discussion, makes no reference to particular people, does not mention any organizations,
and has only a general subject. In the language of the signaling game, the second sentence
is has a larger partition than the first. Of course, while these sentences are part of the full
testimony Dr. McClellan gave, the reported scores for each sentence are independent of
each other and the rest of his testimony. To rate a speaker for an entire hearing, I use a
modification of the basic Li and Nenkova algorithm. The full details are given in Equation
1 from Li and Nenkova (2015), but can be summarized as follows: the measure condenses
all statements made by a single speaker into a 1×N array of sentences, weights the score
for sentence i ∈ N by the length of that sentence, sums the N weighted scores, then
divides this value by the total number of sentences in a speech (effectively normalizing
the scores according to the amount the speaker talked).
Information in hearings is not an absolute, independent entity, so I choose to translate
the specificity values into a z-score for each congressional session, making the values a
within-congress comparison. The z-score transformation normalizes the level of specificity
for each speaker against a general level of discourse precision in a given congress. I
expect that the general makeup of any one session (including partisan control, ideological
distribution, committee assignments, and any aspect of internal structure that can be
chosen by Congress at the outset of each session) will, in some part, drive a general level
of specificity. The z-score for the speaker thus indicates how informative the speaker
was relative to all other speakers. This mitigates any effects of external conditions that
might affect all hearings in some way, but that is not present in the text of the hearings
themselves. For example, if members of Congress respond to low levels of public approval
by becoming more aggressive in hearings, independent of topic, this would affect all
hearings during the period of low approval. A by-congress normalization accounts for the
greater specificity in all hearings, and focuses attention on the relative difference. I also
transform the specificity variable into a z-score across the entire data set for purposes of
checking robustness.
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To test my hypotheses about the amount of information relayed in a hearing, I employ
a simple linear regression model. Because I a directly measuring the theoretical entities –
ideology and information – posited by a causal relationship, I can interpret the outcome
of my econometric model as causal itself. As noted, my dependent variable, Speaker
Specificity is a quantification of information, and is a continuous random variable taking
on values between 0 and 1. The z-score transformation means the variable can take
values on the entire real line, though in practice the values fall in [−3.2, 4.06]. The
key independent variable, Ideological Distance, is a continuous random variable taking
values between 0 (indicating perfect ideological alignment) and 2 (the greatest possible
ideological difference). The second hypothesis concerns the amount of time a member
of congress has served. I use the seniority measure in Stewart III and Woon (2005) to
identify the member’s period of service.
The data also include multiple characteristics of the hearings themselves. This includes
date, hearing title, reference to any bills in either chamber, and, importantly, the involve-
ment of any subcommittee. Numerous hearing connect the content of the proceedings
to a specific subcommittee within the larger committee, and note the subcommittee
membership. While this has considerable importance for the conduct of congressional
business, and likely impacts how the larger chamber interprets the work of the committee
(in the sense of signaling used by Diermeier and Feddersen (2000)), any committee chair
is automatically a member of any subcommittee; I still use the committee chair’s ideal
point even when the hearings indicate the presence of a subcommittee.
4.4 FINDINGS
In the following sections, I demonstrate the support my hypotheses receive under sev-
eral specifications of the relationship between ideological congruence and information
transmission. First I examine only the bivariate relationship posited in the theoretical
model. Second, I expand the relationship to include several additional variables that
could arguably moderate the theoretical relationship.
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4.4.1 Ideology and Informativeness
According to my results, the amount of information related in a hearing, measured by
specificity of speaker language, increases as the ideological distance between the Committee
Chair and the witness decreases. Crawford and Sobel (1982) argument applies well to
the setting of congressional hearings, as the messages sent by the witness are more finely
partitioned with a narrowing of the gap between sender and receiver. In this section I
detail the strength of this relationship, and show that it is robust to several plausible
specifications.
I use a simple linear regression model to test the relationship between ideological
distance and speaker specificity. One advantage of building on the theoretical CS model
is the analytically clean econometric model that it entails. Table 12 shows the results
of running an ordinary least squares model for the key dependent variable and three
versions of the dependent variable. The clear result is support for Hypothesis 4.1 across
all versions of the model. The first version uses just the raw Speaker Specificity as the
dependent variable. The next two models use transformed versions of Speaker Specificity,
first transformed relative to each session of Congress (Within-Congress), and second
transformed relative to the full range of sessions (Between-Congress). Recall that the
basic specificity variable takes a value in [0, 1], while the transformed variables are centered
on 0, with values expressing the number of standard deviations from that mean. The direct
interpretation of the coefficients are thus different among these models. That said, the
general results are the same across transformations: increasing ideological distance results
in a decrease in the amount of information delivered.12 Comparing one transformed
variable to the other, the largest effect is obtained with the Between-Congress (BC)
Z-Score, where a unit increase in ideological distance results in a decrease of specificity
of 0.20, or one-fifth of a standard deviation. The substantive effect is thus large, given
that the entire range of the BC variable’s support spans roughly four standard deviations
in either direction from the mean. I only use the normalized versions of the dependent
model in the rest of the analysis.
12This language is expressly causal. The model is explicitly meant to use empirical data to test a
proposed causal relationship among the theoretical entities (Morton and Williams 2010).
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Table 12: Increasing Ideological Difference Decreases Information
Dependent Variable: Specificity (Raw) Within-Congress Z-Score Between-Congress Z-Score
Ideological Distance −0.03∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Intercept 0.45∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
N 128529 128529 128529
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Hypothesis 4.2 posits a positive relationship between the amount of time a Committee
Chair has served and the amount of information delivered. Again using a simple linear
model, Table 13 shows that there is a statistically significant relationship. Chair seniority
is denoted in integers corresponding to the number of Congressional sessions the individual
has been in place. A unit increase in Chair Seniority, then, has a positive, but substantively
small effect on the overall amount of information transmitted. This result says little about
the theory of committee specialization writ large. Since hearings are convened at the
prerogative of chairs, the chair may choose not to hear about topics for which they are
relatively confident the full chamber recognizes their expertise. Within a chair’s tenure, a
single or limited number of hearings might suffice to signal policy specialization, reducing
the value of subsequent sessions. The observed set of hearings then, are chosen to convey
ongoing rather than prior specialization, so that seniority has no effect for a given hearing
on any particular topic. Thus, communicating specialization may motivate convening the
hearing, but does not have an effect on the testimony delivered.
While the House is larger in size, and thus has more capacity to, and does, hold more
hearings, the effect of ideological distance on information is present in both chambers.
Table 14 shows that ideological differences result in less information being delivered in
both chambers. The effect in the House is a little under double that of the effect in the
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Table 13: Increasing Chair Seniority Modestly Increases Information
Dependent Variable: Within-Congress Z-Score Between-Congress Z-Score
Chair Seniority 0.002∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Intercept −0.03∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
R2 0.001 0.001
N 130670 130670
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Senate (−0.15 vs. −0.09, respectively). The number of observations is also approaching
only twice that of the Senate, despite the number of members of the House being over
four times that of the Senate.
Congress ostensibly uses hearings to elicit information from witnesses in order to
minimize the information asymmetry, at least enough to enable evaluation of some policy
choice. The amount of information, as these results show, are highly dependent on the
ideological congruence between a Committee Chair and the witness (in all these cases, a
representative of an executive branch agency). This dynamic is reminiscent of the ally
principle common to many models of principal-agent relationships (Bendor and Meirowitz
2004). Protecting their information advantage helps bureaucracies retain, and even
enhance, autonomy over policy choices and implementation (Aberbach 1990; Carpenter
2001; Shipan 2005). In this view the Committee Chair is the principal, and the witness
the agent. As the preference of the principal and the agent converge, there is less need
for the former to exert post-delegation pressure on the latter (Huber and Shipan 2002;
Mathew D. McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987). Under these conditions, information
may be more freely given by the agent, since the expectation is a policy outcome that is
more favorable than under a more ideologically disparate Committee Chair.
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Table 14: Ideological Distance Matters in Both Chambers
Dependent Variable: Speaker Specificity (WC Transformation)
House Senate
Ideological Distance −0.15∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Intercept 0.06∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
R2 0.001 0.001
N 79592 48937
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
4.4.2 Additional Influences on Specificity
Several facets of Congressional hearings may serve to enhance or dampen the relationship
between ideological congruence and information transmission. I note several of these for
which data can be obtained through the hearing itself, or via external sources.
First, a contest for control in the US system of separated and shared powers colors how
the government operates in most, if not all, areas of influence. Divided government – when
one chamber’s majority party is different from that of the president – may spur Congress to
greater pugnacity in calling, and conducting hearings. I thus include Divided Government
as a binary variable equal to 1 when the majority party of the chamber holding the
hearing is different than that of the president. With a bureaucracy under opposition
control, in the case of divided government, I expect that the agency representative will
be less forthcoming, and thus have lower specificity. Stated directly, I expect Divided
Government to exert a negative influence on the amount of information revealed.
Furthermore, the tenacity with which Congress pursues its agenda may be a function
of the size of the majority party’s advantage. A greater majority may convince the
party members that policy initiatives are more likely to become legislation, and should
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be bolstered with more hearings, and with more ideologically-compatible witnesses. I
thus include Majority Strength as a count variable indicating the number of members in
the majority party minus the number in the minority party. The agency representative
would also expect a greater chance of policy change as the majority increases, and should
provide better information in order to prevent the committee from forming policy based on
ignorance or misinformation. As Majority Strength increases, then, I expect the amount
of information to increase.
Finally, the actual conduct of a hearing has one considerable deviation from the CS
game: the actors actually more often engage in a dialog, rather than a single witness
delivering her testimony. (Uncontested statements do happen with regularity, however.
Appropriations hearings frequently entail agency representatives reading without inter-
ruption lengthy texts about the fiscal performance of the agency over the past year.)
Committee chairs have control over who speaks, when, and for how long. They can, and
do, regularly interrupt testimony to pose questions or contest the witness’ statement.
Moreover, they can do this themselves, or allow other members of the committee to do so.
The amount this kind of back-and-forth occurs in a single hearing can be captured by
calculating the number of times a speaker in a hearing made a discrete remark (defined
as a single uninterrupted string of words), and dividing it by the number of remarks
made in the entire hearing. I call this variable Interactivity, as it captures how many
times the speaker had to stop their testimony to clarify a point, answer a question (posed
by any person), or restart due to some kind of interruption. While the name of the
variable is chosen to be free of bias, I argue that these interactions arise because the
chair is dissatisfied with how forthcoming the witness is, and thus the frequency of these
interruptions should positively correlate with information transmission. More prosaically,
if the chair likes what she hears, the witness will go on without interruption.
The results of these expanded models are presented in Table 15. I include each new
variable with the previous two predictors in a step-wise fashion. This is to show not
only the coefficient for the newly included variable, but how each addition affects the
two variables of primary interest, Ideological Distance and Seniority. Note that I use the
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Within-Congress transformation of the dependent variable Speaker Specificity in all the
extended models.
The basic results hold through all iterations of the model: increasing ideological
distance decreases the amount of information transmitted, while seniority has the opposite
(though still small) effect. Further, for Majority Strength and Interactivity, the relationship
is in the posited direction. The most prominent outcome here is the substantive size of
the coefficient on the Interactivity variable: 0.704. The implication is that aggressive
exchanges in hearings produce better information. Particularly newsworthy hearings,
despite their propensity to invite grandstanding, may result in quality policy information
as the witnesses are subject to intense scrutiny. As noted, though, we cannot expect
better policy as a result of contentious hearings. Witnesses may provide a great deal
of new and useful insights, but there is no guarantee the committee members employ
them in legislation. The coefficient on Divided Government is different than I proposed
– different parties in power in the executive and congress correlates positively with the
amount of information delivered. Perhaps committee members are more aggressive in
their interrogation of witnesses, so that Interactivity is increasing in Divided Government,
though I do note that the move from unified to divided party control is substantively
small.
4.5 DISCUSSION
In this paper, I explore whether or not hearings provide members of Congress with infor-
mation necessary for successful policy making. I find strong evidence that Congressional
hearings can be more than a propaganda channel Truman (1951), but only when the two
sides of the microphone are in agreement about the subject at hand. Of course, if both
sides are in agreement, any policy change will satisfy the very target of the policy, and
thus is indistinguishable from capitulation. As interests diverge, Congress’ oversight wanes
in effectiveness in as much as the information they can extract from the bureaucracy is
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Table 15: Expanded Models
Model: 1 2 3 4 5
Ideological Distance −0.132∗∗∗ −0.113∗∗∗ −0.115∗∗∗ −0.115∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Divided Government 0.004 0.005 0.008
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Interactivity 0.697∗∗∗
(0.055)
Majority Strength 0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Seniority 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Intercept 0.012 −0.012 −0.014 −0.020 −0.082∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.017)
Agency Fixed Effects X X X X X
R2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003
N 128529 128529 128529 128529 128529
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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curtailed. Given substantial enough ideological differences, the hearing is little more than
a media ploy. Policy change may, in such a case, be built on purely political desires.
These conclusions stem from developing an empirical analog for a theoretical model
first proposed by Crawford and Sobel (1982). To build a structural model that captures
the key entity of the CS game – message partitioning – I subjected the text of thousands
of Congressional hearings to text analysis methods that quantified the specificity of
the language used in delivered testimony. This technique has promise in areas across
political science, quantifying the content of political speeches, party manifestos, campaign
advertising, legislation, ballot initiatives, and could even complement previous work with
text as data (such as press releases used by members of Congress to communicate with
their constituents (Justin Grimmer 2010)). Moreover, the approach I take does not use
the standard bag of words assumption about text (J Grimmer and Stewart 2013). Instead,
I account for the context of the recorded statements by showing that policy information is
directly related to language specificity, which itself is a function of the strategic dynamic
between a witness and a committee chair. This allows me to compare the behavior of
speakers across topics, congressional sessions, and executive branch agencies.
The main substantive contribution of my paper is partially resolving a long-standing
uncertainty about the value of hearings for their stated purpose: to assess, and if needed
restrain, the activity of the bureaucracy. My demonstration of the applicability of the
CS model to hearings, and the success of its predictions, is simultaneously academically
reassuring and politically troubling. We have a satisfying abstract model of the process,
though it forces us to confront the implication that those hearings may serve little purpose
beyond political theater. Rhetorical aggressiveness may rescue the policy value of a
hearing by dragging information out of a reluctant witness; the need to engage in such
questioning, however, is only likely when the amount of information being delivered started
at a low point. The positive relationship between information and ideological similarity is
technically and substantively akin to the ally principle in the study of delegation, agreeing
with both theoretical and experimental evidence (Dickhaut, McCabe, and Mukherji 1995).
Extension of this work would build on the language model itself. While there is ample
reason to believe that major newspapers provide a useful corpus to build the classifica-
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tion model, developing an original corpus of policy-related material would undoubtedly
improve the algorithm’s success. Hearing text could serve as the training data itself, even
incorporating information about the policy area being discussed. Understanding more
about committees as preference outliers, for instance, could be addressed by augmenting
my approach with information about a committee chair’s specific interests – members
with rural constituencies pursuing farm-related legislation, for example (Krehbiel 1990;
Overby and Kazee 2000). Regardless of the specific direction, text analysis built on a
rigorous theory of language usage provides a new method to address open questions about
how information shapes political decision making.
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5.0 CONCLUSION
The foregoing three essays could fairly be said to be as much about misinformation as
about information. At the heart of each essay is a question whose answer hinges not on
an actor having or using just any information, but the right information. Candidates
try to share their true selves with just a select group, hoping other voters will judge
them based on their incomplete or incorrect views. People locked in negotiation may fail
to fully understand the implications of delay, and develop incorrect beliefs about how
much an audience is willing to punish their behavior. And political agents prevaricate
to maintain their relative informational advantage. That said, the work here builds on
a foundation that provides structure and guidance. The rational choice tradition often
leaves information as a highly abstract, almost formless concept. And rightly so, for
many cases. This dissertation, however, is predicated on the view that the specific forms
of that information are often critical for understanding how its acquisition, use, and
manipulation affect political outcomes. By rooting the information in a specific context
– campaigns, negotiations, and congressional hearings in this case – I have shown that
explicit consideration of content increases our understanding of several important political
phenomena.
The first essay, “Dog Whistling,” extends the standard concept of message delivery
by making the content of the message a function, where the resulting information is
probabilistic, and conditional on audience traits. The function is a simple, but powerful
extension. Audience traits, and the fact that speakers tailor their messages according
to them, is a standard concept in cognitive psychology (where it is termed “audience
design”) (Clark and Murphy 1982). Messaging could thus be a function of any number
of politically salient traits, such as race, education, or political sophistication. This
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conditional aspect of messaging also makes empirical exploration of the concept more
tangible: the group distinction provides a clear divide on which to test the reception of
messages. We could learn how and when speech is divisive in more than just religious
examples (Albertson 2014). The second essay, “Time and Punishment,” focuses on blame
as a strategic tool such as voters might have over their elected representatives. Prior
work on blame either limits the target (Groseclose and McCarty 2001), or employs survey
methods that do not allow for endogenous allocation of blame based on controlled levels
of information (Brown 2010; Malhotra and Kuo 2007). Making blame a concrete, and
measurable, is a distinct contribution that, again, links the formal modeling approach
with work on the psychology of voters. Moreover, given the frequency of standoff-like
political fights in the current U.S. Congress, we address a highly topical concern with an
experiment that lets us observe how people assess culpability for costly delay or even total
breakdown. Extending this work would import a dynamic setting, allowing for repeated
negotiations and multiple opportunities for punishment. “Information Transmission in
Congressional Hearings” presents both the most direct test of political information and the
most technical contribution of this dissertation. Viewing messages as abstract spaces to
be partitioned by a speaker is, at first glance, an almost abstruse concept that is amenable
only to the most theoretical of work. Linking these messages to actual language, however,
is possible and useful. I exploited this link to examine whether or not oversight hearings
in congress can truly be used by political principals to extract information from their
agents. Given the pervasiveness of the principal-agent relationship in politics, and thus
political science, the method I applied has application in a vast array of topics. From the
American perspective: the speeches delivered by legislators on the chamber floor could,
once measured by my process, be identified as truly attempting to impart policy specifics,
or toothless political bromides; the informativeness of campaign advertising, the subject
of considerable scrutiny, could be compared at a far more precise level, and across a far
greater sample, than has been done previously; the informational substance of comments
on proposed regulation given during notice-and-comment periods could be scrutinized
for their impact on final regulatory language. Beyond the technical merits, this essay
contributes to work on cross-branch relations and representativeness of the bureaucracy:
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the ability to extract useful information from the executive branch diminishes as the two
sides diverge on their policy preferences, making it hard for the elected body to exert
adequate control over the unelected one.
The centrality of information to political activity is manifest, its impact on all arenas
clear and profound. Consider a simple historical example that fuses this dissertation’s
distinct lines of inquiry into an illustrative whole: the Watergate Hearings. Starting in
June 1972, the nation was gripped by news of a break-in at the Democratic National
Committee’s (DNC) headquarters, and the subsequent revelations that President Richard
Nixon not only knew of this particular crime, but may have actively participated in
planning, and then concealing, the planting of listening devices in the offices. As the
press reported on the crimes, and the complicated relationships among the burglars
caught in the DNC offices, the Republican party leadership, and the president’s own staff,
Senator Howard Baker posed this question to Nixon legal counsel John Dean during a
Congressional hearing:
“What did the president know, and when did he know it?”
Baker’s concise inquiry still echoes through committee hearings and on cable news because
it coalesced the entire scandal into a single, fundamental problem statement. Nixon’s fate
rested on his specific knowledge about criminal activities conducted during his campaign.
The central concern with the investigation was uncovering and evaluating that knowledge.
Baker’s question was posed in frustration, since the information Dean and his colleagues
provided during the hearing was, according to Baker, woefully inadequate to answer the
question.
This inadequacy should come as no surprise to a reader of my dissertation. These
hearings, comprising two nearly diametrically opposed parties, were bound to produce
little of informational value. Even aggressive questioning is of little use when the starting
point for transmission is so close to zero. After Baker’s famous line in October, Nixon
went on to coin his own notorious phrase:
“I am not a crook.”
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This was meant to defend against allegations that Nixon had personally profited from
various deals, tax evasion, and even possible blackmail. Notably, the word crook is unlikely
to trigger the thought of approving illegal spying, but does conjure up thoughts of stolen
money. The difference is subtle, but important: the term addresses the financial gains
portion of the Watergate scandal, but not the issues around abuses of power. For a
political actor so calculating in his approach to every aspect of the presidency, and so
driven by concerns of public perception, these carefully chosen words were meant to direct
attention away from one topic and towards another. And, of course, the final outcome
of the investigation process was Nixon’s resignation, an act that avoided the onrushing
political cliff of impeachment. Perhaps Nixon and his aides fought so long, holding fast
to their respective postions and ultimately delaying the inevitable, because they based
their choices on an incorrect belief about where voters will lay the most blame, just as we
suggest negotiators might. Information – its concealment, manipulation, and ultimate
revelation – brought down a president, and shaped politics for generations (Kutler 1992;
T. H. White 1975).
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APPENDIX A
DOG WHISTLING PROOFS
A.1 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: NO “FULLY TRUTHFUL”
SEPARATING EQUILIBRIA
No equilibria exist where both Candidate 1 types send messages that match their actual
type.
A.1.1 Strategy
In a separating equilibrium Candidate 1’s strategy is to send a message that matches her
underlying type, which I refer to as being “truthful”:
σ(C1γ ) =
 m = o if γ = Om = i if γ = I (A.1)
A.1.2 Voter Beliefs and Best Responses
There are two types of voters to consider, out-group and in-group. Denote beliefs by
µβ, β ∈ {O, I}. In the standard Bayesian way, voters update their beliefs upon hearing a
message from C1. First, the out-group voter beliefs about C1’s type, given the message
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they hear and C1’s strategy, are:
µO(C1O | ho) =
Pr(ho | C1O )Pr(C1O )
Pr(ho | C1O )Pr(C1O ) + Pr(ho | C1I )Pr(C1I )
=
1 · g
(1 · g) + (0 · (1− g))
= 1
µO(C1O | hi) =
Pr(hi | C1O )Pr(C1O )
Pr(hi | C1O )Pr(C1O ) + Pr(hi | C1I )Pr(C1I )
=
0 · g
(0 · g) + (1 · g)
= 0
µO(C1I | hi) =
Pr(hi | C1I )Pr(C1I )
Pr(hi | C1I )Pr(C1I ) + Pr(hi | C1O )Pr(C1O )
=
1 · (1− g)
(1 · (1− g)) + (0 · g)
= 1
µO(C1O | hi) =
Pr(hi | C1O )Pr(C1O )
Pr(hi | C1O )Pr(C1O ) + Pr(hi | C1I )Pr(C1I )
=
0 · g
(0 · g) + (1 · g)
= 0
(A.2)
The same process holds for in-group voters hearing each message, giving: µI(C1I | hi) =
µI(C1O | ho) = 1, and µI(C1I | ho) = µI(C1O | hi) = 0. Put succinctly, voters believe
what they hear, placing no weight on the probability that the candidate has a group
membership other than what they hear C1 claim.
Voters always cast votes for the candidate that provides them the highest utility. Here,
this is also the candidate with the highest probability of matching their group type. This
can be seen in the comparison of expected utility for voting for C1 or C2. I again start by
considering out-group voters, both when C2γ = O and when C2γ = I.
EUvO (C1 | ho) = µO(C1O | ho)UvO (C1O ) + µO(C1I | ho)UvO (C1I ) = 0
UvO (C2 | C2O ) = 0
UvO (C2 | C2I ) = −1
(A.3)
When out-group voters hear C1 claim out-group status (so), they believe the message
with certainty. This means that their expected utility for voting for C1 is the same as
their utility for voting for a C2O . In this case voters choose randomly: Pr(vo = C1) = 1/2.
Voters clearly prefer a C1 that sent so against a C2I , and will vote accordingly. The same
process applies to in-group voters considering a C1 that sent si, versus the two types of
C2γ . Thus, voters will cast their votes for the candidate whom they are certain match
their group-type, and will decide via toss-up if both candidates match. Note that this
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tie-breaking rule also applies if the voter believes candidates have the same type, and
both are of a different type than the voter. Together, this means that the voters’ best
responses are:
BRvO(C2γ , µO) =

C1 if ho, C2I
1
2
if h ∈ {o, i}, hy = C2γ
C2 if hi, C2O
(A.4)
BRvI (C2γ , µI) =

C1 if hi, C2O
1
2
if h ∈ {o, i}, hy = C2γ
C2 if ho, C2I
(A.5)
A.1.3 C1 Utilities
If Candidate 1 is truthful, she sends a message that matches her underlying type, which
in turn affect the voter’s choice. Candidate 1’s utility is thus also a function of Candidate
2’s type. Table 16 lists all the permutations of messages and C2 types.
Table 16 shows utility for each permutation. When C1’s message differs from C2’s
Table 16: Utilities for Combinations of Candidate Types and C1 Messages
Candidate 2 Type Candidate 1 Message Candidate 1 Utility
C2O so
1
2
C2O si vI
C2I so vO
C2I si
1
2
type, C1 captures the votes of all those voter types that match the message. When C1’s
message matches C2’s type, the voters decide via toss-up, resulting in an expected vote
share of half of all voters.
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Except when voter groups are perfectly balanced (vo = vI), the “minority” type of
Candidate 1 (the type whose group matches the smaller voter population) will have a
profitable deviation from the separating strategy. Since no distributional constraints are
placed on voter types, either group-type may dominate the other. To maximize utility, the
minority type of C1 should match her message to C2’s type. For instance, when vI = 0.4,
C1I sending si against a C2O earns a utility of 0.4, which is clearly less than the 0.5 C1
receives for making the voters believe the candidates are similar. Indeed, when the voters
are not evenly balanced, the minority type of Candidate 1 always improves her utility by
matching her message to the majority voter type: either she becomes the lone candidate
(voters believe is) in the majority, and thus gains the larger share of votes, or she moves
from obtaining only the minority voters to splitting all votes evenly.
The knife-edge case of a balanced voter population supports the proposed separating
equilibrium. However, this support disappears in the event of dog whistling.
A.1.4 Using a Dog Whistle
Candidate 1 also has the option of using a dog whistle instead of clearly claiming one
group status or the other. For this candidate equilibrium, I only need to show that the
use of a dog whistle is a better strategy for C1 than claiming her true group membership
when the voting population is strictly balanced.1 First, I work through how the dog
whistle impacts the play of the game.
Dog whistling introduces a probabilistic aspect to message reception. However, given
the separating strategy, this has no effect on voter beliefs about C1’s type. Voters still
believe that C1 is the type claimed in the message they hear (as defined in Equation
(2.1)). Voters cast their votes according to Equations (A.4) and (A.5), though this yield
different utility for C1 since the votes are a function of what message the voter hears.
Consider C1O deviating to using a dog whistle instead of the clear message so. Table
17 gives the new utilities for C1O . Using a dog whistle results in C1 getting votes from:
all those voters that hear a message that matches their type when C1γ 6= C2γ ; half the
1The presence of the deviation to claiming the majority group membership (when C1γ is in the
minority) is enough to prove the absence of separating equilibria in all other cases.
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Table 17: Utilities for C1O Whistling
Candidate 2 Type Candidate 1 Message Candidate 1 Utility
C2O sw pvI +
1
2
(1− q)vO + 1
2
(1− p)vI
C2I sw (1− q)vO +
1
2
pvI +
1
2
qvO
votes of those voters that hear a message indicating C1γ = C2γ . C1, importantly, loses
some voters that she would otherwise gain, specifically those voters that match her type
but who hear m 6= vβ. The case for C1I is identical.
Fixing vI = vO = 0.5 for the case of interest, C1’s utilities in Table 17 clearly present
profitable deviations for either type of C1 against either type of C2. Thus, in the case of a
strictly balanced voting population, both types of C1 would opt to use a dog whistle rather
than sending a clear message about her type (either accurate or inaccurate). A dog whistle
may increase utility for one or both C1 types when the audience is unbalanced. However,
this only provides another example of deviation, and would not be more informative for
the purpose of this analysis. At minimum, when the audience groups are unbalanced, the
minority type of C1 will choose to deviate.
In summary, there are no fully separating equilibria. At least one type of C1 will have
an incentive to deviate. If one voter group-type is larger than the other, the type of C1
corresponding to this smaller audience will, at least, deviate to sending a (clear) message
that differs from her true group type.
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A.2 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: TWO SEPARATING EQUILIBRIA
A.2.1 Strategies
For this equilibrium, one type of C1 chooses to whistle, while the other always sends a
truthful message. For the moment, assume that the out-group type of C1 chooses to
whistle, while the in-group type chooses to truthfully reveal her type. For this proposed
equilibrium:
σ(C1γ ) =
 sw if γ = Osi if γ = I (A.6)
A.2.2 Voter Beliefs and Best Responses
There are two types of voters to consider, out-group and in-group. Denote beliefs by
µβ, β ∈ {O, I}. Voters update with the standard Bayesian process (where possible), though
one difference arises because of the whistling portion of the strategy. The likelihood term
in the Bayes equation is neither certainty (as it would be for a strategy positing a speaker
always issuing one message) nor zero (a it would be in a strategy positing a speaker
never issuing a particular message). In the case of whistling as part of C1’s strategy, the
likelihood equals the voter’s group-type’s probability of hearing a particular message (as
defined in Equation (2.1)). Thus, out-group voters beliefs, given C1’s strategy, are:
µO(C1O | ho) =
Pr(so | C1O)Pr(C1O)
Pr(ho | C1O)Pr(C1O) + Pr(ho | C1I )Pr(C1I )
=
(1− q) · g
((1− q) · g) + (0 · (1− g)) = 1⇒
µO(C1I | ho) = 0
µO(C1O | hi) =
Pr(hi | C1O)Pr(C1O)
Pr(hi | C1O)Pr(C1O) + Pr(hi | C1I )Pr(C1I )
=
qg
gq − g + 1
µO(C1I | hi) =
Pr(hi | C1I )Pr(C1I )
Pr(hi | C1I )Pr(C1I ) + Pr(hi | C1O)Pr(C1O)
=
1− g
gq + 1− g
(A.7)
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These beliefs show how whistling produces voter uncertainty. Only C1O ever sends so, so
voters are certain about the candidate type if they hear ho. However, there are two ways
for voters to hear hi, so voters cannot perfectly infer C1’s type. Thus, voters who hear hi
have posterior beliefs that differ from their prior beliefs, and that are strictly between 0
and 1. The same process holds for in-group voters. The group-based difference in the
probability of hearing particular message changes the likelihood term when hi, yielding
µI(C1O | hi) = pgpg−g+1 , and µI(C1I | hi) = 1−gpg−g+1 .
Voters always cast votes for the candidate they believe will maximize their utility.
This is also the candidate that with the highest subjective probability of matching their
group-type. This can be seen in the comparison of expected utility of voting for C1 or the
utility of voting for C2. I again start by considering out-group voters, both when C2γ = O
and when C2γ = I.
EUvO (C1 | ho) = µO(C1γ = O | so)UvO (C1O ) + µO(C1I | so)UvO (C1I ) = 0
EUvO (C1 | hi) = µO(C1γ = O | si)UvO (C1O ) + µO(C1I | si)UvO (C1I ) = −
gq
gq + 1− g
UvO (C2 | C2O , ho) = 0
UvO (C2 | C2I , ho) = −1
(A.8)
In the even that both C1O and C2O , vO that hear ho choose by tossing a fair coin. However,
vO that hear hi have µO(C1 = O | hi) < 1, so they will cast votes for C2O . Note that vo
will never vote for C2I , no matter what message they hear. The comparison for in-group
voters is symmetric, so vI that hear hi will choose via coin-toss between C1 and C2I , while
vI that hear ho will always vote for C2I .
Comparing what they hear and C2 types, voter best responses are given by:
BRvO(C2γ , µO) =

1
2
if ho & C2O
C2 if hi & C2O
C1 if h ∈ {o, i} & C2I
(A.9)
BRvI (C2γ , µI) =

1
2
if ho & C2O
C2 if h ∈ {o, i} & C2I
C1 if hi & C2O
(A.10)
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Table 18: Utilities for Combinations of Candidate Types and C1 Messages
Candidate 1 Type Candidate 1 Message Candidate 2 Type Candidate 1 Utility
C1O sw C2O
1
2
(1− q)vO + 1
2
(1− p)vI + pvI
si vI
so
1
2
C1O sw C2I vO
si vO
so vO
C1I sw C2O
1
2
(1− q)vO + 1
2
(1− p)vI + pvI
si vI
so
1
2
C1I sw C2I vO
si vO
so vO
A.2.3 C1 Utilities
Using the voter best responses, Table 18 shows C1’s utility under permutations of message
and C2 type.
First, note that C1’s only changes as a function of her message when C2O . This
asymmetry (the lack of different utilities when C2I ) is a result of C1’s strategy in this
equilibrium. The opposite — C1’s utility is the same for any message sent against a C2I —
holds when the strategy has only C1I sending sw. When C2O , dog whistling is the optimal
message when UC1O (sw) ≥ UC1O (si) ≥ UC1O (so):
1
2
(1− q)vO + 1
2
(1− p)vI + pvI ≥ vI ≥ 1
2
⇒
−1 + q
−2 + p+ q ≥ vI ≥
q
p+ q
(A.11)
This expression gives bounds on the size of vI for sw to be supported as the message sent
by C1O . However, when this holds true for C1O , it can also hold true for C1I . When it
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does, C1’s strategy is not optimal since C1I would have an incentive to switch from always
sending si to sending sw. The only time it does not hold is in the knife-edge situation
where UC1O (sw) = UC1O (si) > UC1O (so) (assuming indifference is decided in favor of the
stated strategy). This is only true when p =
q(1− vI) + 2vI − 1
vI
.
Taken together, this indicates that an equilibrium exists where only C1O uses a dog
whistle, C1I reveals her true type, voter beliefs are as given in Equation (A.7), voter
choices are as given in Equations (A.9) and (A.10), and p =
q(1− vI) + 2vI − 1
vI
. For any
other value of p, C1I will deviate to sending sw.
The argument, and thus the result, is similar for the case where C1’s strategy is:
σ(C1γ ) =
 so if γ = Osw if γ = I . (A.12)
The result pins down the specific value, q =
p(1− vO) + 2vO − 1
vO
, that must hold to
support the equilibrium. Otherwise, C1O will deviate to using a dog whistle.
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A.3 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: POOLING EQUILIBRIA
There exist three equilibria where both types of C1 pool on sending the same message,
either so, si, or sw.
A.3.1 Strategy
To pool, Candidate 1’s strategy is to send the same message to voters, regardless of her
type. There are two possible equilibria, one where both types send so, and one where
both types send si. I begin with the former case:
σ(C1γ ) = so ∀ Cγ ∈ {O, I} (A.13)
A.3.2 Voter Beliefs and Best Responses
There are two types of voters to consider, out-group and in-group. Denote beliefs by
µβ, β ∈ {O, I}. In the standard Bayesian way, voters update their beliefs upon hearing
a message from C1. Updating, in this proposed equilibrium, produces posterior beliefs
for voters that equal their prior beliefs. Given the message they hear and C1’s strategy,
these beliefs are:
µO(C1O | ho) =
Pr(ho | C1O)Pr(C1O)
Pr(ho | C1O)Pr(C1O) + Pr(ho | C1I )Pr(C1I )
=
1 · g
(1 · g) + (1 · (1− g)) = g ⇒
µO(C1I | ho) = 1− g
(A.14)
Under the proposed pooling strategy, voters learn nothing from hearing the message
ho, and hearing hi is off the path of play, so Bayes’ Rule does not apply. The same
process holds for in-group voters, giving: µI(C1O | ho) = g, and µI(C1I | ho) = 1− g (and
undefined beliefs in the event hi).
Voters always cast votes for the candidate they believe will maximize their utility.
This is also the candidate with the highest posterior probability of matching their group
type. This can be seen in the comparison of expected utility of voting for C1 or the utility
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of voting for C2. I again start by considering out-group voters, both when C2γ = O and
when C2γ = I.
EUvO (C1 | ho) = µO(C1O | ho)UvO (C1O ) + µO(C1I | ho)UvO (C1I ) = −g
UvO (C2 | C2O ) = 0
UvO (C2 | C2I ) = −1
(A.15)
Voting for C1 after hearing ho has an expected value equal to the basic probability of
C1O . By assumption, g < 1, making it always better for vO types to vote for C2, whom
they know to be γ = O with certainty. Out-group voters will vote for C1 when C2γ = I.
The comparison for in-group voters is symmetric.
In the event that C1 sends si, I pick one set of any beliefs off the equilibrium path.
For out-group voters and C2O , any µO(C1O | si) means that EUvO(C1O | si) ∈ (0, 1) <
Uvo(C2O | si) = 1. That is, there are no beliefs that induce the out-group voters to
switch to voting for the candidate they are certain is out-group to the candidate that
is only possibly out-group. Conversely, when C2γ = I, any positive µvo(C1O | si) means
EUvO(C1 | so) ∈ (0, 1) > UvO(C2I ) = 0. Any positive chance that C1 is a Different type
than C2 is enough to get that group of voters to support C1.
This means that the voters’ best responses are:
BRvO(C2γ , µO) =

C1 if ho & C2I
C2 if ho & C2O
C1 if hi & C2I ∀µvO(C1O | hi) ∈ (0, 1)
C2 if hi & C2O ∀µvO(C1O | hi) ∈ (0, 1)
(A.16)
BRvI (C2γ , µI) =

C2 if ho & C2I
C1 if ho & C2O
C2 if hi & C2I ∀µvI (C1O | hi) ∈ (0, 1)
C1 if hi & C2O ∀µvI (C1O | hi) ∈ (0, 1)
(A.17)
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A.3.3 C1 Utilities
Using the voter’s best responses, Table 19 shows C1’s utility under permutations of
message and C2 type. The format of the table highlights the fact that, given a pair
{C1γ , C2γ}, both messages yield C1 the same utility. Further, that holds true for both
types of C1. Neither type of C1 can improve her utility by switching messages against a
given type of C2.
Table 19: Utilities for Combinations of Candidate Types and C1 Messages
Candidate 1 Type Candidate 1 Message Candidate 2 Type Candidate 1 Utility
C1O so C2O vI
si vI
C1I so C2O vI
si vI
C1O so C2I vO
si vO
C1I so C2I vO
si vO
In words, this says that C1 always obtains the share of voters opposite C2’s type,
regardless of C1’s message. Thus, there is no incentive for either type of C1 to deviate to
a different (clear) message.
Candidate 1 also has the option of using a dog whistle (sw) instead of clearly claiming
one group status or another. One of either C1 type may switch to whistling, and I start
with the case where C1O whistles.
Dog whistling introduces a probabilistic aspect to message reception. However, given
the pooling strategy, whistling does not change voter beliefs about C1’s type. When the
candidates are not pooling on either si or so, then regardless of what the voters hear hear,
their posterior beliefs about C1γ equal their prior beliefs (though, candidate pooling may
require off the equilibrium path voter beliefs as noted above). Recall that voters hear
messages according to Equation (2.1), and cast votes according to Equations (A.16) and
(A.17).
107
Table 20: Utilities for Combinations of Candidate Types and C1 Messages
Candidate 1 Type Candidate 1 Message Candidate 2 Type Candidate 1 Utility
C1O so C2O vI
si vI
sw vI
C1I so C2O vI
si vI
sw vI
C1O so C2I vO
si vO
sw vO
C1I so C2I vO
si vO
sw vO
Fix C2O , and let C1O send sw. Then, C1 obtains vI votes, just as she did by sending
either so or si. The pvI portion of in-group voters that hear hi prefer voting for C1 since
they have a positive belief µI(C1I | hi), despite the message being off the equilibrium path.
The (1− p)vI portion of in-group voters that hear so have belief µI(C1I | ho) = 1− g > 0
(because g ∈ (0, 1)). Similarly, vO voters prefer voting for C2O regardless of the message
they hear. Table 20 shows that the logic holds for all combinations of C1γ and C2γ , so that
C1, under the pooling strategy, always gets the same utility, regardless of the message
sent (clear or whistle).
The above argument began by assuming C1 types pool on so. The analysis shows
there are equilibria where: σ(C1γ ) : so ∀ γ ∈ {O, I}, voter beliefs follow Equation (A.14),
and voters strategies follow Equations (A.16) and (A.17). The argument for pooling on si
is symmetric, proving the existence of two types of pooling equilibria.
A.3.4 Pooling on Whistling
The use of a whistle requires restating the analysis to make the result clear.
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A.3.5 Strategies
This equilibrium has both types of Candidate 1 always sending a dog whistle:
σ(C1γ ) : (sw)∀ γ ∈ {O, I}. (A.18)
A.3.6 Voter Beliefs and Best Responses
There are two types of voters to consider, out-group and in-group. Denote beliefs by
µβ, β ∈ {O, I}. Voters update with the standard Bayesian process (where possible), though
one difference arises because of the whistling portion of the strategy. The likelihood
term in the Bayes equation is not certainty (as it would be for a strategy positing a
speaker always issuing one message) or zero (a it would be in a strategy positing a speaker
never issuing a particular message). In the case of whistling as part of C1’s strategy, the
likelihood equals a voter’s group-type probability of hearing a particular message (as
defined in Equation (2.1)). Thus, out-group voters beliefs, given C1’s strategy, are:
µO(C1O | ho) =
Pr(ho | C1O)Pr(C1O)
Pr(ho | C1O)Pr(C1O) + Pr(ho | C1I )Pr(C1I )
=
g(1− q)
g(1− q) + (1− g)(1− q) = g
µO(C1I | ho) =
Pr(ho | C1I )Pr(C1O)
Pr(ho | C1O)Pr(C1O) + Pr(ho | C1I )Pr(C1I )
=
(1− g)(1− q)
(1− g)(1− q) + g(1− q) = 1− g
µO(C1O | hi) =
Pr(hi | C1O)Pr(C1O)
Pr(hi | C1O)Pr(C1O) + Pr(hi | C1I )Pr(C1I )
=
gq
gq + (1− g)q = g
µO(C1I | hi) =
Pr(hi | C1I )Pr(C1I )
Pr(hi | C1I )Pr(C1I ) + Pr(hi | C1O)Pr(C1O)
=
(1− g)q
(1− g)q + gq = 1− g
(A.19)
When both types of C1γ send sw, there are two ways for voters to hear hi and ho. This is
because of the probabilistic element to hearing each message. Voter beliefs are functions
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of their group-type propensity to hear either ho or ho. The same process holds for in-group
voters, and result in the following beliefs:
µI(C1O | ho) =
g(1− p)
g(1− p) + (1− g)(1− p) = g
µI(C1I | ho) =
(1− g)(1− p)
(1− g)(1− p) + g(1− p) = 1− g
µI(C1O | hi) =
gp
gp+ (1− g)p = g
µI(C1I | hi) =
(1− g)p
(1− g)p+ gp = 1− g
(A.20)
Voters always cast votes for the candidate they believe will maximize their utility.
This is also the candidate that with the highest subjective probability of matching their
group-type. This can be seen in the comparison of expected utility of voting for C1 or the
utility of voting for C2.
EUvO (C1 | ho) = µO(C1O | ho)UvO (C1O ) + µO(C1I | ho)UvO (C1I ) = −g
EUvO (C1 | hi) = µO(C1O | hi)UvO (C1O ) + µO(C1I | hi)UvO (C1I ) = −g
UvO (C2 | C2O ) = 0
UvO (C2 | C2I ) = −1
(A.21)
EUvI (C1 | ho) = µI(C1O | ho)UvI (C1O ) + µI(C1I | ho)UvI (C1I ) = −(1− g)
EUvI (C1 | hi) = µI(C1O | hi)UvI (C1O ) + µI(C1I | hi)UvI (C1I ) = −(1− g)
UvI (C2 | C2O ) = −1
UvI (C2 | C2I ) = 0
(A.22)
Pooling on dog whistling makes voters uncertain about C1γ given whichever message they
hear. By assumption, g ∈ (0, 1), so there are no prior beliefs that, after updating, make
voter posterior beliefs equal 1 or 0. For voters, then, any chance C1γ = vβ makes the
expected utility of voting for C1 higher than the utility of voting for C2 when C2γ 6= vβ.
This yields the following best responses for out- and in-group voters:
BRvO(C2γ , µO) =
 C1 if h ∈ {o, i} & C2IC2 if h ∈ {o, i} & C2O (A.23)
BRvI (C2γ , µI) =
 C1 if h ∈ {o, i} & C2OC2 if h ∈ {o, i} & C2I (A.24)
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Table 21: Utilities for Combinations of Candidate Types and C1 Messages
Candidate 1 Type Candidate 1 Message Candidate 2 Type Candidate 1 Utility
C1O sw C2O vI
si vI
so vI
C1O sw C2I vO
si vO
so vO
C1I sw C2O vI
si vI
so vI
C1I sw C2I vO
si vO
so vO
A.3.7 C1 Utilities
Using the voter best responses, Table 21 shows C1’s utility under permutations of message
and C2 type.
For any pair of message and C2γ , C1 obtains the same utility, regardless of the message
sent. This occurs because voters know C2γ with certainty and voter for her when vβ = C2γ ,
and will take any positive gamble on C1γ when vβ 6= C2γ .
The above argument shows that there is an equilibrium where C1γ sends sw for
γ ∈ {O, I}, supported by voter actions given in Equations (A.16) and (A.17) and beliefs
as given in Equation (A.14).
Together, there are thus three equilibria where C1γ pools on messages, one each for
sending s{i, o, w}.
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A.4 PROOFS OF TWO-DIMENSION MODEL RESULTS
This version of the model has two dimensions that characterize the candidates and the
voters: one ideological dimension, one group dimension. In addition, there is a weighting
on the voters’ ideological dimension, denoted α, that allows for voters to be more or less
ideological, relative to their group. That is, when there is exactly one dimension on which
the voter and the candidate are not equal, an α > 1 indicates the voter prefers voting
for a candidate whose ideology matches his but does belong to the voter’s group. An
α < 1 indicates the opposite: with exactly one mismatched dimension between voter and
candidate, the voter prefers the candidate that matches him on the group dimension. An
α = 1 indicates indifference.
A.5 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4: ONE TYPE OF C1 WHISTLING
There exist equilibria where the type of C1 that perfectly matches the type of C2 (C1τ,γ =
C2τ,γ ), and only that type of C1, uses a dog whistle, while all other types of C1 (C1τ,γ 6=
C2τ,γ ) reveal their true ideological and group types.
A.5.1 Strategy
C1’s strategy in this proposed equilibrium is to use a dog whistle if, and only if, her type
is the exact same as C2’s type:
σ(C1τ,γ ) =
 sx,y = {τ, γ} if C1τ,γ 6= C2τ,γsx,y = {τ, w} if C1τ,γ = C2τ,γ (A.25)
A.5.2 Voter Beliefs and Best Responses
Updating on beliefs occurs in the standard manner, following Bayes’ Theorem. When only
one candidate type uses a dog whistle, voter beliefs shift from the common priors over
112
group-type to specific beliefs that are functions of the voter groups’ differing probabilities
of hearing a candidate claim in-group status (hx,y = {τ, i}). Consider the case where C1M,I
chooses the strategy σ(C1M,I ) : sx,y = {m,w}, while all other types choose σ(C1¬MI ) :
sx,y = {τ, γ}. Then the voter beliefs are given as:
µI(C1M,I | hm,i) = (1−g)pt(1−g)pt+tg
µI(C1M,I | hm,o) = (1−g)(1−p)t(1−g)(1−p)t+gt
µO(C1M,O | hm,i) = (1−g)qt(1−g)qt+gt
µO(C1M,O | hm,o) = (1−g)(1−q)t(1−g)(1−q)t+gt
(A.26)
The calculations for all permutations of voter types, candidate types, and messages are
similar.
Voters always cast votes for the candidate they believe will maximize their utility.
In this version of the model, however Considering the beliefs noted in Eq. (A.26), voter
expected utility is straightforward. Since the proof proceeds by enumeration, first consider
the case where C1 is competing against a C2E,O . Again, C2’s type is fixed and known, and
C2 sends a message that equals her true type by assumption. Considering the equilibrium
strategy, this means that C1E,O sends sx,y = {e, w}, all other types of C1 send sx,y = C1τ,γ .
Table 22 shows voters’ expected utilities for voting for C1, given the message they
hear. The maximum utility for each voter is found by comparing values across rows. The
full share of voters C1E,O wins given what the voters hear is found by comparing the
column value under the candidate type/message pair and comparing it to what the voter
would get by voting for C2E,O . Note that, for voters, the utility ranking is clear for most
cases – (0 > −1 > −1− α) – but sometimes depends on comparing α and −1, since α is
allowed to be greater or lesser than −1.
Completing Table 22 and comparing utilities for each possible combination, including
considering the potential value for α, results in the (rather ungainly) best response
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function for the voter shown in Equation (A.27):
BRvθ,β (σ(C1τ,γ ), C2τ,γ , µ) =

C1 if hx,y = vθ,β & C2τ 6= vθ
C1 if hx,y = vθ,β & C2τ,γ 6= vθ,β
C1 if hx = vθ or hy = vβ & C2τ 6= vθ
C1 if hx 6= vθ = C2τ & hy = vβ 6= C2γ & α ≥ 1
C1 if hx = vθ & C2γ 6= vβ & α ≥ 1
C1 if hy = vβ & C2τ 6= vθ & α < 1
1/2 if hx,y = vθ,β & C2τ,γ = vθ,β
1/2 if hx,y 6= vθ,β & C1τ,γ = C2τ,γ
C2 if hx 6= vθ or hy 6= vβ & C2τ,γ = vθ,β
C2 if hx,y 6= vθ,β & C2τ = vθ, or C2γ = vβ , or both
C2 if hx 6= vθ = C2τ & hy = vβ 6= C2γ & α < 1
C2 if hx = vθ & C2γ 6= vβ & α < 1
C2 if hy = vβ & C2τ 6= vθ & α ≥ 1
(A.27)
This function shows which candidate the voter selects, given the combination of what
the voter hears in each of the dimensions of the message, and how those align with C2’s
types in both dimensions. The first line, then, says that voters will choose C1 when
they hear a message that says C1 matches the voter’s type on both dimensions, and C2
is a mismatch on the ideological dimension (C2τ 6= vβ). The second line indicates that
voters will choose C1 when they hear that same message in line 1, and C2 differs from
the voter on both dimensions. Third, voters will choose C1 if the message they hear
matches one, but not necessarily both, dimensions, while C2 differs from the voter at
least on the ideological dimension. This is, in effect, a weakening of the statement in the
first line. It is spelled out here for clarity, and to make the derivation of the candidate
utilities transparent. All the choices in this function thus indicate where matches (and
mismatches) between the message heard and the incumbent C2 produce votes for either
C1 or C2.
A.5.3 C1 Utilities
The utility to C1 for sending a clear message (no whistling) is simply the sum of those
voters that choose the challenger after hearing a particular message. Obviously, then, if
C1 uses a whistle, the candidate’s share of voters depends on the proportion of each group
that hear one part of the whistle or the other. Again there are numerous permutations of
candidate types and possible messages, so I continue the previous example, then show the
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Table 23: Utilities for Each Type, Given Message and C1’s Strategy
α < 1 α ≥ 1
UC1M,O (sm,o) = vM,O + vM,I = vM vM
UC1M,I (sm,i) = vM,O + vM,I = vM vM,I + vE,I = vI
UC1E,O (se,w) = Eq.(A.28) Eq. (A.28)
UC1E,O (se,o) =
1
2
1
2
UC1E,I (se,i) = vM,I + vE,I = vI vI
general result. Again, set C1E,O = C2E,O , and let σ(C1) : {sx,y = {e, w} if C1E,O and sx,y =
{τ, γ} otherwise}. In that case C1E,O wins those voters that prefer the message they hear
over the clear message sent by C2E,O , and splits those voters that are indifferent between
the two. Thus, by sending se,w, C1E,O ’s expected vote share, minus the cost of the whistle,
is:2
1
2
(1− q)vM,O + 12(1− q)vE,O + 12(1− p)vM,I + 12(1− p)vE,I + pvM,I + pvE,I − c ⇒
1
2
(1− q)(vM,O + vE,O) + 12(1− p)(vM,I + vE,I) + p(vM,I + vE,I)− c ⇒
1
2
(1− q)vO + 12(1− p)vI + pvI ⇒
1
2
(1− q)vO + 12(1 + p)vI − c
(A.28)
Evaluating Table 22 for all voter choices produces Table 23, which shows the utilities for
each type of C1 under this strategy.
Comparing the utilities in Table 23 yields the constraints for supporting the proposed
equilibrium. For example, C1E,O prefers sending se,w to sending se,o when
1
2
(1− q)vO +
1
2
(1 + p)vI − c ≥ 12 ⇒ c < pvI−qvO2 . To guarantee C1E,O does not switch to message se,i
(lying on the group dimension, yielding the utility noted for this message in Table 23,
minus λ), pvI−qvO
2
> vI − λ⇒ λ > (2−p)vI−qvO2 > c.
2Recall that the space for voter types is partitioned into mutually exclusive groups, and so can be
summed across ideology or group identity: vM,O + vE,O = vO, vM,I + vM,O = vM , and so on
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Table 24: Constraints for c and λ to Support Proposed Equilibrium
Candidate Message Conditions
C1M,O(sm,o) λ >
1
2
− vM , λ > vE,I − vM,O, λ > vE,I−vM,O2 , c > pvE,I − qvM,O
C1M,I (sm,i) λ >
1
2
− vM , λ > vE,O − vM,I , λ > vE,O−vM,I2 , c < pvI−qvO2
C1E,O(se,w) c < pvM,I + pvE,I
C1E,I (se,i) λ >
1
2
− vE, λ > vM,O − vE,I , λ > vM,O−vE,I2 , c > qvM,O − pvE,I
In addition to C1E,O sending a whistle, the other types must prefer to not use a whistle.
Consider C1M,O sending sm,w in the proposed strategy. As with lying, voter beliefs are
such that they do not question the message they hear. C1M,O ’s utility is then:
UC1M,O (sm,w) = vM,O + vM,I − c if α ≥ 1
UC1M,O (sm,w) = (1− q)vM,O + vM,I + pvE,I − c if α < 1
(A.29)
Clearly, if α ≥ 1 then C1M,O will never use the dog whistle since it yields a strictly
lower utility. When α < 1, and voters prioritize the ideological dimension over the group
dimension, solving (A.29) for c yields the cost constraint c > pvE,I−qvM,O, which prevents
deviation by the other types to whistling.
Repeating this process for the other types of C1 when σ(C1) : {se,w if C1E,O and sx,y =
{τ, γ} otherwise}, produces a set of constraints for each type that all must be true (in
addition to the model primitives) to support the strategy in equilibrium. These conditions
are presented in Table 24. While there are 13 separate conditions, they do not preclude
finding a level of c and λ that satisfy them all. For example, let vθβ be distributed
uniformly, so that vM,O = vM,I + vE,O = vE,I = 0.25, and let p = 0.75 and q = 0.5. Then,
by substituting values in to the constraints, any 0.0625 < c < 0.375 and 0 < c < λ suffices
to support the equilibrium.
The proposed equilibrium requires a strategy chosen when C1τ,γ = C2τ,γ , which has
just been shown to hold for C1E,O = C2E,O . The process for the remaining three ”matching”
cases is the same as above. The symmetry in the results for the constraints can be seen
in Table 24. Rather than present three more tables of constraints, these are generalized
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Table 25: Constraints for c and λ to Support Proposed Equilibrium
Candidate Types Message Conditions
C1τ,γ = C2τ,γ C1τ,γ (sτ,w) c < Pr(hy = i | β)× vC1¬γ
C1τ,γ 6= C2τ,γ C1τ,γ (sτ,γ) λ >
1
2
− vC1τ ,
λ > vC1¬τ,¬γ − vC1τ,γ ,
c > Pr(hy = i | β)× (vC1¬τ,¬γ + vC1τ,γ )
and presented in Table 25, delineating when the voter types match or mismatch with
C1’s types. The entries in the table give the ways in which candidates may match each
other (or not), then the message C1 chooses, then a general statement on the conditions
required. For instance, the first line indicates that when C1τ,γ = C2τ,γ , and C1 sends a dog
whistle, then the cost of the whistle must be less than the probability that each group
type of voter hears the message hy indicates the candidate is claiming “in-group” status,
times the size of the voter group that is the opposite of C1’s group type. In words, the
cost of the whistle must be less than the size of the vote share C1 gains by inducing
uncertainty in voters of a different group type, drawing those voters to her side. Note
also that because λ > c by assumption, this condition on c is sufficient.
Therefore, there exist equilibria when C2’s type is fixed and known, C1 adopts the
strategy
σC1(C2τ,γ ) =
 m = {τ, w} if C1τ,γ = C2τ,γm = {τ, γ} otherwise , (A.30)
voter beliefs are as noted in Equation (A.26), voter actions are given by the best responses
in (A.27), α takes any value, and the constraints listed in Table 25 are satisfied.
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A.6 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5: NO PARTIAL OR FULL POOLING
DOG WHISTLING
There are three permutations of partial and full pooling. Types of C1τ,γ may pool
by ideological type, by group type, or fully pool on both dimensions. None of these
permutations are an equilibrium. The result for each of the three permutations is
analytically similar, so I group them in the paper. I work through the three cases in turn
below.
A.6.0.1 No Pooling by Ideological Type No equilibrium exists where each ideo-
logical type sends a whistle for their group membership, regardless of their true type.
A.6.1 C1 Strategy
Specifically, the candidate strategy for C1 is:
σC1(C1τ,γ ) : sτ,w ∀τ ∈ {M,E} (A.31)
The strategy indicates that both Extremist and Moderate types of C1 will send a message
revealing their true ideological type, and will always whistle their group type.
A.6.2 Voter Beliefs and Best Responses
Voters update beliefs in the standard Bayesian manner, where possible. Given C1’s
strategy, voters believe the ideological portion of the message, and learn nothing from the
group portion of the message: their posterior beliefs about group type are equal to their
prior beliefs. As an example, the posterior beliefs for any vM,O(C1τ,γ = {M,O} | hm,o) =
tg(1−q)
(tg(1−q))+(t(1−g)(1−q)) = g.
Voters always cast a vote for the candidate that maximizes their expected utility.
This is also the candidate that has the highest posterior probability of matching their
type. Voter utilities are calculated for each permutation of possible message heard and
types of C2. Table 26 shows these values for the case with C2E,O .
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Table 26: Expected Utilities for Voter Choice, Given Group-Based Dog Whistling
Candidates Voter Types
vM,O vM,I vE,O vE,I
EU(C1 | hm,o) = −µIα −µOα µO(−1) + µI(−1− α) µO(−1− α) + µI(−1)
EU(C1 | hm,i) = −µIα −µOα µO(−1) + µI(−1− α) µO(−1− α) + µI(−1)
EU(C1 | he,o) = µO(−1) + µI(−1− α) µO(−1− α) + µI(−1) −µIα −µOα
EU(C1 | he,i) = µO(−1) + µI(−1− α) µO(−1− α) + µI(−1) −µIα −µOα
EU(C2M,O ) = 0 −α −1 −1− α
EU(C2M,I ) = −α 0 −1− α −1
EU(C2E,O ) = −1 −1− α 0 −α
EU(C2E,I ) = −1− α −1 −α 0
The remaining cases are calculated in the same fashion. Together, they result in the
following best response function for the voter:
BRVθ,β(C2τ,γ , µ, µ) =

C1 if hx = C1τ = C2τ , hy 6= C2γ
C1 if hx = C1τ 6= C2τ , hy = C2γ & µI/µO < 1α
C1 if hx 6= vθ = C2τ & vβ 6= C2γ
C1 if hx = C1τ 6= C2τ & µI/µO < 1α
C1 if vθ 6= C2τ & vβ 6= C2γ
C2 otherwise
(A.32)
A.6.3 C1 Utilities
From Table 26 I construct Table 27, showing which voters would opt for C1, given the
message they hear. This table shows immediately that there is no equilibrium where C1
uses the strategy stated in A.31: sending a dog whistle yields the same result as a clear
message, but suffers a cost of λ. In addition, given the assumption c < λ, C1 would not
opt to lie on the ideological dimension (again, given the strategy proposed).
Thus, there is no equilibrium where C1 pools by ideological type on sending a dog
whistle.
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Table 27: C1 Utilities For Clear Messages and Dog Whistling
Message Candidate 2 Type Condition
{M,O} {M,I} {E,O} {E,I}
UC1M,O (sm,o) = vI vO − λ vM − λ vM − 2λ α < 11−g
UC1M,I (sm,i) = vI − λ vO vM − 2λ vM − λ α < 1g
UC1M,γ (sm,w) = vI − c vO − c vM − c vM − c
UC1E,O (se,o) = vE − λ vE − 2λ vI vO − λ α < 11−g
UC1E,I (se,i) = vE − 2λ vE − λ vI − λ vO α < 1g
UC1E,γ (se,w) = vE − c vE − c vI − c vO − c
A.6.4 No Pooling By Group Type
The analysis this Proposition is identical to the analysis for ideological types, substituting
the group-based indexing for the ideology-based indexing. There is no equilibrium where
C1 pools by group type on sending a dog whistle.
A.6.5 No Full Pooling
All types of C1 whistling on both dimensions means voters are uncertain about both
group types, learn nothing from the messages, and thus use their prior beliefs to select
which candidate to vote for. No value is gained from the whistle, and again there is a loss
of λ. Thus, there is no equilibrium where all types of C1 send sτ,w.
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APPENDIX B
BLAME AND CONCESSION
B.1 TIME-BASED AND PUNISHMENT-BASED LEARNING
EFFECTS
Subjects may learn to play the Staring Game differently during the course of the experiment.
If this occurs, and it affects the player’s choices in ways that undermine our hypotheses,
we must correct for them in the design of the experiment. In the case of time-based
effects, we might be concerned that players may alter their strategy as they improve.
Earlier rounds would then represent a different level of information than later rounds,
since players have deduced the “correct” way to play the staring game. The second
issue, punishment-based learning effects, suggests subjects play in one fashion until they
experience punishment themselves, then play differently afterwards. The subjects learn,
in other words, to be more punitive only when they have had points deducted. In this
appendix we address two sources of concern – time-based effects and punishment-based
effects – and show that they are not a problem.
B.1.1 Time-Based Learning Effects
Subjects that choose to concede do so more frequently during the last five seconds of the
Staring Game as the number of rounds increases. While they appear to understand the
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basic game at the outset, after the first rounds they prefer waiting to concede near the
end to conceding early.
Table 28 shows several probit models of this behavior. For each model, a player’s
choice to concede was categorized by either the exact or approximate time of concession.
In the first column, subjects were classified as stopping at “Any Extreme” if their choice
to concede was at t < 5 or t > 25. As noted in the main text, looking at time beyond the
very first and last second accounts for differing subject response times. The significant
coefficient shows that there is an increased probability to concede at one extreme or
another as the number of periods increases. The next models examine whether the
concessions are happening at one or both of these extremes. Columns 2 and 3 captures
those rounds where players concede either within the first five seconds (t = 0...4) or just
the first second, respectively. Clearly, concession at these times is not happening more
frequently in later rounds. Columns 4 and 5 perform a similar analysis for stopping in the
last five seconds (t = 26...30) and the last second, respectively. As the number of periods
grows, players are more likely to concede in the last five seconds, though not at the very
last second.
The presence of a time-based learning effect does not alter our substantive findings.
Our treatment – the introduction of observers – occurs after a number of rounds are
played, so that any effects present are constant for a player and stable during treatment.
In addition, subjects learn to play according to the predictions of the Staring Game
model.
B.1.2 Punishment-Based Learning Effects
Concerns about punishment-based effects are not warranted for this experiment. To show
this, we categorized each round for each subject as being before or after the first round in
which they received a deduction, then compared the use of punishment within subjects.
Table 29 shows the average deductions taken by observers, first in those rounds before
they received any punishment themselves, then after. T-tests show Punishment use is
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Table 28: Time-Based Learning Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Any Extreme First 5 Seconds First Second Last 5 Seconds Last Second
Period 0.11∗∗∗ 0.03 0.05 0.09∗∗ -0.06
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
Constant -0.31 -1.01∗∗∗ -2.41∗∗∗ -0.94∗∗∗ 1.99∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.23) (0.44) (0.21) (0.31)
ln(σ2u) -1.49
∗∗ -0.53 0.11 -0.92∗ -1.07
(0.49) (0.37) (0.52) (0.38) (0.68)
N (rounds) 398 398 398 398 398
N (subjects) 72 72 72 72 72
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
124
statistically equal in these two conditions, and across the targets of punishment (p < 0.2
for Player A, and p < 0.9 for Player B).
Table 29: Punishment Use Before and After Receiving First Deductions
Mean Punishment to A Mean Punishment to B
Pre-Punishment 16.7 17.5
(28.1) (28.8)
Post-Punishment 21.2 19.9
(32.8) (32.8)
Standard deviations in parentheses.
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APPENDIX C
INFORMATION TRANSMISSION
C.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
C.1.1 Hearings Data and Dependent Variable
Table 30 displays the number of hearings used in the final data set for this paper. This
is the total number of hearings that have agency representatives engaged directly with
committee chairs that were available via the Government Printing Office website; this is
not the total number of hearings held in each congress. As the table shows, the number
of hearings in the data set grows over time. This is likely due to both an increase in
the number of hearings being held as well as an increase in the number of hearings with
transcripts being made publicly available. (Numerous downloaded files have no content
beyond the list of members of the convening committee, and so are excluded from this
analysis.)
Figure 6 shows the distribution of the raw scores for the Speaker Specificity measure
developed in the paper. Recall that this score is bounded above by 0 and below by 1. The
distribution is normal, with a small spike just above 0. This occurs with speakers who
are not the primary witness, but interjected to give greetings or very simple responses to
questions.
Figure 7 shows the distribution of the main independent variable in the analysis: the
Within-Congress Speaker Specificity value transformed into a z-score. The data show a
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Table 30: Count of Hearings in Data Set by Congress Number and Chamber
Congress Chamber Count of Hearings
105 House 5028
Senate 1785
106 House 7978
Senate 3179
107 House 7814
Senate 7537
108 House 6052
Senate 6786
109 House 9522
Senate 8007
110 House 14650
Senate 8223
111 House 14695
Senate 7642
112 House 15452
Senate 6320
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Figure 6: Distribution of Raw Speaker Specificity Scores
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pronounced normality in distribution, probably owing to the large number of cases. The
specificity measure is, itself, noisy, but this noise does not appear to be biased in one
direction or another. The range of the variable is potentially infinite in both directions
from 0, but empirically falls between −4 and 5.
C.1.2 Independent Variables
Table 31 shows descriptive statistics for the key independent variables in the paper. The
first variable, Chair Interactivity, is derived from the textual hearing data. The other
variables either directly stem from, or are derived from, the data sources noted in the
paper.
C.2 MEASURING SPEAKER SPECIFICITY
This appendix provides a detailed description of the process of calculating speaker
specificity. The basic algorithm is taken from Li and Nenkova (2015), which should
be considered the primary source text, and should be referred to for further details.
I reproduce some basic information here for completeness and to assist the reader in
following the analysis. Moreover, some code used to develop the specificity scores were
made available by the authors on their website as the Speciteller tool.1
The function of the Speciteller tool, as an implementation of the result published in Li
and Nenkova (2015), is to take a single sentence and produce a measure of how general or
specific the sentence is. To do this, the authors rely on a corpus of sentences from several
sources (the Gigaword Corpus, data from Prasad et al. (2008), and the Penn Treebank) to
serve as a reference for co-training a categorization algorithm. Features of the sentences
are used as possible predictors: the number of words, the average number of characters
in a word, named entities (proper nouns and related words), word polarity, the inverse
document frequency of a word (rare words being more specific), and several others. These
1For those readers who cannot follow links from this document, the website is here:
http://www.cis.upenn.edu/ nlp/software/speciteller.html.
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Figure 7: Distribution of Transformed Speaker Specifity Scores
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Table 31: Summary Statistics for Key Independent Variables
Count Mean Std Min 25% 50% 75% Max
Chair Interactivity 130670 0.085 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.11 1.00
Ideological Distance 128529 0.39 0.22 0.00 0.22 0.39 0.55 1.19
Chair Seniority 130670 15.77 10.06 1.00 8.00 14.00 23.00 49.00
Majority Strength 130670 26.06 23.86 0 9 19 35 78
predictors are used in a logistic regression to classify them as either general or specific.
The results of the regressions are compared against the actual human codings (that is,
data is co-trained in semi-supervised process) to arrive at the best predictive model. In
this way, a single sentence can be assigned a score that is the posterior probability for the
specificity of a given sentence, and can be read as the probability of this sentence being
classified as specific is....
I then apply what Li and Nenkova (2015) note as Equation 1 to extend this classification
process to a whole set of sentences. The full process for arriving at a specificity score
for a single speaker is as follows. First, I parse apart a hearing according to the words
spoken by a single speaker. Given the interactive nature of hearings, a single person will
have associated text in multiple places. Fortunately, hearing text follows a set format for
identifying a speaker: an indented honorific, then a last name (sometimes hyphenated),
followed by a period and a blank space. For example, here is an exchange from legislative
hearing before the Subcommittee On National Parks, Recreation, And Public Lands Of
The Committee On Resources, U.S. House Of Representatives:
Mr. Roemer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I ask unanimous consent to have my entire
statement entered into the record along with facsimiles and explanations of historic
documents that we have from the Library of Congress.
Mr. Hefley. Without objection.
Mr. Roemer. Mr. Chairman, let me appropriately quote John Adams to start my
testimony[...]
From this exchange, using regular expressions in the Python programming language, I
can collect all the words spoken by, in this example, Mr. Roemer. I further split these
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statements by ending punctuation (periods or ellipses) to get a set of all the sentences –
call this set p, and each sentence s – spoken by one witness. From this set, I can use a
modification of Equation 1 in Li and Nenkova (2015)2:
Specificity(p) =
1∑
s∈(p) |s|
∑
s∈(p)
|s| × Pr(specific|s) (C.1)
The Specificity(p) is the score for each speaker I use as my dependent variable. With each
sentence denoted s, the length in words of each sentence is |s|. Finally, Pr(specific|s) is
the posterior probability calculated by the Speciteller process. Each speaker thus receives
a score that indicates the posterior probability that their whole testimony would be
considered specific or general, taking into account each sentence spoken, and normalized
by the amount the speaker spoke. This makes it possible to directly compare speakers
who give extensive testimony with those who give very little.
2The modification eliminates the process of comparing similar sentences in order to assess performance
of their process. The difference in the equation is dropping a subscript i for set p that indicates a pair,
the elements of which are to be used in the comparison.
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